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The present programme of studies investigated whether there is a positive 
emotional bias in the content of confabulation using the semantic-associates 
paradigm. This procedure comprises lists of semantically related items that are 
associated with a non-presented critical distracter. 
 
In three studies, 26 confabulating amnesia patients, 26 non-confabulating 
amnesia patients and 26 healthy controls were presented with the semantic-
associates task. In study 1, this procedure was employed to induce false recall 
and false recognition in response to studying lists of positive, negative and 
neutral word lists. In study 2, a facial expressions semantic-associates 
procedure was constructed to examine false recognition of pictorial items. In the 
final study, participants were induced into positive and negative mood using a 
video mood induction procedure to examine the effects of mood on false recall 
and false recognition.   
 
Confabulating patients showed a positive emotional bias and falsely recognised 
a higher proportion of positive unrelated intrusions compared with non-
confabulating patients and healthy controls. These findings suggested that 
confabulating patients’ tendency to produce pleasant false memories may 
represent a bias in general emotional processing.  
 
However, the positive bias was not found in the facial expressions task. This 
suggested that the distinctive characteristics in pictorial items may aid 
confabulating patients in the discrimination between studied items and non-
studied intrusions.  In addition, reduced false recognition of critical distracters in 
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both confabulating and non-confabulating patients was a marker for gist 
memory impairment in amnesia.  
 
Finally, the video mood induction procedure demonstrated that the positive bias 
in confabulating patients was enhanced by, but not specific, to negative mood. 
However, findings from a signal detection analysis indicated that confabulating 
patients showed a positive bias because their memory strength for positive 
material was significantly weaker compared with that of non-confabulating 
patients and healthy controls. Future studies would need to equate for 
differences in memory strength between controls and amnesia patients in order 
to provide stronger evidence that emotional factors are playing a role in the 



















 1.1. Introduction to Confabulation 
This review of the literature will begin by discussing the definition, classification 
and characteristics of confabulation. This will then relate to brain pathology and 
neuropsychological theories about the nature of the deficit in confabulation. In 
the later part of this review, recent work on the semantic-associates procedure 
will be considered as a measure of prompting false recall and false recognition 
in memory. The scant evidence that has been collected in these tasks in 
confabulation will also be considered in order to set out the goal of the present 
programme of studies.  
 
1.1.1. Definition  
Confabulation refers to false memories observed in the context of a neurological 
disorder (Korsakoff, 1889; Johnson et al., 2000). These memories may be 
entirely false or, in some cases, only partially incorrect (for example, the 
memory is correct but the time, place or temporal context is distorted) (Berlyne, 
1972; Kopelman, 1987). The current consensus is that confabulation is not 
intentional because confabulating patients are typically unaware of the 
inaccuracy of their memory output (Nadel & Moscovitch, 1997; Berrios, 2000). 
 
1.1.2. Classification 
Confabulation is commonly considered as a syndrome because of its varying 
manifestations (Schnider, 2003; Kopelman, 2010; Gilboa and Moscovitch, 
2002). Several classifications have been suggested in order to organise these 
varieties into meaningful groups. Early classifications categorised confabulation 
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into two types called ‘momentary’ and ‘fantastic’ confabulations. Momentary 
confabulations are real memories that are retrieved out of context whereas 
fantastic confabulations are bizarre and convey little or no relation to reality 
(Berlyne, 1972).  
 
An alternative, but overlapping, classification contrasts between ‘spontaneous’ 
and ‘provoked’ confabulations. Spontaneous confabulations are persistent and 
florid erroneous memories that arise without any provocation. In contrast, 
provoked confabulations arise in response to questions or tasks that test the 
patient’s memory (Kopelman, 1999).  
 
In a recent classification, Schnider (2008) organised the different varieties of 
confabulation into four meaningful types. Intrusion or simple provoked 
confabulations appear during memory tests whereas momentary confabulations 
are false statements that appear during conversations or questions. Fantastic 
confabulations are imaginative and sometimes implausible. Finally, 
spontaneous confabulations are grandiose and bizarre false memories that are 
persistent and occur without prompting the patient.  Schnider (2003) argued that 
spontaneous confabulations compel the patient to act on their distorted beliefs. 
Schnider explained that this characteristic distinguishes spontaneous 
confabulations from provoked confabulations, which appear in response to 
memory tests. 
 
Furthermore, Schnider and colleagues (2003) obtained findings that supported 
the distinction between spontaneous and provoked confabulations. They 
showed that spontaneous confabulations were typically observed after lesions 
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to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and contiguous areas including the basal 
forebrain and anterior limbic structures. In contrast, provoked confabulations 
were found in a variety of brain lesions and sometimes occurred in healthy 
individuals.  
 
Conversely, subsequent findings have shown that some patients produce both 
spontaneous and provoked confabulations concurrently. This led Gilboa and 
colleagues (2006) to question whether there is a genuine distinction between 
these two types of confabulations (Gilboa et al., 2006; Zannino et al., 2008). 
 
1.1.3. Characteristics 
Talland (1965) examined the clinical characteristics of confabulation in patients 
with alcohol-induced disproportionate memory impairment, a condition known 
as Korsakoff syndrome. One of these characteristics is that confabulating 
patients are unaware of their memory distortions, a condition known as 
anosognosia. Talland also reported that these patients sometimes acted on 
their confabulations. These patients believed their confabulations to be genuine 
accounts of their lives rather than imagined constructs.   
 
According to Talland, confabulations are typically self-referential experiences 
and relate to the patient. However, the validity of this characteristic was 
questioned when clinical findings showed that patients produced confabulations 
on personally-unrelated tasks (Kopelman, 1987; Wyke and Warrington, 1960). 
Subsequently, Moscovitch (1989) reformulated Talland’s characteristics to state 
that confabulations are more apparent in autobiographical recollection. This 
reformulation recognises that the mechanisms impaired in confabulating 
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patients are more strained when the patient is asked to recount 
autobiographical episodes, but that confabulations can also occur in other types 
of memory (Dalla Barba, 1997; Burgess and Shallice, 1996).  Dalla Barba 
(1993) found that patients produced most confabulatory responses to questions 
relating to episodic memory. These findings were consistent with subsequent 
results by Kopelman and colleagues (1997) showing that patients produced 
eight confabulatory statements on fifteen episodic questions.     
 
Although confabulating patients are unaware of the inaccuracy of their memory 
output, they can identify deterioration in their memory performance (for 
example, difficulty in remembering people’s names). Confabulation is 
associated with amnesia and often with acute confusion. Schnider and 
colleagues (2000) argued that patients stop confabulating over the course of 
time as they recover from temporal confusions in memory.  
 
1.1.4. Diagnosis 
Confabulations and delusions are syndromes that involve distorted beliefs about 
reality. This similarity caused intense controversy and produced two contrasting 
perspectives on the differential diagnosis of confabulations and delusions. One 
view is that there is a distinction between confabulations and delusions, and 
treats them as separate. According to this view confabulations are false 
memories observed in the context of a neurological disorder, whereas delusions 
are false beliefs observed in the context of a psychiatric illness (Mullen, 1986; 




Kopelman (2010) argued that delusions take many forms and can be observed 
in a variety of psychiatric disorders. For example, delusions of control (involving 
actions and emotions) and delusions of thought (concerning thought insertion or 
mind control) are first-rank symptoms of schizophrenia. On the other hand, 
delusions of worthlessness and self-accusation are sometimes found in 
depression. In contrast to confabulations, delusions do not always have a 
memory component. Some of the most commonly observed delusions are 
unrelated to memory. For example, the belief that thoughts are being controlled 
by an external force may be the result of abnormal biases in perception and 
attention. 
 
Coltheart and Turner (2010) put forward an opposing perspective. They noted 
that in both delusions and spontaneous confabulations there is a failure to 
disregard implausible thoughts. They argued that false memories that are 
produced without any provocation are examples of false beliefs and should be 
referred to as delusions rather than as spontaneous confabulations. Coltheart 
and Turner (2009) proposed that the neurological memory syndrome constitutes 
of only provoked confabulations. In contrast, Schnider and colleagues (2008) 
emphasised that spontaneous confabulations are genuine because they are 




Confabulation has often been observed in patients with Korsakoff syndrome 
(Mercer et al., 1977; Dalla Barba et al., 1990). This symptom has also been 
found in a variety of other pathologies, all of which involve memory impairment: 
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traumatic brain injury, dementia, encephalitis and subarachnoid haemorrhage 
(Dalla Barba, 1993, Nedjam et al., 2004; Mercer et al., 1977; Schnider et al., 
2005). However, confabulations not only occur in the context of a memory 
deficit, but have also been associated with damage to the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex (Schnider, 2008; Gilboa et al., 2006). 
 
The anatomical basis of confabulation has been typically studied using 
neuroanatomical lesion data. Gilboa and Moscovitch (2002) reviewed 39 
studies and assessed 79 confabulating patients. They found that the prefrontal 
lobes were damaged in 81% of these patients. In particular, lesions to the 
ventromedial and orbitofrontal aspects were common in these patients.  
 
Subsequently, Gilboa and colleagues (2006) conducted a study on twelve 
patients diagnosed with ruptures of an Anterior Communicating Artery (ACoA) 
aneurysm (Gilboa et al., 2006).  Four of the ACoA patients displayed evidence 
of a confabulatory syndrome. All patients were asked to recount four different 
stories from beginning to end. Findings showed that the confabulating ACoA 
patients tended to produce idiosyncratic details in the stories compared with 
non-confabulating ACoA patients. Gilboa and colleagues conducted a lesion 
analysis and found that the confabulating ACoA patients showed lesions in the 
ventromedial and orbitofrontal prefrontal surfaces of the frontal lobes (Gilboa et 
al., 2006). This finding was similar to Toosy and colleagues (2008) 
neuroimaging results. Toosy and colleagues conducted brain scans on a patient 
diagnosed with an autoimmune disease called Morvan's syndrome. 
Neuropsychological assessments indicated that this patient exhibited 
pronounced confabulatory symptoms and severe memory difficulties. The 
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imaging data on this patient showed abnormalities in the left medial temporal 
lobes but more particularly in the orbitofrontal regions of the brain. This finding 
coincides with the conventional view that the ventromedial and orbitofrontal 
cortex are damaged in confabulation (Schnider, 2008).  
 
Turner and colleagues (2008) investigated the prevalence and localisation of 
confabulation in 38 patients with frontal lesions. These patients were compared 
with 12 patients with posterior lesions and 50 healthy controls. The occurrence 
of confabulation was measured using a confabulation battery that included 
questions that probe personal episodic memory, semantic memory and 
orientation of time. Findings showed that patients with frontal lesions produced 
significantly more confabulations on this test compared with patients with 
posterior lesions and healthy controls. Furthermore, a lesion analysis within the 
frontal lobe showed that patients who confabulated on episodic questions had 
orbital, medial and left lateral lesions. In contrast, patients who confabulated on 
questions that probed orientation showed orbital, medial and right lateral 
damage. Patients who produced confabulations above the normal cut-off on the 
confabulation battery had lesions in the orbital or inferior regions of the anterior 
cingulate cortex. Turner and colleagues (2008) concluded that lesions to the 
frontal lobes are crucial for the development of confabulation than any other 
brain region. 
 
1.2. Theories of Confabulation 
Neuropsychological theories have been proposed to explain the mechanisms 
responsible for confabulations. There are currently four established 
explanations of confabulation. These are: (1) the temporality theory, (2) the 
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retrieval theory, (3) the constructive-memory framework and (4) the motivational 
theory. 
 
1.2.1. Temporality Theories 
The temporality hypothesis proposed that confabulation results from a distorted 
perception of time in the context of an amnesic syndrome. This theory explained 
that confabulating patients may remember the content of events but mistake 
their time of occurrence. Korsakoff (1889) proposed this hypothesis based on 
his observation that confabulation were often about events from past memories. 
Korsakoff postulated that recent memories are fragile and more likely to be 
forgotten in comparison to past memories. As past memories are more potent, 
they are often mistaken as new. More recently, two different explanations have 
emerged within the temporality perspective. 
 
1.2.1.2. Temporal Consciousness Theory   
Dalla Barba and colleagues (1993) proposed one explanation within the 
temporality perspective. They emphasised that the main impairment in 
confabulation is a distorted ‘temporal consciousness’ responsible for assigning 
memories to the correct time. This theory explained that confabulating patients 
are aware that their personal experiences comprise of a past, present and 
future. However, as confabulation is coupled with a memory deficit, there is a 
strain on temporal consciousness to perform a detailed search through 
autobiographical memory. Consequently, temporal consciousness is guided by 
the more stable memory traces (usually semantic memories). As a result, the 
confabulations produced often consist of the patients’ personal habits and 
established routines (Dalla Barba, 2009).  
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The temporal context theory has been supported by findings from observational 
studies. Dalla Barba and colleagues (1997) presented the case of a patient who 
started confabulating after lesions to the Anterior Communicating Artery 
(ACoA). Observations showed that the patient adhered more to her 
confabulations compared with her past experiences. This led to argue that the 
patient’s memory difficulties may be due to a temporal-consciousness deficit.  
 
Subsequently, Dalla Barba and colleagues (1998) examined a patient 
diagnosed with confabulation following cardiac arrest. The patient was 
presented a recognition task where she was asked to identify photographs of 
familiar people and events. Findings showed that the patient correctly 
recognised significantly more photographs of people and events from the fifties 
compared with photographs from later decades. Furthermore, the patient 
produced more confabulatory errors during the recognition of photographs from 
the eighties. These errors decreased during the recognition of photographs from 
earlier decades. Dalla Barba and colleagues concluded that confabulating 
patients employ the most stable traces from their memory. Recent memories 
are more fragile and are less stable compared with past memories. 
 
Limitation of the Temporal Consciousness Theory 
One limitation of the Temporal Consciousness theory is that it mainly derived 
from observations. However, Dalla Barba’s observational studies led him to 
develop the confabulation interview. This is a test designed to identify 
confabulations in separate areas of memory including; personal semantic 
memory, episodic memory, orientation and general semantic memory. This test 
is currently the most recognised and widely used in detecting confabulatory 
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symptoms in the clinical population (Dalla Barba, 1993). The present research 
adopted this procedure to examine confabulation in patients with memory 
disorders. 
 
1.2.1.3. Temporal-Context Confusion Theory 
Schnider and Ptak (1999) proposed the Temporal Context Confusion theory as 
an alternative explanation within the temporality perspective. The explanations 
provided by Schnider and Ptak referred to spontaneous confabulations. These 
are defined as bizarre erroneous memories that compel behaviour and occur 
without any provocation. According to this theory, spontaneous confabulations 
result from a failure to suppress irrelevant memories from intruding in the 
current reality. This theory emphasised that patients often confabulate about 
their past experiences and act on ideas that overlook their present 
circumstances (for example, an inpatient under medical care).  
 
Schnider and colleagues (1996) implemented a temporal context confusion task 
(TCC) to support their theory of confabulation. They skilfully designed a 
recognition memory task that consisted of two trials. For the first trial, 
participants were presented with pictures. Some of the pictures were repeatedly 
presented (targets) while the rest (distracters) were shown once. The 
participants were then asked to identify the pictures that were previously 
presented in the trial. Temporal context confusion was examined in the second 
trial when the same pictures were presented to the participants. In this 
condition, the distracters from the first trial were repeatedly presented. The 
targets from the first trial appeared once and were now the distracters in the 
second trial. Therefore, the first trial was a simple learning and recognition task. 
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In contrast, the second trial increased the level of intrusion in all groups when 
targets from the first trial were presented as distracters. The second trial 
measured whether retrieval was influenced by items recently presented or items 
that appeared in the first trial (Schnider et al., 1996).  
 
Schnider and colleagues (1996) presented the TCC task to confabulating and 
non-confabulating amnesia patients. They found that both groups showed a 
normal performance in the first trial. However, confabulating patients produced 
significantly more intrusions in the second trial compared with the non-
confabulating patients. This led to conclude that confabulation results from an 
incapacity to reject previous memories that are irrelevant in the current context.  
 
A follow-up study of the TCC task showed that performance on the second trial 
significantly improved in the patients who stopped confabulating. This finding 
increased the validity of the TCC task and supported the idea that temporal 
context confusion is an adequate explanation of confabulation (Schnider et al., 
2000). 
 
Limitations of the Temporal-Context Confusion Theory 
Subsequent studies produced findings that questioned the reliability of the TCC 
task. Gilboa and colleagues (2006) presented the TCC task to twelve patients 
diagnosed with anterior communicating artery aneurysm (ACoA). Four of the 
ACoA patients displayed confabulatory symptoms while the remaining eight 
patients were amnesic in the absence of confabulation. Results showed that all 
four confabulating patients’ underperformed on the TCC task. However, this 
was also observed in some non-confabulating ACoA patients. In contrast, 
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healthy controls showed a normal performance in this task. This suggested that 
temporal context confusions may be a feature of ACoA amnesia patients rather 
than specific to patients who confabulate (Gilboa et al., 2006).      
 
1.2.1.4. Limitations of the Temporality theories 
Limitations of the temporality theories have been reported in the literature. 
Moscovitch argued that a temporal disorder is just one of the symptoms of 
confabulation and is not an adequate explanation (Moscovitch, 1995).  
 
Another limitation for temporality theories is that a disordered sense of 
temporality has also been observed in non-confabulating patients. Difficulties 
recalling the temporal order of events have been observed in non-confabulating 
patients with frontal lobe lesions (Johnson et al., 1978; Vriezen and Moscovitch, 
1999).  In addition, Gilboa and Moscovitch (2002) argued that temporal disorder 
may not be the primary cause of confabulation. They believe that difficulty in 
remembering the temporal order of past events may be caused by a retrieval 
deficit (Gilboa and Moscovitch, 2002; Kopelman et al., 1997).  
 
1.2.2. Strategic Retrieval Theories 
Some theories postulated that confabulation is the result of a deficit in the 
retrieval system. These theories shared the view that confabulation is a memory 
deficit but differed on the specific faulty retrieval processes that may underlie 
confabulation (Burgess and Shallice, 1996; Gilboa and Moscovitch, 2002; 
Johnson et al., 1993; Kopelman, 1999; Mercer et al., 1977). There are currently 
three established explanations of confabulation within the retrieval perspective 
that are described below. These are: (1) the working with memory framework, 
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(2) the control process model of autobiographical reconstruction and (3) the 
constructive-memory framework.  
 
1.2.2.1. The Working with Memory Framework 
Moscovitch and Winocur (1992) hypothesized that confabulation is a 
consequence of frontal lobe dysfunction which affects the executive processes 
required for strategic search and the reconstruction of memories. Moscovitch 
and Winocur proposed the Working with Memory theory to explain 
confabulation. This theory described the processes that operate in order to 
retrieve memories. According to this theory, there are two types of retrieval 
processes: associative and strategic. Associative processes are automatic and 
are engaged when environmental cues interact with stored information. This 
interaction leads to the retrieval of the memory sought. However, if the cues are 
ineffective in finding the memory then strategic processes are needed for further 
memory search. The strategic process is active and relies on executive 
processes in order to organise the memory search and comprises the following 
stages: 
1. Supervising search in order to frame the memory problem and identify 
related cues to acquire the memory. 
2. The retrieved memory is monitored in order to determine its veracity. 
3. The retrieved memory is placed in the correct temporal-spatial context.  
 
Moscovitch and Melo (1997) applied the Working with Memory framework to 





1.2.2.2. Control Process Model of Autobiographical Reconstruction  
Burgess and Shallice (1996) argued that confabulation may be the result of 
deficits in the ‘descriptor’ processes that specify appropriate cues to guide 
memory retrieval. A defective specification may lead to an incorrect 
representation being mistakenly activated as the target memory. However, 
Burgess and Shallice explained that strategic search is just one of the disrupted 
memory processes in confabulators. They argued that confabulating patients 
may also have a monitoring deficit. They proposed that monitoring comprises 
two processes: ‘editing’ and ‘mediating’. 
1. Editing processes involve continuously checking the accuracy of the 
memory and comparing it to other retrieved memories.  
2. Mediator processes involve problem-solving used to monitor the general 
plausibility of the memory sought.  
 
Burgess and Shallice’s theory and the Working with Memory Framework both 
share the view that there is a strategic search deficit in confabulation. However, 
while the Working with Memory Framework postulate that a strategic search 
deficit underlies confabulation, Burgess and Shallice argue that strategic search 
is just one of the disrupted memory processes in confabulating patients. 
 
Burgess and Shallice (1996) explained that impaired editing processes result in 
confabulating patients producing memories without verifying their accuracy. 
Faulty mediator processes fail to check the plausibility of the retrieved memory 
processes which results in the production of bizarre confabulations. Burgess 
and Shallice concluded that a strategic search deficit and defective cue-memory 
associations are important processes but do not constitute a sufficient 
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explanation of confabulation. They argued that confabulations could also arise 
as a result of a failure to monitor and edit erroneous memories. 
 
Limitations of the Strategic Retrieval Models 
Dalla Barba (2009) argued that strategic retrieval models are based on 
processes that are difficult to verify. Furthermore, Schnider (2001, 2008) argued 
that the monitoring processes described by these models have not been 
clinically studied and lack experimental evidence. 
 
1.2.2.3. The Constructive Memory Framework 
Schacter and colleagues (1998a) proposed a Constructive Memory Framework 
as an alternative retrieval theory of confabulation. This theory emphasised that 
deficits in both encoding and retrieval processes may underlie confabulation. 
Schacter and colleagues explained that memories of previous events are 
conceptualised as patterns of features distributed across different regions of the 
brain. During encoding, the features of an event link together as a coherent 
representation. The stored events should sufficiently separate from each other, 
a process referred to as pattern separation. An overlap of bound events may 
result in a failure to recall item-specific information that differentiates each 
event. Consequently, individuals retrieve the general theme of the event. To 
avoid this memory distortion, retrieval processes formulate a focused 
description of the event, which activates event-related features. Monitoring 
processes are then required for the accurate retrieval of the context of the 
event. If events are not accessed separately at retrieval or the description of the 




All three strategic retrieval theories described above share the view that 
confabulation is the result of impairment to executive processes needed for 
memory construction (Moscovitch and Winocur, 1992; Burgess and Shallice, 
1996; Schacter et al., 1998a).  These impaired executive processes relate to 
strategic search or to the monitoring processes needed to guide retrieval.  
 
One limitation of these theories is that they do not explain why many 
confabulations alter the patients’ previous experiences so that they appear 
emotionally pleasant (Conway & Tacchi, 1996). 
 
1.2.3. Motivational Theories 
A difficulty for both the temporal and retrieval theories of confabulation is that 
they do not explain why the patients confabulate about a particular event over 
others. Clinical investigations have shown that the content of confabulation is 
usually self-referent and often relates to the patients’ autobiographical 
experiences and future goals (Fotopoulou et al., 2008a; Metcalf et al., 2009). 
Motivational theories share the view that emotional mechanisms influence the 
content of confabulation. However, theories within the motivational perspective 
have differed on what emotional factors determine the content of confabulation. 
There are currently three established explanations within the motivational 
perspective. These are: (1) the Gap-Filling Hypothesis, (2) the Premorbid 







1.2.3.1. The Gap-Filling Hypothesis 
An early motivational theory of confabulation is the ‘gap-filling’ hypothesis. This 
theory argued that confabulations are produced in order to fill the gaps in 
his/her memory and avoid the embarrassing feeling of not being able to 
remember personal events. Bonhoeffer (1901, cited in Talland, 1961) supported 
this view and suggested that confabulations are a response to a conscious 
compensatory mechanism. 
 
However, Nadel & Moscovitch (1997) rejected this view because the current 
consensus is that confabulations are not intentional or inherently strategic. 
Lorente-Rovira and colleagues (2011) pointed out that in the definition of 
confabulation, it is understood that confabulating patients lack awareness of 
their memory deficit. Furthermore, Dalla Barba and colleagues (1993) 
presented confabulating patients with a set of questions where the answers are 
generally unknown (e.g. “how many Renault cars were sold in 1985?”). Similar 
to healthy controls, most confabulating patient responded with I-don’t-know 
answers. These findings rejected the gap-filling hypothesis and supported the 
notion that confabulations are produced unconsciously by the patient and are 
not contrived.   
 
1.2.3.2. Premorbid Personality Theory 
Williams and Rupp (1938) proposed an alternative motivational theory. They 
emphasised that confabulations are partly motivated by the patients’ premorbid 
personality traits. Talland (1961) agreed with this view and suggested that 
confabulations are determined by an interaction between the amnesic deficit 
and the patients’ dispositions. 
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The relationship between confabulation and premorbid personality traits has 
been observed in a series of clinical studies. These studies found that 
confabulating patients were often described by their relatives as introverts 
(Weinstein and Kahn 1955; Weinstein et al., 1956).     
 
One limitation of this theory is that it does not explain how personality traits 
interact with the memory deficit and lead to the production of confabulations 
(Lorente-Rovira et al., 2011). 
 
1.2.3.3. The Self-Memory System Framework 
A current motivational theory emphasised that confabulation may be determined 
by both cognitive and emotional mechanisms (Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 
2000). This theory suggested that memory and executive mechanisms interact 
with processes that construct self-identity. This interaction is referred to as the 
self-memory system (SMS). 
 
According to this theory, autobiographical memories are constructed within a 
SMS. Autobiographical memories are constructed from a knowledge database 
and are monitored by executive processes. Personal goals are produced by the 
working self and control access to the knowledge database by modifying 
executive processes. The SMS is composed of an interaction between the 
autobiographical knowledge database and the working self. It is postulated that 
a disruption to the interaction between these two components may lead to 
confabulations and other memory distortions (Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 
2000; Conway, 2005). The functions of these components are described below.  
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The Autobiographical Knowledge Database 
The Autobiographical Knowledge Database comprises of knowledge about the 
self. This information is organised into three categories:  
- Lifetime periods: general knowledge about a time in the individual’s life 
based on a particular theme. For example, starting college (college 
theme) or a period spent abroad (holiday theme). 
 
- General events: knowledge about a set of events that share a common 
theme. For example, winning a race or passing exams are events that 
represent achievements.  
 
- Event-specific knowledge: detailed knowledge of events that relate to 
personal goals. These include events that have led to planning goals and 
events that currently guide behaviour.   
 
These categories form a hierarchical structure in the knowledge database. 
Knowledge about lifetime periods produces cues that elicit the retrieval of 
general events, and knowledge about general event activates event-specific 
knowledge. This pattern of activation gives access to all three knowledge 
categories and leads to the construction of autobiographical memories. 
Nevertheless, the production of autobiographical memories can be inhibited by 
executive mechanisms. Consequently, personal goals of the working self can 
constrain access to the knowledge database by modifying executive processes 





The Working Self  
Memories processed in the knowledge database are evaluated by the working 
self before they are constructed and retrieved. The working self refers to a 
hierarchy of personal goals or self-representations that modulate the 
construction of specific memories. The goal hierarchy operates by controlling 
processes that determine accessibility of pre-existing knowledge. The main 
function of the working self is to assign accessibility of knowledge to memories 
that favour personal goals in order to achieve coherence between currently 
active goals (Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000).   
 
Another feature of the working self is that it rejects any knowledge that attempts 
to modify currently active goals. It is argued that changing current goals can be 
emotionally stressful and reduces the ability to operate effectively in the world. 
The coherence between current goals becomes disrupted and gives rise to 
discrepancies among three self-representations: the ‘actual self’ (are 
representations of one’s self-identity), the ‘ideal self’ (are representations of 
one’s personal goals) and the ‘ought self’ (are representations of how one 
should behave) (Higgis, 1987). The working self reduces self-discrepancies by 
inhibiting accessibility of memories that conflict with the goal hierarchy. These 
memories are altered or false memories are produced to support current goals 
in order to achieve coherence (Conway, 2005).  
 
Nevertheless, goals that are unrealistic and oppose the knowledge database 
are rejected. For example, an individual’s goal of winning a football match is not 
accepted if knowledge about his/her skills cannot be remembered. Therefore, 
the autobiographical knowledge database constrains the goals in the working 
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self. Goals that are plausible and based on accurate memories are maintained. 
Goals that conflict with the knowledge database indicate a dysfunction of the 
SMS. Accordingly, the construction of memories may be modulated by 
implausible goals and result in the production of confabulations.  
 
Conway and Tacchi (1996) had previously reported a patient who displayed 
confabulatory behaviour following a closed head injury that damaged the 
temporal and frontal brain regions.  The patient showed a tendency to produce 
confabulations that altered present circumstances into a time of happiness. 
Conway and Tacchi argued that the patient’s memory distortions are the result 
of dysfunction to executive processes. Consequently, there is a disruption to 
autobiographical retrieval processes. This impairment also causes difficulties 
distinguishing memories from fantasies. In confabulating patients, fantasies are 
often mistaken as true because they serve to protect one’s well-being. 
   
The self-memory system framework has been applied to explain findings of the 
emotional biases in the content of confabulation. Evidence of the biases in 
confabulation is described below. 
 
Evidence of the positive emotional bias in confabulation 
There is very little research investigating the emotional content of confabulation. 
Recently, clinical observations of the positive bias in confabulations have 
emerged (Fotopoulou et al., 2008a; Fotopoulou et al., 2007a). These findings 
showed that confabulating patients contort past memories to be more positive 
and wishful in contrast to non-confabulating patients and healthy controls. For 
example, a confabulating patient may contort the reason for his hospital 
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appointment with a pleasant confabulation about coming to work or visiting 
relatives. Therefore, these patients wish to maintain a coherent personal 
account as healthy and self-sufficient. It is argued that patient’s wish for self-
coherence may be due to a dysfunction of executive processes that guide the 
construction of memories based on the patient’s reality. This deficit distorts the 
correspondence between memory and reality demands in a manner that 
personal goals influence memory construction. As a result, the memories 
produced appear implausible and exaggerate one’s self-identity (Conway and 
Fthenaki, 2000; Conway and Tacchi, 1996; Fotopoulou et al., 2009).  
 
Furthermore, Bajo and colleagues (2010) examined the content of true and 
false memories in 24 confabulating amnesia patients. They found that naïve 
judges rated the majority of patients’ confabulations as either pleasant or 
unpleasant compared with ‘true’ memories. This study concluded that the 
content of confabulations have an emotional component but are not necessarily 
positive.   
 
Evidence of self-referent biases in confabulation 
Further observations have reported that the content of confabulation is 
frequently self-referent (Gilboa et al., 2006; Metcalf et al., 2010; Fotopoulou et 
al., 2008b). A selective bias to produce pleasant self-referent confabulations 
was observed in a prose recall task. Confabulating patients recalled the 
negative self-referent prose in a manner that represented a positive self-image. 
This selective bias was not observed when these patients recalled non-referent 
prose. This finding suggested that confabulating patients recall is prone to 
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motivational distortions due to deficits in the control and monitoring of retrieval 
processes.  
 
Comparatively, self-enhancement biases in autobiographical recollection have 
also been observed in older adults (Mather and Carstensen, 2005). Older 
patients often showed frontal brain impairments similar to confabulating 
patients. This suggested that the tendency to exaggerate one’s self-identity 
through memory reconstruction may be caused by a dysfunction to executive 
processes (Fotopoulou et al., 2009). 
 
Evidence of the relationship between low mood and positive confabulations 
Fotopoulou and colleagues (2008a) obtained paradoxical findings showing that 
positive confabulations are associated with depression. These results showed 
that the higher the patients’ rating on the depression scale, the greater the 
production of pleasant and self-enhancing confabulations. This correlation led 
Fotopoulou (2009) to suggest that confabulations are an adaptive or defensive 
function that serves to maintain self-esteem and a positive temperament. 
However, this explanation of confabulation raised doubts as clinical 
observations have consistently reported confabulations that convey a negative 
self-concept. For example, confabulations about the death of a relative have 
been reported in the literature (Metcalf et al., 2010; Gilboa, 2010). This 
suggested that the positive emotional bias in the content of confabulations is not 
universal (Metcalf et al., 2010).  Metcalf and colleagues (2010) concluded that 
the content of confabulations reflect a personal bias to retrieve memories that 
support past self-representations in order to maintain self-coherence. These 
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past self-representations can be either positive or negative and are congruent to 
the individuals past experiences (pleasant or unpleasant). 
 
1.2.3.4. Limitations of the Motivational Theories 
One limitation of the motivational account of confabulation is that it is based on 
very few experimental studies (Fotopoulou et al., 2008a; Fotopoulou et al., 
2008b; Metcalf et al., 2010; Bajo et al., 2010). In addition, studies examining 
motivational factors in confabulation used naïve judges to analyse the content 
of confabulations (Fotopoulou et al., 2004). These judges were asked to rate 
the emotional valence of each confabulation on a seven-point scale. Related to 
this, it has been argued that findings based on a rating system are vulnerable to 
biases (Hoyt, 2000). For example, rating whether a narrative is ‘somewhat 
positive’ or ‘positive’ is ambiguous and depends on the judges’ own 
interpretations. Several studies have shown biases in judgement and decision 
making (Kerr et al., 1996; Hilbert, 2012). These biases may lead to inaccurate 
results and reduce the validity of the study.  
 
Alternative experimental methods are yet to be introduced to investigate the 
emotional triggers of confabulation. As a result, the present research used the 
semantic-associates procedure to examine the emotional biases in 
confabulation. This procedure, also known as the Deese-Roediger-McDermott 
(DRM) procedure, was initially developed by James Deese (1959). This 
procedure was used to investigate the intrusion of non-studied words after 
learning semantically related word lists. Previous studies have employed this 
procedure in healthy controls and amnesia patients in order to examine 
systematic differences in false recall and false recognition in memory (Schacter 
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et al., 1998b; Melo et al., 1999; Ciaramelli et al., 2006). However, this procedure 
has not been previously used to examine the role of emotions in the content of 
confabulation. The semantic-associates procedure is described in detail below.  
 
1.3. Semantic Associates Procedure 
False recognition is a type of memory distortion that has received wide research 
interest. False recognition is a term used to define an erroneous assertion that a 
novel item was previously presented (e.g.: word, event or person). Previous 
research has consistently observed the false recognition phenomenon in the 
semantic-associates procedure.  
 
This procedure was first employed in the healthy population where participants 
were presented with 36 lists of words. Each list consisted of 12 word associates 
to one non-presented critical distracter. For example, the critical distracter 
‘butterfly’ formed this list of associates: moth, insect, wing, bird, fly, yellow, net, 
pretty, flower, bug, cocoon and colour. A free recall test was administered 
immediately after the presentation of each list. Findings using this procedure 
showed that healthy participants tended to produce a critical distracter in 
response to its association to the words on the list (Deese, 1959).  
 
Roediger and McDermott (1995) later replicated and extended the semantic-
associates procedure using recognition tests. They constructed 24 lists that 
each comprised 15 word associates from a critical distracter. Roediger and 
McDermott examined whether participants would falsely recall and falsely 
recognise critical distracters. After the free recall tests, participants were 
presented a recognition test where they were asked to respond ‘old’ or ‘new’ to 
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48 of the previously studied words. These words were selected from each of the 
16 study lists, from serial positions 1, 8 and 10. The recognition test also 
included 16 critical distracters and 8 non-studied words that were unrelated to 
the previously studied lists. Roediger and McDermott reported that participants 
produced a higher rate of false recognition (55%) than false recall (40%) for 
critical distracters (Roediger and McDermott, 1995). This finding was replicated 
when the procedure was carried out in different modalities where the lists of 
associated items were presented in written, auditory and pictorial conditions 
(Schacter et al., 1997; Ciaramelli et al., 2006; Koutstaal et al., 2001).  
 
Explanations for false recall and false recognition in the semantic-associates 
procedure 
Schacter and colleagues (1998a) argued that the false recall and false 
recognition effect produced by the semantic-associates procedure may be the 
result of a faulty pattern separation. Schacter postulated that studying lists of 
word associates causes the item representations to extensively overlap. 
Consequently, participants recall the gist of the list and fail to remember item-
specific information. This causes a difficulty in distinguishing between studied 
words and non-studied intrusions.  
  
Reyna and Brainerd (1995) proposed a similar explanation within the fuzzy-
trace theory. They suggested that information is encoded into two different 
memory traces: verbatim and gist. Verbatim traces are memory representations 
about the item-specific details of the studied item. Gist traces are 
representations about the overall theme of the studied items. In the semantic-
associates task, words that correspond to the theme of the list are favoured 
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because the gist traces are stronger. Consequently, critical distracters are 
falsely recalled because they evoke a strong sense of familiarity to the studied 
list.   
 
The semantic-associates procedure was subsequently employed in clinical 
populations. This procedure was often used to examine false recognition in the 
following groups of patients: 1) non-confabulating amnesia patients, 2) patients 
with frontal lobe lesions, 3) patients with false recognition syndrome and 4) 
confabulating amnesia patients.  
 
1.3.1. The Semantic Associates Procedure in Non-confabulating Amnesia 
Patients  
Schacter and colleagues (1998b) employed the semantic-associates procedure 
to examine false recognition in non-confabulating amnesia patients and healthy 
controls. As predicted, findings showed that non-confabulating amnesia patients 
recognised a significantly lower proportion of previously studied (target) words 
compared with healthy controls. However, the non-confabulating amnesia 
patients also falsely recognised a lower proportion of critical distracters 
compared with healthy controls. Interestingly, these patients falsely recognised 
more unrelated intrusions than critical distracters. These findings were 
replicated by further studies using the semantic-associates procedure. These 
studies concluded that non-confabulating amnesia patients have a tendency to 
show reduced false recognition to critical distracters compared with healthy 




1.3.2. The Semantic Associates Procedure in Patients with Frontal Lobe 
Lesions  
Previous studies have also observed high levels of false recognition in patients 
with frontal lobe lesions (Parkin et al., 1996; Schacter et al., 1996; Delbecq-
Derouesné et al., 1990).  They argued that this memory distortion, called the 
false recognition syndrome, is not necessarily related to spontaneous 
confabulation. In contrast to confabulation, patients with false recognition 
syndrome show relatively intact episodic memory. These studies found that the 
rate of false recognition in these patients increased when the test items were 
related to the overall theme of the studied list. This suggested that any item that 
evoked a sense of familiarity was falsely recognised.  
 
Subsequent studies using the semantic-associates procedure found that 
patients with Alzheimer's disease showed elevated levels of false recognition 
across repeated trials compared with healthy controls (Balota et al., 1999; 
Budson et al., 2000). Budson and colleagues (2002) postulated that the frontal 
lobe impairment that coincides with Alzheimer's disease may be responsible for 
the high rate of false recognition in these patients. To examine this hypothesis, 
Budson and colleagues (2002) examined false recognition in patients with 
frontal lobe lesions and age-matched healthy controls. The two groups were 
presented with the semantic-associates procedure across repeated study-list 
trials. Patients with frontal lobe damage showed increasing levels of false 
recognition across the trials. In contrast, healthy controls showed reduced false 
recognition the more trials they did. These findings led to suggest that 
impairment of the frontal lobes may be contributing to Alzheimer's patients’ 
failure to suppress false recognition across repeated trials.  
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1.3.3. The Semantic Associates Procedure in Confabulating Amnesia 
Patients  
Melo and colleagues (1999) administered the semantic-associates procedure to 
three different groups of patients: 1) amnesia patients with medial temporal lobe 
(MTL) damage, 2) amnesia patients with frontal lobe damage and 3) non-
amnesic patients with frontal lobe damage. Three out of the four patients in the 
frontal lobe amnesia group were diagnosed as exhibiting confabulatory 
symptoms during the time of the study. This study found that both MTL amnesia 
patients and frontal lobe amnesia patients showed reduced false recognition to 
critical distracters, but increased levels of false recognition to unrelated 
intrusions. Therefore this study showed that reduced false recognition to critical 
distracters is a tendency found in both confabulating and non-confabulating 
amnesia patients. The results from this study contrast with the findings obtained 
in patients with false recognition syndrome. While confabulating patients 
showed reduced false recognition (Melo et al., 1999; Ciaramelli et al., 2006), 
patients with false recognition syndrome showed an increased rate of false 
recognition (Schacter et al., 1996; Parkin et al., 1996; Delbecq-Derouesné et 
al., 1990). Therefore these findings suggest that confabulation and the false 
recognition syndrome may be two separate memory disorders.  
 
Ciaramelli and colleagues (2006) conducted a similar study using the semantic-
associates procedure. They examined false recognition between three groups 
of amnesia patients: 1) confabulating amnesia patients with ventromedial 
lesions, 2) non-confabulating amnesia patients with frontal lesions and 3) 
amnesia patients with non-frontal lesions. These three patient groups were also 
compared with a healthy control group. All three groups of amnesia patients 
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falsely recognised a lower proportion of critical distracters compared with 
healthy controls when presented with the “standard” semantic-associates 
procedure. There were no significant differences between the amnesia groups 
on the rate of false recognition to critical distracters. However, the confabulating 
group falsely produced significantly more unrelated intrusions compared with 
the non-confabulating patients with non-frontal lesions (Ciaramelli et al., 2006). 
Therefore, this study supports Melo’s finding that confabulating patients show 
increased levels of false recognition to unrelated intrusions, but reduced false 
recognition to critical distracters.  
 
Explanations for false recall and false recognition in the amnesic population 
Schacter and colleagues (1996) postulated a deficit in non-confabulating 
amnesia patients’ gist representation. They suggested that healthy participants 
form a link between the words in the studied list and construct a coherent gist 
representation. As critical distracters fit the gist representation, they elicit a 
strong sense of familiarity and are often falsely recognised as previously studied 
words. In contrast, non-confabulating amnesia patients retain limited gist 
information and form a weak link between the studied words. This impairment 
makes it difficult for amnesia patients to remember the previously studied list.  
As non-confabulating amnesia patients have a poor gist representation, they 
are less susceptive to critical distracters compared with healthy controls. During 
the recognition test, this poor gist representation causes a difficulty in 
distinguishing between studied and non-studied words. Schacter and 
colleagues gist memory theory derived from a series of studies examining false 
recognition in non-confabulating amnesia patients using the semantic-
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associates procedure. Therefore, this theory does not relate to confabulating 
amnesia patients.    
 
Koutstaal and colleagues (1999) suggested that false recall and false 
recognition of critical distracters may be due to source confusions in the 
standard semantic-associates paradigm. In this procedure, the studied lists are 
presented in auditory or written form. They argued that when presented with a 
list of semantically related words, elaborative processes may “generate” the 
critical distracter during encoding and/or retrieval. Consequently, participants 
confuse the origin of the critical distracter in terms of whether the word was 
previously studied or spontaneously generated. Koutstaal and colleagues 
postulated that amnesia patients may show reduced false recall and false 
recognition of critical distracters due to an inability to generate the critical 
distracter during learning and/or retrieval.   
 
Koutstaal and colleagues (2001) examined whether non-confabulating amnesia 
patients low rate of false recognition is due to a gist memory deficit. They 
argued that pictorial and visual modalities provide distinctive perceptual 
information and reduce any possible source confusions. They also argued that, 
unlike the standard semantic-associates paradigm, this procedure provides a 
clear measure of gist-based false recognition because the conditions of 
conceptual and perceptual similarly provoke false recognition. On this basis, 
Koutstaal and colleagues presented a pictorial semantic-associates task to non-
confabulating amnesia patients. Patients were presented with pictures of 
common items in each category (for example: birds, teddy bears or flowers). 
Subsequently, these patients were presented with a recognition test that 
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comprised previously studied pictures, unrelated pictorial intrusions and 
category-related pictorial distracters. Findings showed that the non-
confabulating amnesia patients falsely recognised significantly less category-
related distracters compared with controls. Koutstaal and colleagues concluded 
that these findings support the notion of gist memory impairment in non-
confabulating amnesia patients (Koutstaal et al. 2001).  
 
Israel and Schacter (1997) used the pictorial semantic-associates paradigm in a 
series of experiments and found that this procedure reduced false recognition of 
critical distracters compared with the standard procedure where words were 
used instead of pictures. Israel and Schacter suggested that limited access to 
item-specific information in the standard semantic-associates procedure 
contributes to false recognition. They argued that the studied items in the 
pictorial semantic-associates procedure comprise of distinctive perceptual 
representations that reduces the rate of false recognition. However, the pictorial 
semantic-associates procedure has not been examined in confabulating 
amnesia patients. The present research constructed a pictorial semantic-
associates procedure using emotional facial expressions in order to examine 
whether confabulating patients would show the positive emotional bias when 
the studied items are pictorial. The present study aimed to address whether 
confabulating patients low rate of false recognition is due to degraded gist 
memory. 
 
The present research also aimed to examine whether pictorial information 
reduces false recognition in all three groups of participants.  To address this, 
the present research compared false recognition data between study 1 and 
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study 2. In study 1, the associates list comprised of written words while study 2 
comprised of facial expressions.  Based on Israel and Schacters’ theory that 
pictorial information reduces false recognition, the present study investigated 
whether participants’ rate of false recognition is significantly lower in study 2 
compared with study 1.    
 
Recently, Ruci and colleagues (2009) examined mood congruent false 
memories in healthy participants using the semantic-associates procedure. 
They used positive, negative and neutral word lists from Roediger and 
colleagues (2001). They induced participants into negative and positive mood 
states by asking them to read a story entitled the ‘The Lottery Ticket’. 
Participants were also asked to use their imagination in order to simulate the 
emotions that were being depicted in the story. They found that participants 
falsely recognised more critical distracters that matched the mood state induced 
during the time of learning the studied lists. This affective method has not been 
previously used in the clinical population. The present study similarly uses 
Roediger and colleagues (2001) positive, negative and neutral studied lists to 
examine the positive emotional bias in confabulating amnesia patients.   
 
Some of the key theories and evidence described in the previous sections are 









To summarise, Fotopoulou and colleagues (2009) suggested that the content of 
confabulation is positive and self-enhancing. They also argue that 
confabulations serve to protect the patients’ well-being from difficult and 
emotionally distressing situations. This view has been contradicted by evidence 
that showed confabulations sometimes conveyed unpleasant self-concepts 
(Metcalf et al., 2010; Gilboa, 2010). To conclude, there is inconsistent evidence 
regarding the role of emotions in confabulation. Furthermore, current research 
methods examining the emotional content of confabulations are vulnerable to 
inaccuracies. These studies ask naïve judges to evaluate the emotional valence 
of confabulations. Biases in judgment may influence the naïve judges’ 
interpretations and lead to inaccurate findings. On this basis, alternative 
research methods are needed to investigate the emotional triggers of 
confabulation (Fotopoulou et al., 2008a). The semantic-associates procedure 
has been employed to induce confabulatory responses in both the healthy and 
clinical population. To date, this procedure has not been implemented to 
examine the content of confabulation. Therefore, the present research aimed to 
examine the emotional biases in the content of confabulations using the 
semantic-associates procedure. The present research modified the semantic-
associates procedure to incorporate affect using positive, negative and neutral 
associates to non-presented critical distracters.      
 
Related to this, Koutstaal and colleagues (1999) argued that the standard 
semantic-associates procedure may evoke source confusion that result in false 
recall and false recognition of critical distracters in healthy participants. The 
contrasting findings observed in non-confabulating amnesia patients’ may be 
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due to a failure to generate the critical distracter. On this basis, Koutstaal and 
colleagues (2001) constructed the pictorial semantic-associates procedure to 
reduce source confusions because pictorial information is more conceptually 
detailed and enhance encoding processes. Using the pictorial semantic-
associates procedure, Koutstaal and colleagues found that non-confabulating 
amnesia patients falsely recognised a lower proportion of category-related 
distracters in contrast to controls. These findings led Koutstaal and colleagues 
to support the notion of degraded gist memory in amnesia. However, previous 
studies have not examined the pictorial semantic-associates procedure in 
confabulating amnesia patients. The present research used emotional facial 
expressions to construct a pictorial semantic-associates procedure in order to 
examine whether pictorial information influences the positive emotional bias in 
confabulating amnesia patients. 
 
Furthermore, Fotopoulou and colleagues (2008a) found an association between 
depressed mood and pleasant confabulations. This led them to suggest that 
confabulations serve to maintain the patients’ well-being. However, these 
findings indicate an association between mood and confabulations and do not 
address whether pleasant confabulations are caused by negative mood states. 
Therefore, the present research also aimed to investigate the effects of mood 
on the content of confabulation. Participants were induced to positive and 





In conclusion, an affective semantic-associates procedure was employed in 
three separate studies to address the aims below. The methods used to 
address these aims are described in the next chapter: 
1. To examine emotional biases in content of confabulation. 
2. To examine the positive emotional bias in confabulation using a pictorial 
semantic-associates procedure. 

























2.1. Introduction to Methods 
This chapter will begin by discussing ethical approval, background 
neuropsychological tests, and the inclusion and exclusion criteria that were 
involved in the current set of studies. In the later part of this chapter, the 
experimental procedures and the statistical analyses employed for each of the 
three studies will be discussed.  
 
2.2. Research Ethics Approval 
The North West London Ethics Committee granted the present research project 
a favourable ethical opinion. With regard to the specific issue of patients who 
lack capacity under the Mental Capacity Act (2005), the committee stated that 
informed consent must be sought from the patient’s next-of-kin. The committee 
also stated that if the patient is thought to have gained the ability to give 
informed consent during the time of the study, the researcher must go through 
the information sheet with them and seek a written consent retrospectively. If 
the patient wished to withdraw, their research data must be destroyed. The 
researcher adhered to these protocols successfully. Subsequently, two 
substantial amendments were also approved which granted the permission to 
recruit patients from the Care Plus Partnership rehabilitation centre and use 
patients’ clinical MRI scans for the purposes of the research. The present 
research was also granted R&D approval from each recruitment site. Site-
specific approval was also granted for this research by Camberwell St Giles 
Ethics Committee, which gave permission to recruit healthy volunteers from 
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King’s College London. The ethics committee and the R&D offices received 
annual monitoring reports regarding the research.    
 
2.2.1. Recruitment sites 
Patients were recruited from the following NHS Foundation Trusts: South 
London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust, Guys’ and St. Thomas’ NHS 
Foundation Trust and the Edgware Brain Injury Rehabilitation Centre. 
 
Patients were also recruited from an independent rehabilitation centre in South 
East London called the Care Plus Rehabilitation Partnership. 
 
Volunteers for the healthy control group were recruited from King’s College 
London. These participants were recruited by sending a circular email 
advertising the study to all members of staff, students and volunteers (see 
Appendix 2.1 and 2.2).  The participant inclusion and exclusion criteria for this 
study are discussed later in this chapter. 
 
2.2.2. Recruitment and Informed Consent – Confabulating and Non-
confabulating Patients 
Clinicians from the different recruitment sites notified the researcher if they 
identified their patient as clinically amnesic either additionally confabulating or 
non-confabulating. The clinicians provided information about the study to 
patients who met the research criteria. The patient was also asked whether 
he/she would be willing to be approached by the researcher. If granted 
permission, the researcher approached the patient about the purpose of study 
and read the information sheet before informed consent was sought. During this 
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time, the researcher examined whether the patient was able to give informed 
consent drawing on advice from the patient’s clinician. If the patient lacked 
capacity, the patient’s informant was approached and provided with an 
alternative information sheet. Once written consent was obtained, patients were 
invited to take part in the study.  
 
2.2.3. Recruitment and Informed Consent – Healthy Volunteers  
The researcher identified healthy participants for this research by sending a 
circular email about the study to all members of King’s College London. The 
email explained the purpose of the study, procedures, inclusion and exclusion 
criteria and the researcher’s contact details (see Appendix 2.1 and 2.2). 
Individuals who expressed an interest in participating were given an information 
sheet before written consent was sought. Participants were then invited to take 
part in the study.  
 
2.3. Background Neuropsychological Tests 
All participants in the present research were administered the background 
neuropsychological tests described below. Some patients had been 
administered the background tests for clinical screening prior to being recruited 
for this study. In these cases, the chosen background tests were not performed 
if they had been previously administered by their respective clinical care team 
within four months of being recruited to this study. 
 
Only the confabulating and non-confabulating amnesia groups were 
administered the Dalla Barba confabulation interview. The veracity of the 
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patients’ answers to this interview was then checked using the designated 
informant’s knowledge.  
 
2.3.1 Screening measures used to categorise participants into 
confabulating, non-confabulating and control groups. 
 
The Dalla Barba confabulation interview (Dalla Barba, 1993) 
Rationale: The Dalla Barba confabulation interview was used as a screening 
measure to allocate participants into the confabulating and non-confabulating 
amnesia groups. The present research used an adapted UK version of the Dalla 
Barba Confabulation Battery (Kopelman et al., 1997, see Appendix 2.3). 
 
Measure: The confabulation battery was developed to provoke confabulations 
by asking patients some questions that probe different areas of memory: These 
included: personal semantic (e.g. age, address, marital status, etc.), episodic 
(e.g. “What did you eat for dinner yesterday?”), general semantic memories 
(e.g. “Who is Winston Churchill?”) and orientation in time and place (e.g. “What 
is the date today?”). The battery also included “I-don’t-know” semantic 
questions (e.g.: “How many Renault cars were sold in 1985?”) and “I-don’t-
know” episodic questions (e.g.: “What did you do on the 13th of March 1985?”). 
Dalla Barba (1993) found that confabulating patients showed a normal 
performance and did not produce confabulatory answers on the “I-don’t-know” 
questions in the interview. Conversely, Van Damme and d’Ydewalle (2010) 
conducted a recent study and found that confabulating patients presented with 




Analysis: The present research used Dalla Barba’s scoring criteria to analyse 
patients’ answers to the questions on the confabulation battery. For personal 
semantic and episodic questions, responses that were verified as false by the 
patients’ informant (i.e. relative or carer) were scored as confabulations. 
Questions from the other memory sections had obvious answers (e.g.: “what 
year are we in?”) and did not require verification from the patient’s informant. 
 
Scoring criteria for confabulation: There is currently no standardised cut off 
score for confabulation on this confabulation battery. It has been consistently 
reported in the literature that confabulating patients produce more confabulatory 
responses to the episodic questions on the Dalla Barba confabulation battery 
(Dalla Barba, 1993). Kopelman and colleagues (1997) found that patients 
produced 8 or more confabulatory responses in the episodic section of the 
confabulation battery. Subsequently, Bajo and colleagues (2012) used a cut-off 
score of 8 in the episodic section as an inclusion criterion for recruiting 
confabulating patients in their study. This criterion was adopted for this study to 
define the amnesic confabulating group, with the amnesic non-confabulating 
group having a score of 4 or less in this section of the test. For both groups, 
there had to be a clinical diagnosis of amnesia.  
 
The Hospital Anxiety and Depression scale (HADS) (Zigmond and Snaith, 
1983). 
Rationale: The Hospital Anxiety and Depression scale (HADS) was used as a 




Measure: The HADS is a self-report rating scale that measures symptoms of 
anxiety and depression. It consists of seven scale items that pertain to anxiety 
and a further seven scale questions that pertain to depression. While there are 
varieties of published mood scales, the HADS was employed in the present 
research for the following reasons: 
1. It is a recognised measure for identifying depression and anxiety in 
patients with physical disorders (e.g.: Encephalitis and brain 
haemorrhage). 
 
2. Zigmond and Snaith (1983) argued that questionnaires that measure 
symptoms of mood disorders are sometimes affected by physical 
illnesses such as insomnia and fatigue. They developed the HADS 
questionnaire to prevent an increased depression scale score in patients 
with such symptoms by basing the questions purely on the cognitive 
symptoms of anxiety and depression.  
 
Analysis: A score greater than 8 on the depression item scale is suggestive of 
severe depression. Similarly, a score greater than 8 on the anxiety item scale is 









2.3.2 Neuropsychological cognitive tests used to estimate premorbid and 
current intellectual functioning.  
 
National Adult Reading Test Revised (NART–R) – Measure of Premorbid 
Intellectual Ability (Nelson and Willison, 1991) 
 
Rationale: The NART-R is used to estimate the participants’ premorbid 
intellectual functioning.  
 
Measure: The NART-R measures the ability to correctly pronounce a list of 50 
phonetically irregular words.   
 
Analysis:  The number of errors on the NART-R test can be used to generate a 
predicated full scale IQ (FSIQ), verbal IQ (VIQ) and performance IQ (PIQ).  
Predictions of WAIS-III IQ scores were obtained using both the NART-R and 
WAIS-III manuals.  
 
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence Two Subtests (WASI) (Wechsler, 
1999) 
 
Rationale: The WASI subtests were used to estimate the participants’ current 
intellectual capacity. This test was also used as a screening measure to ensure 
that the participants recruited had a minimum IQ of 80.   
 




- Vocabulary – Participants were asked to describe the meaning of 42 
words, presented verbally and also on a list. 
 
- Matrix Reasoning – Participants were presented with different designs 
that had a piece missing. They were asked to complete each design by 
choosing the correct piece from a multiple choice.  
 
Analysis: Raw scores were converted to a full scale IQ score using the 
protocols set out in the WASI manual.  
 
2.3.3. Neuropsychological cognitive tests used to measure verbal and 
nonverbal recall and recognition memory. 
 
Wechsler Memory Scale Subtests - Fourth Edition (WMS-IV) (Wechsler et al., 
2009) 
 
Rationale: The WMS-IV subtests were used to measure immediate visual and 
verbal memory. These subtests were also used as a screening measure in 
order to match the confabulating and non-confabulating amnesia groups on the 
severity of their memory disorder.  
 
Measure: Three different subtests within the WMS-IV were used as described 
below: 
- Logical Memory 1 – Participants were asked to listen to a short story, 




- Verbal-Paired Associates 1 - Participants were presented with a list of 
auditory word pairs. Four of the word pairs were semantically related 
(e.g.: “sky and cloud”) while ten were unrelated (e.g.: “paint and big”). 
After the presentation of the list of word pairs, participants were 
presented with the first word and asked to recall the companion word. 
This procedure is repeated four times for the word pairs, presented in a 
different order. 
 
- Visual Reproduction – Participants were presented with 5 pictures. Each 
picture was displayed for only 10 seconds and then the participant was 
asked to draw it immediately from their memory. 
 
Analysis: Participants’ responses to the subsets were scored and analysed 
using the WMS-IV manual. All raw scores were adjusted to scaled and 
percentile scores.    
 
Recognition Memory Test (RMT) – Measure of Verbal and Non-verbal Memory 
(Warrington, 1984) 
 
Rationale: The RMT was used to measure participants’ ability to retain verbal 
and visual information. 
 
Measure: The RMT is a memory test that comprises two forced-choice 
recognition tasks. The first test measures recognition of 50 words (RMW) and 
the second test measures recognition of 50 faces (RMF). These tests are used 
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to assess verbal and visual memory deficits respectively and were originally 
developed as a screening measure in amnesia patients (Warrington, 1974).  
 
Analysis: Raw scores were converted into percentile scores using the RMT 
manual.  
 
2.3.4. Neuropsychological cognitive tests used to measure executive 
functioning. 
 
The Hayling and Brixton Tests – Measure of Executive Functioning (Burgess 
and Shallice, 1997) 
 
Rationale: Executive functions are the processes that regulate memory and 
other cognitive processes. The Hayling and Brixton Tests were used to assess 
participants executive functioning. 
 
Measure: This measure comprises the Hayling Sentence Completion Test and 
the Brixton Spatial Anticipation Test. The Hayling Tests comprise two sections 
and are described below. This is followed by a description of the Brixton test. 
- Hayling Sensible Completion – Participants are presented with 15 
sentences. Each sentence is incomplete and has the last word missing. 
The participant’s task is to give a word which correctly completes the 
sentence as quickly as possible. Scoring on this test is based on the time 
the participant takes to respond. This test is used to measure the ability 




- Hayling Unconnected Completion – Participants are presented with a 
further incomplete 15 sentences. This time they have to give a word that 
is completely unrelated to the sentence as quickly as possible. This test 
generates two sets of scores: the first score is based on the time the 
participant takes to respond and the second score is based on whether 
the participant’s response word is (correctly) unconnected, somewhat 
connected or (incorrectly) connected to each sentence. This test is used 
to measure the ability to suppress prepotent responses. 
 
- The Brixton Test – this test comprises 55 pages that all have the same 
design, a two by five grid, indicating 10 possible locations of a single 
filled blue dot. On each page the dot is in a particular location, and this 
location changes with each new page. In doing so, the movement of the 
dot follows a particular pattern. Participants’ task is to pick up on the 
pattern of the moving blue dot and predict the location it will go to next as 
each page is turned. After a pattern sequence, the pattern changes to a 
new one. This test is used to measure the ability to identify the pattern 
and also respond appropriately to the change in the patterns.  
 
Analysis: Raw scores were converted to scaled and percentile scores using the 
manual.   
 
2.4. Sample Power Analysis  
A power analysis was carried out to determine the number of participants 
needed for the present programme of studies. This analysis aimed to estimate 
the sample size needed in order to identify a significant difference between 
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confabulating and non-confabulating patients in their performance on the 
semantic-associates procedure, as described below. 
 
The power analysis was carried out using Ciaramelli and colleagues (2006) 
false recognition findings from confabulating patients and healthy controls. The 
false recognition means and standard deviations from Ciaramelli’s study and 
corroboration from a statistician suggested that a sample size of 13 participants 
in each group with an effect size of 1.18 would provide 80% power at an alpha 
of 0.05.  
 
2.5. Participants 
This research project comprised three studies. Each study involved three 
groups of participants: 13 confabulating amnesia patients, 13 non-confabulating 
amnesia patients and 13 healthy controls. The participants recruited for the first 
study also took part in the second study. Thirty-nine new participants were 
recruited for the third study where each of the three groups comprised 13 
participants.  
 
2.5.1. Inclusion Criteria 
Patients recruited for this research had to have a clinical diagnosis of amnesia. 
Patients also had to score 1.5 or more standard deviations on the Wechsler 
memory subtests below what was expected on the basis of their current 






Inclusion criteria for confabulating patients 
Patients who were clinically diagnosed as producing confabulatory responses 
by the clinician were recruited to the confabulating amnesia group. In addition, 
the patients had to also have a minimum score of 8 on the episodic section of 
the Dalla Barba Confabulation Battery (Dalla Barba, 1993; Kopelman et al., 
1997; Bajo et al., 2012). 
 
Inclusion criteria for non-confabulating patients 
Patients who were clinically diagnosed with amnesia in the absence of 
confabulatory behaviour were recruited to the non-confabulating amnesia 
group. These patients had to also score 4 or less on the episodic section of the 
Dalla Barba Confabulation Battery (Dalla Barba, 1993; Kopelman et al., 1997; 
Bajo et al., 2012). 
 
Inclusion criteria for healthy controls 
Volunteers who had no history of physical and neurological disorders were 
recruited to the healthy control group. On this basis, they were not administered 
the Dalla Barba Confabulation Battery. These participants were matched to the 
confabulating and non-confabulating groups based on age, gender, level of 
education and WASI IQ. 
 
2.5.2. Exclusion Criteria 
Participants with specific learning disabilities and who were unable to complete 




Participants who were clinically diagnosed with severe depression and who 
scored greater than 8 on the depression and anxiety scales of the Hospital 
Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS) were excluded.  
 
Participants who had high WASI IQ scores that did not match the confabulating 
group approximate mean WASI IQ score were excluded from this study.  
 
An informant (i.e. next of kin or a carer) was used to verify the patient’s 
confabulatory responses to the autobiographical memory questions on the Dalla 
Barba confabulation battery. Patients who did not have an informant were 
excluded from participating in this study.  
 
2.6. Ascertainment  
Several participants were approached for this research project. However, not all 
of the participants who were assessed took part in these studies. The 
participants approached in this research project are described in detail below.  
 
Confabulating Patients: In all, 33 confabulating patients were approached for 
this research. Two patients rejected the invitation to take part in the study. Two 
patients scored below 80 IQ points on the WASI two subtests and were 
excluded, as they did not fit the screening criteria. Three further patients were 
excluded because they did not have a personal informant present to verify their 
responses on the Dalla Barba confabulation interview.  
 
Non-confabulating Patients: A total of 30 non-confabulating patients were 
approached for this research. Two of these patients rejected the invitation to 
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take part in the study. Two further patients were excluded because they did not 
have a personal informant present to verify their responses on the Dalla Barba 
confabulation interview.  
 
Healthy Controls: 32 healthy volunteers were approached for this research. One 
participant was excluded after not attending two screening appointments. 
Another participant later decided to not take part due to work commitments. 
Four participants were excluded because they had high WASI IQ scores that 
did not match approximately the experimental group. This left a total of 26 
healthy volunteers that participated and completed all neuropsychological and 
experimental procedures.  
 
2.7. Experimental Procedures 
Three separate studies were conducted to address the following aims: 
4. To examine emotional biases in content of confabulation. 
5. To examine the positive emotional bias in confabulation using a pictorial 
semantic-associates procedure. 
6. To investigate the effects of mood on the content of confabulations. 
 
An affective semantic-associates procedure was used in each study to address 
these aims. The measures used to construct the affective semantic-associates 







2.7.1. Study One – Affective Semantic-Associates Procedure 
 
Rationale: The first study aimed to examine the emotional biases in the content 
of confabulation.  
 
Measure: An affective semantic-associates procedure was constructed using 9 
lists of word associates from Roediger and colleagues (2001). The 9 lists 
comprised 3 positive, 3 negative and 3 neutral word lists (see Appendix 2.4). 
Each list consisted of 15 words, all associated with the same non-presented 
critical distracter. Each word was printed on an A5 card and was displayed in a 
booklet. The positive, negative and neutral lists were separated into three 
display booklets in order to counterbalance the order in which they were 
presented to each participant. 
 
After each list was presented, a recall test was administered immediately. The 
recognition test was then administered. This test was constructed by displaying 
a total of 36 previously studied words. These words were selected from each of 
the 9 study lists, from serial positions 1, 2, 12 and 15. Roediger and McDermott’ 
(1995) constructed their recognition test using studied words from serial position 
1, 8 and 10 although they did not give reasons for why they had chosen these 
positions. However, the nature of the semantic-associates procedure is that the 
first word in each list is the most associated to the critical distracter, while the 
second word in the list is the second most associated to the critical distracter. 
The lower the word is on the list, the least association it has to the critical 
distracter. For this reason, the recognition test in the present study comprised a 
previously studied word that was highly associated to the critical distracter 
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(word from position 1), a word that was the least associated to the critical 
distracter (word from position 15) and words that were somewhat associated 
(words from position 2 and 12). The recognition test therefore comprised 
previously studied words with varying degrees of association to the critical 
distracter.  
 
The recognition test also included 9 critical distracters and 36 non-presented 
words that were unrelated to the previously studied lists. Each word was printed 
on an A5 card and was displayed in a booklet. The studied words, critical 
distracters and unrelated intrusions were all presented in a single display 
booklet. The 36 unrelated intrusions were also used from Roediger and 
colleagues (2001). They examined false recall in healthy participants and 
presented 55 word lists. In the present study, 9 word lists were used as studied 
lists for 3 word categories (positive, negative and neutral). Thirty-six words from 
the remaining word lists from Roediger and colleagues (2001) were selected as 
unrelated intrusions based on their emotional valence. This approach was used 
from Ruci and colleagues (2009). They argued that affective unrelated 
intrusions from Roediger and colleagues’ (2001) unused word lists make a good 
contrast because they have been previously used in the semantic-associates 
procedure.     
 
One limitation of the semantic-associates procedure is that participants are 
administered a recall test immediately after the presentation of each word list. 
After recall tests have been administered for all the word lists, participants are 
then administrated a recognition test. Therefore, the nature of this procedure 
means that there is a longer duration between the study phase and the 
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recognition test. Due to this delay, the rate of false recognition may increase as 
a consequence of forgetting. Despite this limitation, this procedure has been 
widely used in false memory research and is currently the only recognised 
approach to experimentally inducing false recall and false recognition.  
 
Procedure: All three groups of participants performed the affective semantic-
associates procedure in approximately 1.5 hours. Healthy controls completed 
this procedure in approximately 45 minutes.     
 
Analysis: A repeated measures ANOVA was used with Group (confabulating 
amnesia patients, non-confabulating amnesia patients and healthy controls) as 
the between participant factor and Word category (positive, negative and 
neutral) as the with-in participant factor.  
 
Three separate two-way ANOVAs were carried out to examine participants’ 
performance on previously studied target words, critical distracters and 
unrelated intrusions.  
 
To summarize, the analysis for study 1 consisted of a 3 (Group) x 3 (Word-
Category) analysis of variance. 
 
2.7.2. Study Two - Facial Expressions Semantic-Associates Procedure 
 
Rationale: This study aimed to examine the positive emotional bias in 
confabulation using a pictorial semantic-associates procedure. All three groups 




Measure: A semantic-associates procedure was constructed using photographs 
of emotional facial expressions. These photographs were used from Kohler 
(2003) and comprised facial expressions from 6 emotional categories: anger, 
disgust, fear, sad, neutral and happy (see Appendix 2.5). Each emotional 
category consisted of ten photographs of facial expressions. Each photograph 
was printed on an A5 card and displayed in a booklet. The photographs for all 
six emotional categories were presented in a single display booklet.  
 
This procedure did not include a recall test as the studied items were presented 
in the form of pictures. Instead participants were examined on their ability to 
recognise the pictorial studied items.  
 
The recognition test for this procedure was constructed by displaying six of the 
previously studied photographs from each emotional category. These 
photographs were selected from serial positions 1, 3, 5, 6, 8 and 10. For each 
emotional category, 5 non-studied intrusions and one critical distracter were 
also included in the recognition test.  
 
Pilot study: A preliminary experiment was conducted for this study in order to 
produce a non-presented critical distracter for each of the 6 emotional 
categories. Ten healthy participants were presented with 48 photographs from 
the 6 emotional categories. Kohler (2003) identified these photographs as 
expressing one of the 6 emotions with extreme intensity (for example, a 
photograph expressing extreme happiness).  For each emotional category, 8 of 
the extreme intensity photographs were displayed on a Dell desktop computer 
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screen. Participants were asked to rate the expression on the photographs for 
each emotional category on a rating scale from 1 (the least expressive of that 
emotion) and 10 (the most expressive). For each emotional category, the 
photograph that received the highest rating was selected as the critical 
distracter (see Appendix 2.6 for pilot data). 
 
Procedure: All three groups of participants were administered the facial 
expressions semantic-associates procedure in approximately 1 hour while 
healthy controls completed this procedure in approximately 30 minutes. 
 
Healthy controls were administered studies 1 and 2 in one session. This group 
completed both studies in approximately 2.5 hours. The confabulating and non-
confabulating groups were administered studies 1 and 2 in two separate 
sessions in order to reduce the risk of burden and fatigue. The two patient 
groups completed this study in approximately 3 hours. 
 
Analysis: A repeated measure ANOVA was used with Group (confabulating 
amnesia patients, non-confabulating amnesia patients and healthy controls) as 
the between participant factor and Word category (happy, sad, fear, disgust, 
anger and neutral) as the with-in participant factor.  
 
Three separate two-way ANOVAs were carried out to examine participants’ 





To summarize, the analysis for study 2 consisted of a 3 (Group) x 6 (Word-
category) analysis of variance. 
 
2.7.3. Study Three – Mood Induction and the Semantic-Associates 
Procedure 
 
Rationale: This study aimed to examine the role of mood on the content of 
confabulation.  
 
Measure: This study aimed to induce participants into positive and negative 
mood states. Participants were induced into a mood state before the 
presentation of the semantic–associates procedure in order to investigate the 
effects of mood on false recall and false recognition. Video mood induction 
procedures have been previously shown to induce temporary but effective 
mood states (Smith, 1995; Henry et al., 2009; Kunzmann and Gruhn, 2005). 
These studies used short films that depicted stories with pleasant or unpleasant 
emotional content. This procedure was found to be effective in inducing reliable 
mood states. On this basis, the present research aimed to employ a video mood 
induction procedure in order to induce each participant into a positive and a 
negative mood state on two separate occasions. Participants were induced into 
a positive mood condition using a 7 minute scene from the British comedy 
series entitled ‘Dad’s Army’. Negative mood was induced using a 10 minute 
edited scene from a movie entitled ‘One True Thing’. Both videos were 
presented to participants using an Acer Notebook computer. These videos were 
used in previous research and were shown to induce emotional responses in 
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both healthy controls and patients with Alzheimer’s disease (Kunzmann and 
Gruhn, 2005; Mograbi et al., 2012).  
 
Mood Induction Procedure: All three groups of participants were first induced to 
positive and negative mood states before they performed the affective 
semantic-associates procedure. Participants were induced into a mood state 
using a positive and a negative video mood induction procedure. In each group, 
half of the participants were induced into a positive mood state before 
performing a semantic-associates procedure in the first session. After 
approximately two weeks, these participants were invited for a second session 
where they were induced into a negative mood state before performing another 
semantic-associate procedure. The other half of the participants were allocated 
to the two mood conditions in the reverse order.  
 
Participants completed a PANAS questionnaire immediately after the 
presentation of the video clip. 
 
Mood Induction Pilot study: a preliminary experiment was conducted to examine 
whether the mood induction procedure induced participants into positive and 
negative mood states. Four healthy participants were asked to watch one of two 
video clips. Half of the participants watched the video clip from the positive 
condition entitled ‘Dad’s Army’, while the other half watched the video clip from 
the negative condition entitled ‘One True Thing’.  Participants were then asked 
to complete the Positive Affect Negative Affect Scale (PANAS) questionnaire 
adapted from Watson and Clark (1994) to measure their mood immediately 
after the clip ended (see Appendix 2.7). After approximately two days, 
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participants who watched the positive video were presented with the negative 
video. Similarly, participants who watched the negative video were later 
presented with the positive video clip. This experiment revealed that participants 
rated their mood as more pleasant after watching the positive video. These 
participants also rated their mood as more negative after watching the negative 
video. This suggested that the chosen video clips were reliable in inducing 
participants into positive and negative mood conditions (see appendix 2.8 for 
pilot data).   
 
Affective Semantic Associates Procedure: The affective semantic-associates 
lists used in the first study were employed in the third study. However, 3 more 
lists were added to make a total of 12 lists of word associates. The 12 study 
lists comprised 4 positive, 4 negative and 4 neutral word lists. Each list 
consisted of 15 word associates to one non-presented critical distracter (see 
Appendix 2.9). Each word was printed on an A5 card and was displayed in a 
booklet. The lists were divided into Condition 1 and Condition 2 and were 
presented in a counter-balanced order between the positive and negative mood 
inductions. For example, a participant who received the word lists from 
Condition 1 in the positive induction procedure later received the lists from 
Condition 2 in the negative induction procedure. 
 
A recall test was administered immediately after participants had been 
presented with each list in the display booklet. 
 
The recognition test was constructed by displaying 24 of the previously studied 
words. These words were selected from each of the 12 study lists, from serial 
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positions 1, 2, 12 and 15 as outlined above. The recognition test also included 6 
critical distracters and 24 non-presented words that were unrelated to the 
previously studied lists. Each word was printed on an A5 card and was 
displayed in a booklet. The studied words, critical distracters and unrelated 
intrusions were all presented in a single display booklet. 
 
Healthy controls were administered study 3 in two separate sessions; the total 
time taken was approximately 3.5 hours. The confabulating and non-
confabulating amnesia groups had three separate sessions, with approximately 
5 hours for total completion. 
 
Analysis: A repeated measure ANOVA was used with Group (confabulating 
amnesia patients, non-confabulating amnesia patients and healthy controls) as 
the between participant factor. Word-category (positive, negative and neutral) 
and Mood condition (positive or negative) were the with-in participant factors. 
 
Three separate three-way ANOVAs were carried out to examine participants’ 
performance on target words, critical distracters and unrelated intrusions.   
 
To summarize, the analysis for study 3 consisted of a 3 (Group) x 3 (Word-









Study 1: The Affective Semantic-Associates Procedure  
 
3.1. Introduction 
Previous studies have obtained findings showing that there are emotional 
biases in the content of confabulation. However these findings were often 
derived from single-case studies (Conway and Tacchi, 1996; Fotopoulou et al., 
2004; Solms 2000). Fotopoulou and colleagues’ (2008b) work on a prose recall 
task in confabulating patients is one of the very few studies that have 
experimentally examined the emotional content of confabulation. The findings 
from this study suggested that the content of confabulation is often more 
pleasant than the real memories that they replaced. Fotopoulou and colleagues 
(2008a) argued that further experimental research is needed to investigate the 
emotional triggers of confabulation. Therefore, the present study aimed to 
examine whether there is an emotional bias in the content of confabulation 
using the semantic-associates paradigm (Roediger et al., 2001). This procedure 
was used to examine whether confabulating patients show a tendency to 
produce more positive false memories in comparison with non-confabulating 
amnesia patients and healthy controls.  
 
In a series of studies, Fotopoulou and colleagues (2004, 2008a, and 2008b) 
obtained findings showing that confabulating patients distort their previous 
memories such that they become more emotionally pleasant in contrast to non-
confabulating patients and healthy controls. Confabulating patients’ often 
attributed their current memory impairment and other disabilities to their 
premorbid personality and beliefs. Fotopoulou (2010) argued that these 
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patients’ desire to maintain self-coherence is not adequately processed due to 
executive dysfunction and impaired reality monitoring. A deficit in executive 
processes may distort the correspondence between memory and reality 
demands in the sense that current personal goals override the process of 
memory reconstruction. Consequently, patients produce confabulations that 
appear more exaggerated than the corresponding reality (Fotopoulou et al., 
2010).  
 
Fotopoulou and colleagues (2009) showed that confabulating patients produced 
more positive self-referent false memories compared with healthy controls. 
Naïve judges rated patients’ confabulations as significantly more positive 
compared with the patients’ true experiences as verified by the patients’ 
designated informant. This finding led Fotopoulou and colleagues to postulate 
that confabulation serves to maintain a positive self-image. However, the 
confabulations reported in the current literature are not universally positive and 
self-enhancing (Metcalf et al., 2010; Bajo et al., 2010). Clinical observations 
have reported a tendency for patients to produce confabulations related to the 
death of a close-relative (Metcalf et al., 2010; Gilboa, 2010). This led Metcalf 
and colleagues (2010) to hypothesise that confabulation reflect a personal bias 
to recall memories that are related to self-representations in order to maintain 
self-coherence. These self-representations are related to the individual’s past 
experiences whether pleasant or unpleasant.  
 
To summarise, there is controversy in the current literature about whether there 
are emotional biases in the content of confabulation. Fotopoulou and colleagues 
(2008a) argued that the content of confabulation is motivated and wishful. 
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Conversely, Metcalf and colleagues (2010) opposed this perspective and 
argued that the content of confabulation is not necessarily self-enhancing as 
some patients have been shown to produce unpleasant confabulations 
(Schnider, 2008; Metcalf et al., 2010; Bajo et al., 2010). However, previous 
studies have consistently used rating systems to analyse the emotional content 
of confabulation (Turnbull et al., 2004; Fotopoulou et al., 2008a; Bajo et al., 
2010). This method relies on naïve judges to rate the emotional valence of the 
confabulation. Several studies have shown biases in judgement and decision 
making which can influence the naïve judges’ ratings and sometimes lead to 
inaccurate results (Kerr et al., 1996; Robert, 1998; Hilbert, 2012).  
 
The present research is the first to use the semantic-associates procedure to 
examine the emotional content of confabulation. This procedure, developed by 
Deese (1959), is well-established for inducing false recall and false recognition 
in healthy participants through the presentation of lists of words related to non-
presented critical distracters (Roediger and McDermott, 1995). For example, the 
critical distracter ‘butterfly’ formed this list of associates: moth, insect, wing, bird, 
fly, yellow, net, pretty, flower, bug, cocoon and colour. Findings using this 
procedure showed that healthy participants tended to falsely recall and falsely 
recognise a critical distracter in response to its association to the studied words 
on the list (Deese, 1959; Roediger and McDermott, 1995). The semantic-
associates procedure was subsequently employed to examine false recall and 
false recognition in patients with severe memory disorders.   
 
Schacter and colleagues (1998) examined false recognition in non-
confabulating amnesic patients using the semantic-associates procedure. 
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Results from this study showed that non-confabulating amnesic patients falsely 
recognised a lower proportion of critical distracters compared with healthy 
controls. Furthermore, these patients falsely recognised more unrelated 
intrusions than critical distracters. The finding that non-confabulating amnesic 
patients show a low rate of false recognition to critical distracters was replicated 
by further studies using the semantic-associates procedure (Melo et al., 1999; 
Ciaramelli et al., 2006; Koutstaal et al., 2001). Schacter and colleagues (2002) 
suggested that non-confabulating amnesic patients’ tendency to show reduced 
false recognition to critical distracters but increase false recognition to unrelated 
intrusions may be due to degraded gist memory. Critical distracters elicit a 
strong sense of familiarity in healthy participants because these non-presented 
words fit the theme of the studied list. It is postulated that amnesic patients 
retain limited gist information and are less likely to falsely recognise critical 
distracters compared with healthy controls. However, this theory has been 
based on findings from non-confabulating amnesic patients and has not been 
applied to explain false recognition in confabulating amnesic patients. 
 
Melo and colleagues (1999) conducted a study of patients with frontal lobe 
lesions that consisted of both confabulating and non-confabulating patients. 
Therefore, this study did not investigate the systematic differences in false 
recognition between confabulating and non-confabulating patients. Despite this, 
Melo and colleagues found that the majority of patients with lesions in the 
medial temporal lobes and frontal lobes showed reduced false recognition to 
critical distracters, but increased levels of false recognition to unrelated 
intrusions. This pattern was observed in both confabulating and non-
confabulating patients. Therefore this study suggested that some confabulating 
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patients with frontal lobe lesions show reduced false recognition to critical 
distracters. 
 
Subsequently, Ciaramelli and colleagues (2006) examined systematic 
differences in false recall and false recognition between 5 confabulating 
amnesia patients and 9 non-confabulating amnesia patients using the semantic-
associates procedure. Findings showed that both the confabulating and non-
confabulating amnesia patients falsely recognised a lower proportion of critical 
distracters compared with healthy controls. There were no significant 
differences between the two amnesia groups on the rate of false recognition to 
critical distracters. However, the confabulating group falsely recognised a 
significantly higher proportion of unrelated intrusions compared with the non-
confabulating group.  
 
To date, the semantic-associates paradigm has not been used to examine 
emotional biases in the content of confabulation. Therefore, this procedure was 
modified in the present study by using lists of negative, positive and neutral 
words from Roediger and colleagues (2001). The present study addressed the 
following aims: 
 
- To investigate whether confabulating and non-confabulating amnesia 
patients recall and recognise a lower proportion of target words 




- To investigate whether confabulating and non-confabulating amnesia 
patients falsely recall and falsely recognise a lower proportion of critical 
distracters compared with healthy controls.  
 
- To investigate whether confabulating amnesia patients show a bias to 
falsely recall and falsely recognise more positive unrelated intrusions 
compared with non-confabulating amnesia patients and healthy controls.  
 
- To investigate whether confabulating amnesia patients show a bias to 
falsely recall and falsely recognise more positive unrelated intrusions 
compared with negative and neutral intrusions.  
 
3.2. Method 
The method section of chapter three will begin by discussing the participants’ 
demographic and clinical diagnoses. The chosen background 
neuropsychological tests used in this study will then be briefly summarised. In 
the later part of this method section, the experimental procedure for this study 
will be outlined.  
 
3.2.1. Participants 
This study comprised three groups of participants: 13 confabulating amnesia 
patients, 13 non-confabulating amnesia patients and 13 healthy controls.  All 





The recruitment criteria for the present research are briefly summarised below.  
A more detailed description of the inclusion and exclusion criteria has been 
presented in the previous chapter.  
 
Patients who were clinically diagnosed with amnesia were approached for this 
study. Confabulating patients were recruited if they were clinically identified as 
producing confabulatory responses. Patients allocated to the confabulating 
amnesia group had to also score 8 or more on the episodic section of the Dalla 
Barba confabulation battery. In contrast, non-confabulating patients were 
recruited if they were diagnosed with amnesia in the absence of confabulatory 
behaviour. These patients had to also score 4 or less on the episodic section of 
the Dalla Barba confabulation battery (Bajo et al., 2010).  
 
Matching Variables  
The non-confabulating group and healthy controls were recruited on the basis 
that they matched the confabulating group on demographic variables (i.e.: age, 
gender and level of education).  Measures were also taken to ensure that there 
were no significant differences between the confabulating and non-
confabulating groups for the severity of amnesia. These measures are 
described below: 
 
Participants Demographic Differences 
Statistical analyses were employed to examine differences between the three 




Table 3.1 (below) shows the mean percentage of males and females in each of 
the three groups. The table also shows the means and standard deviations for 
age and level of education.  
 
A chi-square test for independence (with Fisher’s Exact Test) was used to 
analyse group differences on gender. This test showed no significant difference 
between the groups: x2 (2, n= 39) = .92, p = .76.  
 
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to analyse differences between the three 
groups based on age and level of education. Findings showed that there were 
no statistically significant age differences between the groups (F (2, 36) = 2.63, 
p = .09) and level of education (F (2, 36) = 1.75, p = .19).  
 
Table 3.1: Demographic difference:  The mean (SD) and significant differences on age 
and gender between the three participant groups: 13 confabulating patients, 13 non-







Gender    
               % Male 69.2% 69.2% 53.8% 
               % Female 30.8% 30.8% 46.2% 
Age    
                   







Level of Education    
                 











Participants standard deviation differences based on the WMS-IV subtests 
Table 3.2 (below) shows mean raw scores and z scores on the Wechsler 
Memory Scale-IV immediate subtests (WMS-IV, Wechsler, 1998) across the 
current sample of confabulating and non-confabulating amnesia patients. This 
table shows the differences between the z scores for the WMS-IV memory tests 
and z scores for current (WASI) IQ. Patients were recruited on the basis that 
their score on each memory test is a minimum of 1.5 standard deviations below 
their current measured IQ. 
 
Table 3.2: Matching variables: Differences between confabulating and non-
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A score of more than 1.5 standard deviations below current WASI IQ on the 
Wechsler memory subtests indicated an amnesic syndrome. Table 3.2 shows 
that the two amnesia groups performed markedly worse on the memory 
subtests than this cut-off score. An independent-samples t-test shows that there 
were no significant differences between the two groups on z scores (see Table 
3.2 for t-test results). This suggests that there were no significant difference 
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between the two patient groups for the severity of amnesia. Although there were 
no significant differences between the two amnesia groups on IQ corrected 
visual reproduction, the confabulating group had a significantly lower raw score 
on this test in comparison with the non-confabulating group (see Table 3.4).   
 
Participants’ Clinical Diagnoses 
Amnesia is a memory disorder that occurs in the context of differing clinical 
diagnoses and underlying pathologies. On this basis, the confabulating and 
non-confabulating amnesia patients in the present research were grouped 
according to their clinical diagnoses. Table 3.3 shows the clinical diagnoses that 
the patients were given at the time of recruitment. 
 
Clinical Diagnoses in the Confabulating Group  
The confabulating patients that were recruited for this research were often 
diagnosed with Wernicke-Korsakoff syndrome (7/13). Traumatic brain injury 
was also common in this group and was often the result of vehicle accidents 
and falls (4/13). One confabulating patient had been diagnosed with 
cerebrovascular disease caused by hypertension. There was also one case of 
HIV encephalopathy in the current sample of confabulating patients.  
 
Clinical Diagnoses in the Non-confabulating Group  
Similar to the confabulating group, Wernicke-Korsakoff syndrome was the most 
common diagnosis in the current sample of non-confabulating amnesia patients 
(5/13). However, traumatic brain injury was not observed in this group. 
Cerebrovascular disease was more common in the non-confabulating group 
and was caused by hypertension (3/13). Epilepsy in this group was the result of 
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seizures arising from the temporal lobe region (3/13). Only one non-
confabulating patient had been diagnosed with HIV encephalopathy.  Limbic 
Encephalitis had been diagnosed in one patient. 
 
Table 3.3 Clinical Diagnoses: 13 confabulating amnesia patients and 13 non-
confabulating amnesia patients were grouped according to their clinical diagnoses at 
the time of recruitment.  





 N=13 N=13 N=26 
 









7 (53.8%) 5 (38.5%) 12 (46.2%) 
Cerebrovascular Disease 1 (7.7%) 3 (23.1%) 4 (15.4%) 
HIV Encephalopathy 1 (7.7%) 1 (7.7%) 2 (7.7%) 
Temporal Lobe Epilepsy  0 (0%) 3 (23.1%) 3 (11.5%) 
Limbic Encephalitis 0 (0%) 1 (7.7%) 1 (3.8%) 
 
3.2.2. Neuropsychological Measures 
Background neuropsychological tests were chosen to characterise the patterns 
of cognitive function and impairment in each participant. The 
neuropsychological tests used in the present research are summarized below. 
  
- National Adult Reading Test-Revised (NART-R) (Nelson and Willison, 





- Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence 2-subtests (WASI) 
(Wechsler, 1999):  The Vocabulary and Matrix Reasoning subtests were 
used to estimate current intellectual ability.  
 
- Wechsler Memory Scale-IV immediate subtests (WMS-IV) (Wechsler, 
1998): Logical Memory, Verbal Paired Associates and Visual 
Reproduction subtests were used to measure anterograde verbal and 
non-verbal recall memory. 
 
- Recognition Memory Test (RMT; Warrington, 1984): This test was used 
to measure both verbal and nonverbal recognition memory. 
 
- Hayling and Brixton Tests (Burgess and Shallice, 1997): These tests 
were used to measure executive functioning. 
 
3.2.3. The Affective Semantic-Associates Procedure 
The materials used to construct the affective semantic-associates procedure 
were described in the previous chapter. The affective semantic-associates 
procedure was administered in the following order: 
 
1. Study Phase - Participants were presented with 9 lists of words. Each list 
contained 15 word associates of one non-presented critical distracter (see 
Appendix 2.4). Each word was printed on a single page inside an A5 display 
booklet. The participants were asked to study each presented word. The 
researcher presented each word for three seconds before turning the page 
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to display the next word. Each display booklet contained three word-lists 
belonging to one of the following categories: positive, negative and neutral. 
 
2. Free Recall Test – A free recall test was administered immediately after the 
presentation of each list. Once participants had completed the recall test for 
all nine lists, they were then administered the recognition test. 
 
3. Recognition Test - Participants were presented with a single display booklet 
containing 36 previously studied words. The booklet also included 36 new 
non-presented words that were unrelated to the lists and 9 critical distracters 
that had not been previously studied, but were related to the words 
presented in the study phase. Participants were asked whether they had 
previously been presented with each word in the study phase of the 
experiment and to respond with either ‘yes’ or ‘no’. 
 
3.3. Results  
This section will begin with a discussion of the results for each 
neuropsychological test administered to the three groups of participants. This is 
followed by a discussion of the results obtained from the confabulation 
interview. In the later part of this section, the results obtained from the 
semantic-associates procedure will be discussed.  
 
3.3.1. Neuropsychological results 
The neuropsychological data were statistically analysed using one-way ANOVA 
in order to compare the three groups. In addition, independent-samples t-tests 
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were used to compare the confabulating and non-confabulating groups on 
memory and executive measures. 
 
Table 3.4 (below) shows the means, standard deviations and percentile scores 
of the three groups on the neuropsychological tests. This is followed by a 
description of the findings on participants’ performance on each 






















Table 3.4: Neuropsychological Results: Mean raw scores, standard deviations and percentile 
scores on neuropsychological tests between 13 confabulating amnesia patients and 13 non-


























       
WASI (2-subtests)       
Vocabulary  55.7 (10.6) 50th  57.7 (9.0) 63rd  58.8 (5.8) 63rd  
Matrix Reasoning 18.6 (3.7) 50th  24.9 (9.4) 75th  25.6 (6.0) 75th  
WASI Full Scale IQ 98.2 (11.68) 45th  105.5 (11.4) 63rd   108.1(8.1) 70th  
       
 
WMS IV (immediate subtests) 
     
Logical Memory  9.6 (4.6) 1st  14.1 (6.9) 5th   30.1 (3.4) 75th  
Verbal Paired Associates  4.3 (4.8) 1st  8.5 (6.9) 2nd   39.2 (10.9) 75th  
Visual Reproduction 15.0 (7.7) 1st  23.9 (6.2) 5th   41.3 (1.6) 91st   
       
 
RMT 
      
Word Recognition 29.3 (5.4) 1st 35.8 (4.9) 5th  47.8 (2.6) 75th   
Face Recognition 28.0 (3.7) 1st  35.3 (4.7) 5th  41.8 (4.4) 25th  
       
 
Hayling Test 
      
Sentence Completion 
(Time) 
27.9 (13.6) 5th  18.4 (7.7) 25th  16.2 (10.3) 25th  
Unconnected Completion 
(Time) 
57.7 (10.8) 25th  48.6 (11.8) 50th  27.5 (15.9) 50th 
Unconnected Completion 
(Error) 
15.0 (3.2) 5th  13.2 (9.0) 10th  2.2 (2.7) 75th 
       
 
Brixton Test 
      




Premorbid and Current Intellectual Ability 
The NART-R and WASI tests were used in the present research to measure 
participants premorbid and current intellectual functioning. An inspection of the 
means on these tests suggested that both patient groups’ current intellectual 
ability was mildly deteriorated compared with their estimated premorbid 
cognitive functioning. However, an analysis of these results using one-way 
ANOVA showed no statistical differences between the three groups on the 
NART-R (F (2, 36) = 1.29, p = .29) and WASI IQ (F (2, 36) = 3.11, p = .06).    
 
Anterograde Memory 
The WMS-IV and RMT were used to examine participants’ verbal and non-
verbal recall and recognition memory abilities. An inspection of the percentile 
scores on Table 3.4 indicated that both patient groups were markedly impaired 
in terms of remembering verbal and non-verbal information. One-way ANOVA 
showed that there were significant differences between the three groups on all 
three WMS–IV immediate subtests: logical memory (F (2, 36) = 56.74, p<.01), 
verbal paired associates (F (2, 36) = 74.69, p <.001) and visual reproduction (F 
(2, 36) = 76.45, p<.001). Further analysis using Tukey post-hoc test indicated 
that the confabulating group significantly underperformed on all three subtests 
compared with the healthy controls (p<.001). However there were no significant 
differences between the two amnesia groups on the logical memory subtest 
(mean difference = 4.46, p = .08) and the verbal paired associates subtest 
(mean difference = 4.23, p = .37). However, the Tukey test also indicated that 
there were significant differences between the confabulating and non-
confabulating groups on the immediate visual reproduction subtest (mean 
difference = 8.92, p<.001). There were no significant differences between the 
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two amnesia groups when their visual reproduction scores were corrected for IQ 
(see Table 3.2). On the RMT tests, a Tukey post-hoc analysis indicated that the 
confabulating group significantly underperformed compared with the healthy 
controls (p<.01). In addition, the confabulating group recognised a significantly 
lower proportion of words and faces on the RMT tests compared with the non-
confabulating group (p<.01). This suggested that the confabulating group were 
more impaired on visual and verbal recognition compared with the non-
confabulating group.  
 
Executive Functioning 
The Hayling and Brixton tests were used to measure participants’ executive 
abilities. The mean scores on Table 3.4 show that the confabulating group 
markedly underperformed on executive measures. There were significant 
differences between the three groups on the Hayling sentence completion test: 
F (2, 36) = 4.24, p<.05. Further analysis using Tukey post hoc test indicated 
that the confabulating group significantly underperformed on this test compared 
with the healthy controls: mean difference = 11.62, p<.05. However, no 
significant differences were found between the two amnesia groups: mean 
difference = 9.46, p = .08. Furthermore, there were significant differences 
between the three groups on the Hayling unconnected completion time scores: 
F (2, 36) = 18.38, p<.001. The confabulating patients had more difficulties 
initiating a well-timed response compared with healthy controls: mean 
difference = 30.15, p<.001. However, there were no significant differences 
between the two amnesia groups on this test: mean difference = 9.08, p = .19.  
There were significant differences between the three groups on the Hayling 
unconnected completion error scores: F (2, 36) = 18.38, p<.001. Furthermore, 
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both the confabulating and non-confabulating groups produced more errors on 
this test compared with healthy controls (p<.001). However, there were no 
significant differences between the confabulating and non-confabulating groups 
on this test: mean difference = 1.85, p = .69. These findings showed that both 
amnesia groups were slower to respond yet produced more errors than the 
healthy controls.  
 
On the Brixton test, there were significant differences between the three groups: 
F (2, 36) = 25.90, p<.001. Further analysis using Tukey post hoc test revealed 
that the confabulating group had more difficulties identifying and following a rule 
compared with the two comparison groups: non-confabulating group: mean 
difference = 8.69, p<.001 and healthy controls: mean difference = 11.93, 
p<.001. 
    
3.3.2. Confabulation results 
Table 3.5 (below) shows the mean proportion of confabulatory responses 
produced in response to the following sections of the Dalla Barba interview: 
personal semantic, episodic, general semantic, general episodic and orientation 
questions. The results were calculated by obtaining the mean proportion of 
confabulatory answers produced in response to each section of the Dalla Barba 
interview. These results were analysed using proportions as the total number of 





Table 3.5: Confabulation Results: Proportion of confabulatory answers in each section 
of the questionnaire expressed as means and standard deviations for the confabulating 
and non-confabulating groups.  
Dalla Barba 
Confabulation Battery 







Between Groups  
Mean 
  
SD Mean  SD t-test results 
 
Confabulatory 
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Table 3.5 shows that the confabulating group produced more confabulatory 
answers compared with the non-confabulating group during the whole interview. 
This is confirmed by an independent-samples t-test which shows significant 
differences between the two groups in the total proportion of confabulatory 
responses produced on this measure.    
 
In addition, the independent-samples t-test shows that the confabulating group 
produced a significantly higher proportion of confabulatory answers compared 
with the non-confabulating group on personal semantic questions, episodic 
questions and general semantic questions. The confabulating group were also 
more disorientated in time and place compared with the non-confabulating 
group. 
 
The independent-samples t-test also shows that the confabulating group 
produced a significantly higher proportion of confabulatory answers compared 
with the non-confabulating group on both semantic and episodic “I-don’t-know” 
questions. 
 
3.3.3. Experimental Results  
Free recall and recognition results obtained from the affective semantic-
associates procedure were analysed for all three groups. 
 
Three separate repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted to analyse the 
three dependent variables: target words, critical distracters and unrelated 
intrusions. This method was carried out for the recall and recognition tests.  The 
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results for the recall test are described below. This is followed by the results for 
the recognition test. 
 
3.3.3.1. Recall Results  
Table 3.6 shows the mean proportion of target words correctly recalled from the 
three word categories (positive, negative and neutral). The table also shows the 
mean proportion of critical distracters and unrelated intrusions falsely recalled 
from the three word categories between the three groups of participants.   
 
Table 3.6: Recall Results: Mean scores (SD) for the proportion of target words, critical 
distracters and unrelated intrusions produced in the recall test between the three groups of 
participants.  
 












   Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
 
Proportion of Target Words :  
 








Negative Target Words 
 
.18 (.06) .27 (.05) .50 (.08) 
Neutral Target Words 
 
.17 (.05) .25 (.05) .46 (.07) 
 
Proportion of Critical Distracters: 
 








Negative Critical Distracters 
 
.05 (.12) .05 (.12) .18 (.17) 
Neutral Critical Distracters 
 
.03 (.09) .03 (.09) .15 (.22) 
 
Proportion of Unrelated Intrusions: 
 








Negative Unrelated Intrusions 
 
.08 (.14) .08 (.14) .08 (.14) 
Neutral Unrelated Intrusions .08 (.14) .10 (.16) .05 (.12) 
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Recall Test Results for Target Words 
A repeated measures ANOVA was used to examine the proportion of target 
words recalled from three word categories (positive, negative and neutral) 
between three groups (confabulating group, non-confabulating group and 
healthy controls). Results from this test showed a significant main effect of 
Group: F (2, 36) = 159.39, p<.001 and Word-Category: F (2, 72) = 4.11, p<.05. 
However there was no significant interaction between Group and Word-
Category: F (4, 72) = .60, p= .66.  This suggested that there is a significant 
difference in the proportion of targets correctly recalled between the three 
groups. These findings also suggested that there were overall differences in 
terms of the proportion of targets recalled across the word categories. However, 
there were no group differences in the proportion of targets recalled across the 
word categories.   
 
Tukey post-hoc analyses were also carried out to explore the significant main 
effect of Group using one-way ANOVA. This test showed that the confabulating 
group recalled a significantly lower proportion of target words compared with the 
two comparison groups: non-confabulating group (mean difference = .08, 
p<.001) and healthy controls (mean difference = .31, p<.001). The non-
confabulating group also recalled a significantly lower proportion of target words 
compared with healthy controls (mean difference = .23, p<.001). These findings 
indicated that the confabulating group was more impaired on recall compared 
with the non-confabulating group. Nevertheless, the non-confabulating group 





Paired-sample t-tests were then carried out to explore the significant main effect 
of Word-Category. Findings showed that overall participants recalled a higher 
proportion of positive and negative target words compared with the neutral 
words: positive targets (t (38) = 3.05, p<.01) and negative targets (t (38) = 2.02, 
p=.05). However there were no significant differences between the proportion of 
positive and negative targets recalled: t (38) = .71, p= .49. The results indicated 
that generally affective information may be easier to retrieve compared with 
non-emotional information. 
 
Recall Test – Results for Critical Distracters 
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to examine the proportion of 
critical distracters recalled from three word categories (positive, negative and 
neutral) between the three groups of participants (confabulating group, non-
confabulating group and healthy controls). There was a significant main effect of 
Group: F (2, 36) = 13.17, p<.001. Maulchy’s test showed that the assumption of 
sphericity had been violated for the main effect of Word-Category (x2(2) =1.96, 
p=.15). The degrees of freedom were then corrected using Greenhouse-
Geisser estimates (ε =.86). Furthermore, there was no significant interaction 
between Group and Word-Category: F (4, 72) = .53, p= .72. These findings 
indicated that there were differences in the proportion of critical distracters 
falsely recalled between the groups, but not across the three word categories.  
 
The significant main effect of Group was further examined using a Tukey post 
hoc test. This analysis revealed that the two amnesia groups recalled a 
significantly lower proportion of critical distracters compared with the healthy 
controls: confabulating group (mean difference = .16, p<.001) and non-
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confabulating group (mean-difference = .15, p<.001). There was no significant 
difference between the confabulating and non-confabulating groups on the 
proportion of critical distracters recalled (mean difference = .01, p= .98). 
Therefore, the confabulating and non-confabulating groups both showed 
reduced false recognition of critical distracters compared with healthy controls. 
 
Recall Test – Results for Unrelated Intrusions 
Figure 3.1 reflects insignificant weak trends which show that the confabulating 
group falsely recalled a higher proportion of positive unrelated intrusions 
compared with negative and neutral intrusions. This figure also shows that the 
confabulating group falsely recalled a higher proportion of positive intrusions 
















Figure 3.1: False Recall of Unrelated Intrusions: Mean proportion of unrelated intrusions from 
the positive, negative and neutral categories falsely recognised by the three groups of 
participants: 13 confabulating amnesia patients, 13 non-confabulating amnesia patients and 13 




A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to examine the proportion of 
unrelated intrusions recalled from three word categories (positive, negative and 
neutral) between three groups of participants (confabulating group, non-
confabulating group and healthy controls). Results from this test showed that 
there was no significant main effect of Group F (2, 36) = .23, p= .80. There was 
no significant main effect of Word-Category F (2, 72) = .06, p= .94.There was 
also no significant interaction between Group and Word-Category: F (4, 72) = 
.41, p= .80. These results suggested that there were no significant differences 
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between the three groups in terms of the proportion of unrelated intrusions 
falsely recalled across the word categories. 
 
Summary of Recall Results 
Findings showed that the confabulating group had more difficulties recalling 
previously studied words compared with non-confabulating patients and healthy 
controls. Findings also showed that both confabulating and non-confabulating 
patients falsely recalled a significantly lower proportion of critical distracters 
compared with healthy controls. Furthermore, no significant differences were 
observed between the three groups on the false recall of unrelated intrusions.  
 
3.3.3.2. Recognition Test Results  
Table 3.7 (below) shows the mean proportion of target words correctly 
recognised from the three word categories (positive, negative and neutral). The 
table also shows the mean proportion of critical distracters and unrelated 
intrusions falsely recognised from the three word categories between the three 











Table 3.7: Recognition Results: Mean scores (standard deviations) for the proportion of target 
words, critical distracters and unrelated intrusions produced in the recognition test between the 
three participant groups.  
 












   Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
 
Proportion of Target Words :  
 








Negative Target Words 
 
.57 (.12) .63 (.15) .79 (.14) 
Neutral Target Words 
 
.45 (.12) .56 (.16) .76 (.17) 
 
Proportion of Critical Distracters: 
 








Negative Critical Distracters 
 
.36 (.25) .33 (.33) .64 (.29) 
Neutral Critical Distracters 
 
.26 (.24) .20 (.22) .41 (.34) 
 
Proportion of Unrelated Intrusions: 
 








Negative Unrelated Intrusions 
 
.13 (.16) .15 (.10) .08 (.11) 
Neutral Unrelated Intrusions 
 
.19 (.17) .22 (.13) .10 (.11) 
 
 
Recognition Test - Results for Target Words 
A repeated measures ANOVA was used to examine the proportion of target 
words recognised from three word categories (positive, negative and neutral) 
between the three groups (confabulating group, non-confabulating group and 
healthy controls). Results on this test showed that there was a significant main 
effect of Group: F (2, 36) = 32.57, p<.001 and a main effect of Word-Category: 
F (2, 72) = 4.90, p<.05. However, there was no significant interaction between 
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Group and Word-Category: F (4, 72) = .53, p= .71. These findings suggested 
that there were significant differences between the three groups in terms of the 
proportion of targets correctly recognised. However, the groups did not differ in 
terms of the types of words recognised across the three word categories. 
 
The significant main effect of Group was further explored using a Tukey post-
hoc analysis. This indicated that the confabulating group recognised a lower 
proportion of target words compared with the two comparison groups: non-
confabulating group (mean difference = .09, p<.05) and healthy controls (mean 
difference = .27, p<.001).The non-confabulating group falsely recognised a 
lower proportion of target words compared with healthy controls (mean 
difference = .18, p<.001). These findings are consistent with the results from the 
recall test and indicated that the confabulating group had more difficulties 
recognising previously studied words compared with the two comparison 
groups. In addition, the non-confabulating group were more impaired on 
recognition compared with healthy controls. 
 
Paired-sample t-tests were then carried out to analyse the main effect of Word-
Category. This test showed that overall participants recognised a significantly 
higher proportion of target words from the two emotional categories compared 
with the neutral category: positive targets (t (38) =3.29, p<.01) and negative 
targets (t (38) = 2.36, p<.05). However there were no significant differences 
between the proportion of positive and negative targets recognised: t (38) = .23, 
p= .82. These findings are consistent with the recall results and suggested that 




Recognition Test - Results for Critical Distracters 
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to examine the proportion of 
critical distracters recognised from three word categories (positive, negative and 
neutral) between the three groups of participants (confabulating group, non-
confabulating group and healthy controls). Findings showed that there was a 
main effect of Group: F (2, 36) = 4.60, p<.05. There was also a significant main 
effect of Word-Category: F (2, 72) = 8.45, p<.01. However, there was no 
significant interaction between Group and Word-Category: F (4, 72) = .76, 
p=.56. These findings indicated a significant difference in terms of the 
proportion of critical distracters falsely recognised between the groups. The 
findings also suggested that there were overall differences in terms of the 
proportion of critical distracters recognised across the word categories. 
However, there were no differences between the three groups in terms of the 
proportion of critical distracters falsely recognised across the word categories.  
 
A Tukey post hoc test was used to explore the significant main effect of Group. 
This showed that the two amnesia groups recognised a significantly lower 
proportion of critical distracters compared with healthy controls (mean 
difference = .24, p<.05). There was no significant difference between the 
confabulating and non-confabulating groups on the proportion of critical 
distracters falsely recognised (mean difference = .00, p= 1.00).  These findings 
are consistent with the results from the recall test and indicated that both the 
confabulating and non-confabulating patients showed reduced false recognition 




Paired-sample t-tests showed that participants falsely recognised a significantly 
higher proportion of critical distracters from the two emotional categories 
compared with the neutral category: positive critical distracters (t (38) = 3.70, 
p<.01), and negative critical distracters (t (38) = 3.17, p<.01). However there 
were no significant differences between the proportion of positive and negative 
critical distracters falsely recognised: t (38) = .21, p= .84.  
 
Recognition Test - Results for Unrelated Intrusions 
Figure 3.2 illustrates that the confabulating group produced a high proportion of 
positive unrelated intrusions in the recognition test compared with unrelated 
intrusions from the other word categories (negative and neutral). This figure 
also shows that the confabulating group falsely recognised a higher proportion 















Figure 3.2: False Recognition of Unrelated Intrusions: Mean proportion of unrelated intrusions 
from the positive, negative and neutral categories falsely recognised by the three groups of 
participants: 13 confabulating amnesia patients, 13 non-confabulating amnesia patients and 13 




A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to examine the proportion of 
unrelated intrusions falsely recognised from three word categories (positive, 
negative and neutral) between the three groups of participants (confabulating 
group, non-confabulating group and healthy controls). Findings showed a 
significant main effect of Group: F (2, 36) = 10.91, p<.001. There was no 
significant main effect of Word-Category: F (2, 72) = 2.26, p=.12. However, 
there was a significant interaction between Group and Word-Category: F (4, 70) 
= 3.39, p<.05. These findings indicated that the groups differed in terms of the 
proportion of unrelated intrusions falsely recognised across the word categories. 
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A Tukey post hoc test was used to explore the significant main effect of Group. 
Findings showed that the two amnesia groups falsely recognised a higher 
proportion of unrelated intrusions compared with healthy controls: confabulating 
group (mean difference= .14, p<.001) and non-confabulating group (mean 
difference=.09, p<.01). However, there were no significant differences between 
the confabulating and non-confabulating groups in terms of the proportion of 
unrelated intrusions falsely recognised (mean difference=.04, p=.33). These 
findings indicated that the confabulating and non-confabulating groups showed 
a higher rate of false recognition for unrelated intrusions compared with healthy 
controls. 
 
The significant interaction effect was further examined using the same analysis 
as above. Results showed no significant differences between the three groups 
in terms of the proportion of negative and neutral unrelated intrusions. A Tukey 
post hoc test indicated that the confabulating group falsely recognised a 
significantly higher proportion of positive unrelated intrusions compared with the 
two comparison groups: non-confabulating group (mean difference = .18, p<.01) 
and healthy controls (mean difference = .28, p<.001).  There were no significant 
differences between the non-confabulating group and healthy controls in terms 
of the proportion of positive intrusions falsely recognised (mean difference = 
.10, p = .20). These findings indicated that the confabulating group showed a 
positive bias in the false recognition of unrelated intrusions. 
 
Summary of Recognition Results 
Results from the recognition of target words were consistent with the findings 
obtained from the recall test. This showed that the confabulating group correctly 
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recognised a significantly lower proportion of targets compared with the non-
confabulating group and healthy controls. Findings also showed that the 
confabulating and non-confabulating groups falsely recognised a lower 
proportion of critical distracters compared with healthy controls. There were no 
significant differences between the two amnesia groups in terms of the 
proportion of critical distracters falsely recognised. In contrast to the results from 
the equivalent recall test, findings showed that both the confabulating and non-
confabulating groups falsely recognised a higher proportion of unrelated 
intrusions compared with healthy controls. In addition, the confabulating group 
falsely recognised a higher proportion of positive unrelated intrusions compared 
with the non-confabulating group and healthy controls. The confabulating group 
also falsely recognised a higher proportion of positive unrelated intrusions 
compared with negative and neutral intrusions. This positive bias was not found 
in the non-confabulating group and healthy controls. 
 
Signal Detection Analyses 
Signal detection analyses were carried out using rates of endorsement of target 
words (hit rate) with rates of selection of unrelated intrusions (false alarms) for 
each of the three word categories (positive, negative and neutral). A standard 
correction was first carried out on any hit rates of 1.0 or false alarm rates of 0, 
as recommended by Wixted and Lee (2012). The signal detection analysis 
provided measures of memory strength (d prime) and response bias (BD"). 
Higher values of d prime indicate greater memory strength and higher values of 
BD" indicate a conservative response criterion (Brophy, 1986; Donaldson, 
1993). A one-way ANOVA was used to examine significant differences between 
the three groups in terms of these measures.  
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Signal Detection Analysis for the Positive Word-Category 
The analysis used the positive targets for the hit rates and the positive unrelated 
intrusions for the false alarm rate. Table 3.8 (below) shows that the 
confabulating group had a lower d’ value compared with the non-confabulating 
group and healthy controls, confirmed by an ANOVA that showed that the d 
prime scores across the three groups were significantly different: F (2, 36) = 
32.75, p<.001. However there were no significant differences between the 
groups on BD" estimates: F (2, 36) = 0.67, p=.52.  
 
Table 3.8 Signal detection Analysis: Measures of Memory Strength (d’) and response bias (BD") 
comparing positive targets with positive unrelated intrusions between the three participant 
groups. 
 
A post hoc Tukey test showed that the confabulating group had a significantly 
lower memory strength compared with the non-confabulating group (mean 
difference = 0.87, p<.01) and healthy controls (mean difference = 1.84, p<.001). 
In addition, memory strength in the non-confabulating group was significantly 




Signal Detection Analysis –  
Positive Hit Rate Compared 





























Signal Detection Analysis for the Negative and Neutral Word-Categories 
Signal detection analyses were also carried out for the negative and neutral 
word categories. The findings showed that the three groups were not 
significantly different in terms of d prime or response bias for both of these word 
categories (see Table 3.9).  
 
Table 3.9 Signal detection Analysis: Measures of Memory Strength (d’) and response bias (BD") 
comparing targets with unrelated intrusions for the negative and neutral word-categories. 
 
 
Summary of Signal Detection Results 
The findings from the positive category indicated that although the three groups 
differed in memory strength, they used the same response criterion. The 
confabulating group had a significantly lower memory strength compared with 
the non-confabulating group and healthy controls. Furthermore, these results 
were not found in the negative and neutral word-categories. This suggested that 
confabulating patients tendency to falsely recognise more positive unrelated 
intrusions may be because their memory strength for positive material is 
significantly weaker compared with that of non-confabulating amnesia patients 


















































Previous experimental studies have consistently examined the emotional bias in 
confabulation using a rating system where naive judges were asked to rate the 
emotional valence of the patients’ confabulations (Fotopoulou et al., 2008a; 
Bajo et al., 2010). The present research aimed to examine the content of 
confabulation using the semantic-associates procedure that is recognised for its 
robustness in inducing false memories. The present study is the first to examine 
whether there are emotional biases in the content of confabulation using an 
affective semantic-associates procedure.  
 
To summarize, the findings from this study suggested the following:  
1) Confabulating patients correctly recalled and recognised a lower 
proportion of target words compared with non-confabulating patients and 
healthy controls. 
 
2) Both confabulating and non-confabulating patients showed reduced false 
recall and false recognition to critical distracters compared with healthy 
controls. 
 
3) Confabulating patients showed a positive emotional bias and falsely 
recognized a higher proportion of positive unrelated intrusions compared 
with the non-confabulating patients and healthy controls. 
 
4) Confabulating patients falsely recognized a higher proportion of positive 




Schacter and colleagues (1996) used the semantic-associates procedure and 
found that non-confabulating amnesia patients showed reduced correct 
recognition of target words compared with healthy controls. This finding was 
interpreted in the light of poor explicit memory in amnesia. Schacter and 
colleagues argued that degraded explicit representation cause difficulties in 
remembering previously presented information. In the present study, findings 
showed that the confabulating patients recalled and recognised a lower 
proportion of target words compared with non-confabulating patients. This 
finding indicates that the confabulating amnesia patients’ explicit memory may 
be more impaired compared with non-confabulating patients. This finding is 
consistent with the neuropsychological results, which showed that confabulating 
patients were more impaired in some memory tests compared with non-
confabulating patients. 
 
Furthermore, both confabulating and non-confabulating patients in the present 
study falsely recalled and falsely recognised a lower proportion of critical 
distracters compared with healthy controls. The present findings also showed 
that the two amnesia groups did not differ significantly in terms of the proportion 
of critical distracters produced. These findings are consistent with the results 
from Ciaramelli and colleagues (2006) work, who found that the reduced false 
recognition of critical distracters in confabulating patients may be due to an 
amnesia deficit rather than as a consequence of the impaired mechanisms 
specific to the confabulatory syndrome.   
 
Schacter and colleagues (1996) argued that amnesia patients’ tendency to 
show reduced false recall and false recognition of critical distracters may be due 
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to a deficit in understanding the gist of the studied list. However, Koutstaal and 
colleagues (1999, p.336) suggested that, in response to studying a list of 
semantically related items, elaborative processes may “generate” or 
automatically activate critical distracters during encoding and/ or retrieval. 
Consequently, healthy participants falsely recall or recognise the critical 
distracter due to source confusions in terms of whether the word was previously 
studied or spontaneously generated.  Amnesia patients show reduced false 
recognition of critical distracters because they are unable to generate these 
items. In relation to the present findings, it is currently unclear whether amnesia 
patients’ reduced false recall and false recognition of critical distracters is due to 
degraded gist memory or to a failure to generate the word during encoding and/ 
or retrieval. 
 
The present study also showed that confabulating patients falsely recognised a 
high proportion of positive intrusions compared with non-confabulating patients 
and healthy controls. This finding supports Fotopoulou and colleagues (2008b) 
in the notion that there is a positive emotional bias in confabulation. However 
Fotopoulou and colleagues reported that amnesia patients’ tendency to produce 
pleasant confabulations is specific to self-referent information. Confabulating 
patients presented with a prose recall task distorted previously studied negative 
self-referent prose to be more positive and self-enhancing. This bias was not 
observed when these patients recalled non-referent prose. In the present study, 
the confabulating patients showed a positive emotional bias in response to 
studying lists of word associates from three different categories (positive, 
negative and neutral) that are not obviously self-referent. This suggested that 
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the tendency to produce positive false memories may not be self-serving but 
represents a bias in general emotional processing.  
 
The present research also showed that the positive bias in confabulating 
patients was observed in false recognition but not in false recall. The recall test 
examined the proportion of correctly recalled words and the spontaneous 
production of non-presented words (critical distracters and unrelated intrusions). 
In contrast, the recognition test presented participants with a display booklet 
containing words, which they were asked to identify, as previously presented. 
Therefore the recognition test examined the provoked production of non-
presented words as participants were presented with the critical distracters and 
unrelated intrusions and to identify whether they were previously studied.  
 
One possible explanation for why the positive bias was not observed in false 
recall is that the delay between the study phase and recognition test was longer 
for recognition than recall memory testing. Confabulating patients may have 
recognised a significantly high proportion of positive intrusions as a 
consequence of weaker memory. An inspection of figure 3.1 and figure 3.2 
indicated that there is a similar pattern of results between the recall and 
recognition tests. Confabulating patients in both of these tests produced more 
positive unrelated intrusions compared with the non-confabulating patients and 
healthy controls. However, the proportion of positive intrusions falsely recalled 
in the confabulating group may have not approached statistical significance 
because the recall test was administered immediately after the study phase, 
whereas the recognition test was at a delay of approximately 15 minutes. This 
explanation is supported by findings from the signal detection analysis showing 
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that confabulating patients have significantly lower memory strength in the false 
recognition of positive unrelated intrusions compared with non-confabulating 
amnesia patients and healthy controls. These findings suggested that the 
tendency to falsely recognise more positive intrusions may be due to weaker 
memory for positive information. However it is also possible that weaker 
memory may be due to a positive emotional bias in the content of confabulation. 
 
In conclusion, only the findings from false recognition provide evidence for the 
positive emotional bias in the content of confabulation. Based on the findings 
from the signal detection analysis, the positive bias was only observed in false 
recognition because the delayed recognition test may have weakened memory 
in the confabulating group. Therefore the semantic-associates procedure is a 
weak model of confabulation. The findings from the semantic-associates 
procedure can only have strong implications for confabulation if the positive bias 
is found in both false recall and false recognition. Future studies would need to 
match the delay between the recall and recognition tests in order to examine 
the positive bias. Delaying the recall test may enhance the false recall of 
positive intrusions in confabulating patients. This would provide evidence of the 
positive bias in spontaneous confabulations. 
 
In the present study, there were no differences between confabulating and non-
confabulating patients in terms of false recall and false recognition of critical 
distracters. This suggested that the significantly reduced false recall and false 
recognition of critical distracters may be a consequence of impaired processes 
in amnesia. Schacter and colleagues (1998) argued that degraded gist 
representations in amnesia impair the ability to form a link between the studied 
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lists and reduces the susceptibility to critical distracters. However the findings 
from this study do not indicate whether reduced false recall and false 
recognition is due to poor gist memory. As a result, the study described in the 




























Study 2: The Facial Expressions Semantic-Associates Procedure  
 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter concerns application of a pictorial semantic-associates technique 
to confabulating amnesia patients. Before introducing this aspect, the chapter 
reviews the existing theoretical work concerning the pictorial semantic-
associates procedure in non-confabulating amnesia patients.  
 
The robustness of the semantic-associates procedure has contributed to an 
increase in false memory research. Schacter and colleagues (1996) argued that 
false recognition in the semantic-associates procedure may be determined by 
gist memory. They explained that healthy participants are more likely to falsely 
remember a critical distracter because it relates to the overall gist of the 
previously studied list. In contrast, non-confabulating amnesia patients find it 
difficult to form a link between the studied words and are unable to identify the 
theme in the list. As a result, critical distracters evoke a stronger sense of 
familiarity in healthy controls than in non-confabulating amnesia patients. 
 
In a series of controlled experiments, Schacter and colleagues (1997) 
constructed a pictorial semantic-associates procedure to examine false 
recognition in healthy participants. The procedure consisted of line drawings 
that were related to non-presented critical distracters. Some of the drawings 
were used from Roediger and McDermott’s (1995) word lists and were 
converted into pictures. Schacter and colleagues found that the proportion of 
critical distracters falsely recognised in response to the pictorial procedure was 
significantly lower than the proportion of critical distracters produced in 
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response to the standard procedure using written words (Schacter and Norman, 
1997; Schacter and Israel, 1997). This finding led them to suggest that both gist 
memory and having limited access to item-specific information may determine 
false recognition. Schacter and colleagues argued that the pictorial semantic-
associates procedure reduces the rate of false recognition because the studied 
pictorial items comprise distinctive perceptual representations. This increases 
access to item-specific information and helps in the discrimination of studied 
items from non-studied intrusions. 
 
Subsequently, Koutstaal and colleagues (2001) argued that non-confabulating 
amnesia patients’ reduced false recognition of critical distracters is subject to an 
alternative explanation. They referred to Johnson and colleagues’ (1993) 
explanation of false memories in healthy participants. Johnson and colleagues 
argued that false memories are a consequence of confusing the source or origin 
of the information. Healthy participants have a difficulty in distinguishing 
whether the critical distracter was an actual word from the studied list or a word 
that was unconsciously generated in response to the studied list. Critical 
distracters are produced because of source confusion and are mistaken for 
previously studied words.  
 
Koutstaal and colleagues (2001) applied this theory to non-confabulating 
patients. They postulated that as amnesia patients generally remember fewer 
items, they are less likely to confuse the source of the critical distracters. 
Koutstaal and colleagues examined this hypothesis using a semantic-
associates procedure that used novel objects as stimuli. Each object was 
constructed from a semantically related non-presented item known as the 
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prototype, which was later presented as a critical distracter in the recognition 
test. The procedure was used to reduce any source confusion. As the prototype 
was never seen or previously presented, participants were unlikely to produce 
the critical distracter spontaneously while studying the list of words. Koutstaal 
and colleagues argued that if non-confabulating patients’ tendency to show 
reduced false recognition was due to a source memory deficit then these 
patients would show increased false recognition when presented with pictorial 
critical distracters. However, the results showed reduced false recognition in 
non-confabulating amnesia patients and supported the notion of degraded gist 
memory. 
 
Schacter and colleagues (1999) developed another pictorial semantic-
associates task to examine whether semantic and conceptual gist 
representations play a role in false recognition. They hypothesised that false 
recognition of critical distracters in this study would be due to perceptual and 
conceptual gist memory processing rather than source confusions. Non-
confabulating amnesia patients were presented with pictures of common items 
in each category that were constructed from category-related distracters. 
Results showed that non-confabulating patients falsely recognised a 
significantly lower proportion of category-related distracters compared with 
healthy controls. These findings led Schacter and colleagues to conclude that 
gist memory is the main determinant of false recognition in the semantic-
associates procedure. Non-confabulating patients show reduced false 
recognition due to degraded gist representations that reduce the ability to form 




In conclusion, previous studies using the pictorial semantic-associates 
procedure supported the notion of gist memory impairment in non-confabulating 
amnesia patients (Koutstaal et al., 2001; Schacter et al., 2002). However this 
procedure has not been previously implemented in confabulating amnesia 
patients. Evidence of gist memory impairment in confabulating patients would 
provide a new insight into the mechanisms impaired in confabulation.  
 
Melo and colleagues (1999) argued that semantic processes modulated by the 
lateral temporal neocorex underlie gist memory. Subsequently, Verfaellie and 
Schacter (2005) argued that the brain regions related to memory such as the 
medial temporal lobes and diencephalon structures play a major role in the 
encoding of semantically-related information. Evidence of impaired gist memory 
in confabulating patients would suggest that the semantic processes needed to 
encode the relationship between items may be impaired in confabulation. On 
this basis, the present study is the first to examine gist memory in confabulating 
patients using a pictorial semantic-associates procedure. 
 
This study also aimed to examine the emotional biases in the content of 
confabulation. This approach may help to address whether confabulating 
patients also show positive biases in response to encoding pictorial information. 
In this context, using facial material is appropriate because it provides the 
opportunity to present emotionally related items to study biases in recognition 
memory. The present research used emotional facial expressions to construct a 




- To investigate whether confabulating and non-confabulating patients 
correctly recognise a lower proportion of pictorial target items compared 
with healthy controls. 
 
- To investigate whether confabulating and non-confabulating patients 
falsely recognise a lower proportion of pictorial critical distracters 
compared with healthy controls. 
 
- To investigate whether confabulating patients falsely recognise more 
non-studied intrusions from the happy emotional category compared with 
other categories (anger, disgust, fear, sad and neutral). 
 
- To investigate whether confabulating patients show a positive bias to 
falsely recognise more happy non-studied intrusions compared with non-
confabulating patients and healthy controls.  
 
- To investigate whether the overall rate of false recognition in all three 
















This study comprised the same three groups of participants who took part in 
study 1: 13 confabulating amnesia patients, 13 non-confabulating amnesia 
patients and 13 healthy controls. Participants’ demographic and diagnostic 
characteristics are not presented in this section as they have already been 
described in the previous chapter. 
 
4.2.2. Neuropsychological Measures 
The three groups of participants completed neuropsychological tests before 
they were administered the experimental procedures. The neuropsychological 
results have been presented in the previous chapter.  
 
4.2.3. The Facial Expressions Semantic-Associates Procedure 
A facial expressions semantic-associates procedure was constructed for the 
present study using the photographs from Kohler (2003). The materials used to 
create this procedure were described in the method chapter. The facial 
expressions semantic-associates procedure was administered in the following 
manner: 
 
1.  Study Phase - Participants were presented with photographs from six 
emotional categories: anger, disgust, fear, sad, neutral and happy (see 
Appendix 2.5). Each category contained 10 photographs that were 
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associates to one non-presented critical distracter. Each photograph was 
printed on a single page inside an A5 display booklet. The participants were 
asked to study each photograph for three seconds while the researcher 
turned the page to display the next item. All the photographs were displayed 
inside a single display booklet. 
 
2. Recognition Test - Participants were presented with a single display booklet 
containing 36 previously studied photographs. Six of the photographs were 
from each emotional category. This booklet also contained 36 new non-
presented intrusions and six critical distracters that had not been previously 
studied but were related to each emotional category (see Appendix 2.5). 
Participants were asked whether they had been previously presented with 
each photograph in the study phase of the experiment and to respond with 
either ‘yes’ or ‘no’. 
 
4.3. Results  
This section presents the analysis of results and the findings obtained from the 
present study. 
 
4.3.1. Analysis of Results 
A repeated measures ANOVA was used to analyse participants’ performance 
on the facial expressions semantic-associates procedure. The experimental 






4.3.2. Experimental Results 
Recognition results obtained from the affective semantic-associates procedure 
were analysed for all three groups. Table 4.1 (below) shows mean and standard 
deviations for the proportion of target items, critical distracters and non-studied 
intrusions produced in the recognition test between the three groups of 
participants. 
 
Three separate repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted to analyse the 
three dependent variables: previously studied (target) items, category-related 



















Table 4.1: Recognition Results: Mean scores (standard deviations) for the proportion of target 
items, critical distracters and non-studied intrusions produced in the recognition test between 















   Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
 
Proportion of Target items:  










Disgust Target   
 
.46 (.29) .44 (.20) .73 (.22) 
Fear Target 
 
.39 (.20) .46 (.23) .52 (.30) 
Sad Target 
 
.47 (.27) .55 (.29) .68 (.21) 
Neutral Target 
 
.56 (.19) .51 (.31) .65 (.24) 
Happy Target 
 
.48 (.24) .36 (.32) .68 (.24) 
 
Proportion of Critical Distracters: 
 








Disgust Critical Distracters  .08 (.28) .15 (.38) .69 (.48) 
 








Sad Critical Distracters 
 
.00 (.00) .08 (.28) .38 (.51) 
Neutral Critical Distracters 
 
.08 (.28) .08 (.28) .69 (.48) 
Happy Critical Distracters 
 
 
.15 (38) .15 (.38) .54 (52) 
 
Proportion of Non-studied Intrusions: 
 








Disgust Non-studied Intrusions  
 
.12 (.12) .08 (.11) .01 (.05) 
 









Sad Non-studied Intrusions 
 
.12 (.14) .09 (.11) .08 (.13) 
Neutral Non-studied Intrusions 
 
.10 (.13) .12 (.14) .04 (.07) 
Happy Non-studied Intrusions 
 





Results for Target Items 
A repeated measures ANOVA was used to examine the proportion of target 
items recognised from the six emotional categories (anger, disgust, fear, sad, 
neutral and happy) between the three groups (confabulating group, non-
confabulating group and healthy controls). There was a significant main effect of 
Group: F (2, 36) = 5.87, p<.01 and a main effect of Emotional category: F (5, 
180) = 2.40, p<.05. However, there was no significant interaction between 
Group and Emotional category: F (10, 180) = 1.53, p = .13. These findings 
suggested that the groups differed in terms of the proportion of targets 
recognised, but not across the emotional categories.  
 
Tukey post-hoc analyses were also carried out to explore the significant main 
effect of Group from a one-way ANOVA. Findings showed that the two amnesia 
groups recognised a significantly lower proportion of target items compared with 
healthy controls: confabulating group (mean difference = .21, p<.05) and non-
confabulating group (mean difference= .20, p<.05). However, there were no 
significant differences in the proportion of target items recognised between the 
confabulating and non-confabulating groups (mean difference = .01, p=1.00). 
 
Paired-sample t-tests were carried out to explore the significant main effect of 
Emotional category. Findings showed that overall participants recognised a 
significantly lower proportion of targets from the fear category compared with 
targets from the anger category (t (38) = 3.04, p<.01), the sad category (t (38) = 





Results for Critical Distracters 
Repeated measures ANOVA was used to examine the proportion of critical 
distracters recognised from the six emotional categories (anger, disgust, fear, 
sad, neutral and happy) between the three groups (confabulating group, non-
confabulating group and healthy controls). There was a significant main effect of 
Group: F (2, 36) = 20.12, p<.001. However, there was no significant main effect 
of Emotional category: F (5, 180) = 1.49, p=.20. There was also no significant 
interaction between Group and Emotional category: F (10, 180) = .58, p=.83. 
These findings indicated that there were significant differences between the 
groups in terms of the proportion of critical distracters recognised, but not 
across the emotional categories. 
 
Post-hoc analyses were also carried out to explore the significant main effect of 
Group from a one-way ANOVA. Findings showed that the two patient groups 
recognised a significantly lower proportion of critical distracters compared with 
healthy controls: confabulating group (mean difference = .46, p<.001) and non-
confabulating group (mean difference= .42, p<.001). However, there were no 
significant differences in terms of the proportion of critical distracters falsely 
recognised between the confabulating and non-confabulating amnesia groups 
(mean difference = .04, p=.88). These findings indicated that both the 
confabulating and non-confabulating patients showed reduced false recognition 
of critical distracters compared with healthy controls. 
 
Signal Detection Analysis for the Critical Distracters 
A signal detection analysis was carried out using rates of endorsement of target 
words (hit rate) with rates of selection of critical distracters (false alarms). This 
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analysis was carried out to examine differences in memory strength (d prime) 
and response bias (BD") between the three groups on this test. Findings 
showed that there were no significant differences between the three groups in 
terms of memory strength: F (2, 36) = 2.52, p=.09. However there were 
significant differences between the groups on BD" estimates: F (2, 36) = 3.20, 
p=.05. 
 
A post hoc Tukey test showed that the confabulating group had a significantly 
higher BD" estimate compared with healthy controls (mean difference = 0.48, 
p=.04). However, there were no significant differences found between the 
confabulating and non-confabulating amnesia groups (mean difference = .17, 
p=.65). These findings indicated that the confabulating group used a more 
conservative response criterion compared with healthy controls. No significant 
differences were found between the non-confabulating group and healthy 
controls on BD" estimate. 
 
Results for Non-studied Intrusions 
Figure 4.1 illustrates that both the confabulating and non-confabulating groups 
falsely recognised more non-studied intrusions across all the emotional 








Figure 4.1: False Recognition of non-studied Intrusions: Mean proportion of non-studied 
intrusions from the positive, negative and neutral categories falsely recognised by the three 
groups of participants: 13 confabulating amnesia patients, 13 non-confabulating amnesia 




A repeated measures ANOVA was used to examine the proportion of non-
studied intrusions recognised from the six emotional categories (anger, disgust, 
fear, sad, neutral and happy) between the three groups (confabulating group, 
non-confabulating group and healthy controls). There was a significant main 
effect of Group: F (2, 36) = 5.48, p<.01. However, there was no significant main 
effect of Emotional category: F (5, 180) = 1.46, p=.21. There was also no 
significant interaction between Group and Emotional category: F (10, 180) = 
.62, p=.79. These findings indicate group differences in terms of the proportion 
of non-studied intrusions falsely recognised. However, there were no significant 
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differences in the proportion of non-studied intrusions recognised across the 
emotional categories. 
 
Tukey post-hoc analyses were then carried out to explore the significant main 
effect of Group. Findings showed that both the confabulating and non-
confabulating groups falsely recognised significantly more non-studied 
intrusions compared with healthy controls: confabulating group (mean 
difference = .05, p<.05) and non-confabulating group (mean difference= .06, 
p<.05). However, there were no significant differences in terms of the proportion 
of non-studied intrusions falsely recognised between the confabulating and non-
confabulating groups (mean difference = .00, p=.99). These findings indicated 
that confabulating and non-confabulating patients show increased false 
recognition of non-studied intrusions compared with healthy controls.  
 
Results comparing false recognition between studies 1 and 2 
Table 4.2 (below) shows mean proportion of critical distracters and non-studied 
intrusions falsely recognised across the three groups of participants in studies 1 
and 2. This shows that the confabulating and non-confabulating groups falsely 
recognised a lower proportion of critical distracters and non-studied intrusions in 
the present study compared with study 1. Findings for the proportion of critical 
distracters across the two studies are further described below. This is followed 
by a description of the findings comparing the proportion of non-studied 






Table 4.2: Comparing False Recognition between Studies 1 and 2: Mean proportion of critical 
distracters and non-studied intrusions produced in the recognition test between the three 
participant groups in studies 1 and 2.  
 



















































Results for critical distracters between studies 1 and 2 
A repeated measures ANOVA was used to examine the proportion of critical 
distracters falsely recognised from two study-types (study 1 and study 2) 
between the three groups of participants. There was a significant main effect of 
Group: F (2, 36) = 22.18, p<.001. There was also a significant main effect of 
Study-Type: F (1, 36) = 4.97, p<.05. However, there was no significant 
interaction between Group and Study-Type: F (2, 36) = 1.78, p =.18.  These 
findings suggest that the groups differed in terms of the proportion of critical 
distracters falsely recognised. The findings also indicated that there were 
significant differences in the proportion of critical distracters recognised 
between the two studies, but not in relation to group differences. 
 
Paired-sample t-tests were carried out for each group to compare the proportion 
of critical distracters between studies 1 and 2. The two amnesia groups falsely 
recognised a significantly lower proportion of critical distracters in study 2 
compared with study 1: confabulating group (t (12) = 2.29, p<.05) and non-
confabulating group (t (12) = 2.36, p<.05). In contrast, healthy controls showed 
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no significant difference in terms of the proportion of critical distracters 
produced between studies 1 and 2: (t (12) = .20, p=.85).  These findings 
indicated that pictorial material reduced false recognition of critical distracters in 
amnesia patients. 
 
Results for non-studied intrusions between studies 1 and 2 
A repeated measures ANOVA was used to examine the proportion of non-
studied intrusions from two study-types (study 1 and study 2) between the three 
groups of participants. There was a main effect of Group: F (2, 36) = 16.21, 
p<.001. There was also a significant main effect of Study-Type: F (1, 36) = 
21.30, p<.001. However, there was a near-significant interaction between 
Group and Study-Type: F (2, 36) = 2.86, p =.07. These findings suggested that 
there were significant differences in the proportion of non-studied intrusions 
falsely recognised between the two studies.  
 
Paired-sample t-tests were also carried out for each group to compare the 
proportion of non-studied intrusions between studies 1 and 2. This analysis 
showed that the two amnesia groups produced significantly more non-studied 
intrusions in study 1 compared with study 2: confabulating group (t (12) = 4.18, 
p<.01) and non-confabulating group (t (12) = 2.25, p<.05). Healthy controls 
showed no significant difference in terms of the proportion of non-studied 
intrusions falsely recognised between studies 1 and 2: (t (12) = 1.34, p=.21). 
These findings indicated that the encoding of pictorial items also significantly 
reduced the rate of false recognition in both confabulating and non-




Summary of Results 
Findings from this study replicated the results from study 1 and showed that 
both confabulating and non-confabulating patients recognised a significantly 
lower proportion of target words and non-presented critical distracters 
compared with healthy controls. However, in contrast to the results from study 
1, findings from the present study showed no evidence of the positive emotional 
bias in confabulation. No significant differences were found between the three 
groups in terms of the proportion of non-studied intrusions falsely recognised 
across all the emotional categories. Findings also showed that both 
confabulating and non-confabulating patients falsely recognised a lower 
proportion of critical distracters and non-studied intrusions in this study 
compared with study 1. This indicated that pictorial stimuli in the semantic-

















Previous studies examined gist memory in non-confabulating amnesia patients 
and healthy controls using the pictorial semantic-associates procedure 
(Koutstaal et al., 1999; Schacter et al., 1997; Schacter et al., 2002). Koutstaal 
and colleagues (1999) found that non-confabulating patients showed reduced 
false recognition of pictorial critical distracters compared with healthy controls. 
They suggested that healthy participants falsely recognised a critical distracter 
based on its conceptual and perceptual similarity to the previously studied 
items. Koutstaal and colleagues concluded that non-confabulating patients’ 
tendency to falsely recognise a lower proportion of critical distracters might be 
due to degraded gist memory in amnesia (Koutstaal et al., 2001; Schacter et al., 
2002).  
 
However, the pictorial semantic-associates procedure had not been used in 
confabulating amnesia patients. Therefore, the present research used this 
procedure by incorporating faces with different emotions to examine the positive 
emotional bias that has been associated with confabulation. The second aim of 
this study relates to the findings from study 1 presented in the previous chapter. 
The results from the previous chapter showed that confabulating patients falsely 
recognised a lower proportion of critical distracters compared with healthy 
controls. However, study 1 did not explain why confabulating and non-
confabulating amnesia patients were less susceptible to critical distracters 
compared with healthy controls. Therefore, the present study also aimed to 
address whether confabulating patients’ tendency to show reduced false 




To summarise, the findings from this study suggested the following:  
 
1) Both confabulating and non-confabulating amnesia patients correctly 
recognised a lower proportion of target items compared with healthy 
controls. 
 
2) Both confabulating and non-confabulating patients showed reduced false 
recognition of critical distracters compared with healthy controls.   
 
3) Confabulating patients did not show a positive bias in the false 
recognition of non-studied intrusions. 
 
4) Relative to healthy controls, both confabulating and non-confabulating 
patients showed reduced false recognition of critical distracters and non-
studied intrusions in the present study compared with study 1. 
 
Previous research using the semantic-associates procedure showed that non-
confabulating patients correctly recognised a lower proportion of target items 
compared with healthy controls (Schacter et al., 1996; Koutstaal et al., 2001). It 
was argued that amnesia patients had poor explicit representations, which 
affected their ability to remember previously presented information. In the 
present study, both confabulating and non-confabulating patients showed 
significantly reduced correct recognition compared with healthy controls. 
Moreover, there were no differences between the two amnesia groups in terms 
of the proportion of correctly recognised targets. This finding supported previous 
theories in the notion of impaired explicit memory in amnesia patients. 
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In the study described in the previous chapter, a positive emotional bias was 
found in the confabulating group. These patients falsely recognised more 
emotionally positive non-studied intrusions, compared with non-confabulating 
patients and healthy controls. This positive bias was not found in the present 
study using the pictorial semantic-associates procedure. In the confabulating 
group, no differences were found in the proportion of non-studied intrusions 
falsely recognised across all the emotional categories. These findings 
suggested that confabulating patients may have had less difficulty processing 
pictorial stimuli.  
 
Schacter and colleagues (1997) argued that pictorial items form unique 
conceptual and perceptual representations. Encoding of pictorial items helps in 
the discrimination of studied items from non-studied intrusions. In relation to the 
current findings, this suggested that when patients with impaired memory and 
executive processes are unable to discriminate between true memories and 
imagined constructs, emotional processing biases give rise to confabulations.  
 
The present study is the first to use a pictorial semantic-associates procedure to 
examine false recognition in confabulating amnesia patients. This has provided 
a novel finding showing that both confabulating and non-confabulating patients 
falsely recognised a lower proportion of pictorial critical distracters compared 
with healthy controls. This suggested that the semantic processing mechanisms 
needed to encode the relationship between items may be impaired in these 
patients. However, both confabulating and non-confabulating patients did not 
differ in terms of the proportion of critical distracters falsely recognised. This 
indicated that there were no differences between the two groups in the severity 
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of their gist memory deficit. This implies that confabulating patients’ reduced 
false recognition results from their amnesia deficit rather than the impaired 
mechanisms specific to confabulation. The finding of reduced false recognition 
in this study is a marker of poor gist memory in amnesia with or in the absence 
of confabulation.  
 
However, findings from a series of studies led Mayes and colleagues (1980) to 
conclude that amnesia patients’ show a normal pattern of performance in 
processing semantic information. These findings contradicted the notion that 
there is degraded gist memory in amnesia. Amnesia patients’ and healthy 
controls were presented with lists of shapes to study. Amnesia patients were 
administered a recognition test immediately after the presentation of each list, 
while healthy controls were tested after a longer retention interval. Mayes and 
colleagues delayed the recognition test in controls in order to equate memory 
performance of amnesic patients and controls. They argued that delaying the 
memory tests prevents interaction effects which can arise as a result of having 
different memory strengths. The findings showed that amnesia patients’ 
performance was similar to healthy controls. Both amnesia patients and healthy 
controls’ recognition memory performance improved in a high level task where 
they were asked to produce a label (i.e. meaningful interpretation) for each item 
during learning. In addition, the two groups did worse on a low level task where 
they were asked to count the number of sides of each presented shape during 
learning. The finding that the two groups performed better in the high level task 
indicated that they attached strongly meaningful labels to the shapes during 
learning and retrieval. Mayes and colleagues argued that as the high level task 
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had a similar effect on recognition in the two groups; it was possible that the 
amnesia patients used semantic processes during learning similar to controls. 
 
Mayes and colleagues (1981) also showed that delayed memory in healthy 
controls was similar to amnesic immediate memory. In relation to the semantic-
associates procedure, the finding of reduced false recognition of critical 
distracters in amnesia may not be due to gist memory impairment, but rather a 
significantly weaker memory in amnesia patients compared with healthy 
controls. However, using a signal detection analysis, findings in the present 
study showed that there were no significant differences between the three 
groups on memory strength. This indicated that the significantly reduced false 
recognition of critical distracters in the confabulating and non-confabulating 
groups may not be due to weaker memory. However, the confabulating group 
used a more conservative response criterion during the recognition of critical 
distracters compared with healthy controls, but not when compared with the 
non-confabulating group. It can be argued that conservative responding in the 
confabulating group may be a consequence of degraded gist memory which 
makes it more difficult to form a link between the studied lists.      
 
Schacter and colleagues (1997) found that the use of pictures in the semantic-
associates procedure ‘suppressed’ overall false recognition in healthy controls. 
They suggested that pictures are easier to retrieve than words because they 
comprise detailed item-specific information that enhances encoding 
mechanisms and helps to reject non-presented items. The findings from the 
present study were compared with those in study 1 in terms of the proportion of 
critical distracters across the three groups. Relative to healthy controls, the 
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findings showed that the confabulating and non-confabulating patients falsely 
recognised a significantly lower proportion of critical distracters and non-studied 
intrusions using pictorial stimuli compared with written stimuli. This indicated 
that the pictorial stimuli reduced false recognition of non-presented items in 
amnesia patients.  
 
A possible explanation for these findings is proposed in relation to Schacter’s 
theory of degraded gist memory in amnesia. Healthy participants in the present 
study may have falsely recognised pictorial critical distracters because these 
items evoke emotional facial expressions that were perceptually and 
conceptually similar to the studied items. In contrast, amnesia patients’ 
degraded gist memory may have reduced their ability to form a link between the 
facial expressions in each category. Consequently, these patients may have 
relied on the features in the photographs (such as the face, eyes, hair) rather 
than the emotion being expressed. As a result, amnesia patients may have 
rejected more pictorial distracters because these items did not have the item-
specific details associated with the studied items.  
 
However, one limitation is that the recognition test in this study was 
administered immediately after the study phase, whereas the recognition test in 
study 1 was administered at a delayed retention interval. Therefore, it is 
possible that false recognition was significantly higher in study 1 because the 
delayed recognition test may have weakened memory.  
 
In conclusion, confabulating and non-confabulating patients’ tendency to show 
reduced false recognition of critical distracters indicated degraded gist memory 
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in amnesia. Confabulating patients did not show a greater false recognition rate 
than non-confabulating patients. This suggested that degraded gist memory is 
due to an amnesic deficit and is not specific to confabulation.   
 
In comparison to healthy controls, the confabulating and non-confabulating 
amnesia patients also showed reduced false recognition of critical distracters 
and non-studied intrusions in the present study compared with study 1. This 
suggested that both confabulating and non-confabulating patients may have 
relied on item-specific knowledge about the studied items (i.e. facial features) in 
rejecting critical distracters and non-studied intrusions. However, the reduced 
false recognition rate found in this study might have also been due to the 



















Study 3: Mood Induction and the Affective Semantic-Associates 
Procedure  
 
5.1. Introduction  
Fotopoulou and colleagues (2004, 2008a) have reported that confabulating 
patients show a tendency to produce positive and self-enhancing false 
memories about themselves in contrast to non-confabulating patients and 
healthy controls. They have argued that the positive bias in confabulation 
serves to maintain well-being and self-coherence in an otherwise confusing and 
sometimes stressful circumstance (Fotopoulou, 2009). The present study aimed 
to examine whether mood influences the positive emotional bias in 
confabulating amnesia patients using a video mood induction procedure. In this 
study, confabulating amnesia patients, non-confabulating amnesia patients and 
healthy controls were induced to negative and positive mood states followed by 
an affective semantic-associates procedure.  
 
Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) argued that emotions, personal goals and 
the wish for self-coherence may shape the manner in which confabulations 
occur in the context of brain injury or disease (Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 
2000; Fotopoulou, 2008; Burgess and McNeil, 1999). According to this 
hypothesis, executive processes guide the reconstruction of memories in order 
to maintain self-coherence. When executive processes are impaired, memories 
are altered or confabulations are produced to support current goals (Conway 
and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). This theory was subsequently used as a basis for 
suggesting that emotional biases in confabulation arise when personal goals 
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are exaggerated in autobiographical memory reconstruction (Fotopoulou et al., 
2007).   
 
Fotopoulou and colleagues (2008a) obtained a “paradoxical” finding showing 
that the higher the confabulating patients rating on the depression scale, the 
greater the production of pleasant and self-enhancing confabulations. This 
correlation between negative mood and pleasant confabulations led to the 
conclusion that further research is needed to investigate whether low mood 
triggers confabulations (Fotopoulou et al., 2008a, pp.771). 
 
However, Metcalf and colleagues (2010) obtained contrasting findings showing 
that patients who were clinically depressed often produced fewer pleasant 
confabulations. Bajo and colleagues (2010) obtained similar findings in a more 
recent study examining the affective valence of confabulation. They found a 
weak positive correlation between depression and unpleasant confabulations. 
This led to the conclusion that the effects of low mood on the content of 
confabulation is “subtle and not necessarily specific to confabulations” (Bajo et 
al., 2010, p.981).Therefore, the role of emotions on the content of confabulation 
is currently unclear and further research is needed to investigate this topic.  
 
Previous studies have employed a variety of mood induction procedures to 
examine more generally the effects of mood on recall in healthy participants. 
These studies induced participants into negative and positive mood conditions 
prior to studying lists of words (Bower et al., 1981; Scharff et al., 2003; Storbeck 




Some of the earliest studies on this topic used mood simulation techniques. For 
example, a well-recognised procedure known as the Velten technique involves 
healthy participants simulating feelings of happiness or sadness while studying 
a list of statements from three different categories (positive, negative and 
neutral) (Velten, 1968). The technique has been used to demonstrate mood 
congruent bias with participants recalling a higher proportion of affective 
information that was congruent to the simulated mood (Bower et al., 1981; 
Kenealy, 1997).  
 
However, investigations of the mood congruent phenomenon were met with 
some inconsistencies. Some studies failed to replicate the mood congruent 
effect and argued that this memory bias is an unstable phenomenon (Tobias, 
1992). 
 
More recently, Ruci and colleagues (2009) examined mood congruent false 
memories in healthy participants. Participants were administered negative and 
positive mood inductions prior to studying lists of affective words from Roediger 
and colleagues (2001). This study used a mood simulation technique where 
participants were asked to simulate the emotions that were being depicted in 
the story entitled ‘The Lottery Ticket’. They found that participants falsely 
recognised more critical distracters that matched the mood state induced during 
the time of learning the studied lists. An important issue in conducting such 
research is the success and validity of the mood induction technique.  In this 
regard, mood simulation techniques successfully induced positive and negative 
mood states in healthy participants (Ruci et al., 2009). However, mood 
simulation techniques have received much criticism. Fiedler and colleagues 
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(2001) argued that procedures such as the Velten technique may not be 
inducing reliable mood states. They argued that when participants are asked to 
stimulate a specific mood, the outcome of the experiment becomes more 
obvious. Consequently, the participants may respond by acting towards how 
they think they should behave. Fiedler and colleagues argued that the findings 
of a mood congruent effect using this procedure may be the result of response 
bias rather than genuine mood states.  
 
Some studies employed musical mood induction procedures as an alternative 
approach to the Velten technique (Gerrards-Hesse et al., 1994; Kenealy, 1997). 
These studies found that participants in the positive musical condition reported 
higher levels for happiness than participants in the sad musical condition. Martin 
(1990) argued that this procedure is effective in inducing negative mood states 
particularly depression, but less efficient in inducting elated mood compared 
with the Velten technique.    
 
Video mood induction procedures have been shown to induce temporary but 
robust mood states (Kunzmann and Gruhn, 2005; Mograbi et al., 2012). This 
procedure consists of films that portray stories with pleasant or unpleasant 
emotional content.  For example, Kunzmann and Gruhn (2005) used sad film 
clips to induced negative emotional reactions. Mood was measured using self-
report questionnaires. Participants’ heart rate and the electrical conductance of 
the skin were also monitored. This procedure was found to induce high levels of 
sadness in older adults. Subsequently, Mograbi and colleagues (2012) used 
film clips to induce positive, negative and neutral mood states. This procedure 
was found to induce reliable mood states in Alzheimer’s patients and controls.  
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To date, previous studies have not used a mood induction procedure to 
examine the effects of mood on confabulation. The present study used negative 
mood video clips from Kunzmann and Gruhn’s (2005) study (also used by 
Mograbi et al 2012) and a positive mood video from Mograbi and colleagues 
(2012) to induce mood changes. Participants completed video mood induction 
prior to the administration of the affective semantic-associates procedure. This 
study aimed to address the following: 
 
- To investigate whether the video mood induction procedures induce all 
three groups of participants into positive and negative mood states.  
 
- To investigate whether all participants recall and recognise more 
affective target words that are congruent to the induced mood state. 
 
- To investigate whether confabulating patients falsely recall and falsely 
recognise more positive critical distracters in the negative mood condition 
compared with the positive mood condition.  
 
- To investigate whether confabulating patients falsely recall and falsely 
recognise more positive unrelated intrusions in the negative mood 
condition compared with the positive mood condition.  
 
- To investigate whether confabulating patients falsely recall and falsely 
recognise more positive unrelated intrusions in the positive and negative 





The method section of chapter 5 will begin by discussing participants 
demographic and clinical diagnoses. This will be followed by a brief summary of 
the chosen background neuropsychological tests. In the later part of this 
section, the experimental procedure used in this study will be discussed.  
 
5.2.1. Participants 
This study comprised three new groups (confabulating; confabulating amnesic; 
and healthy controls) each consisting of 13 participants. 
 
All participants were recruited based on the inclusion and exclusion criteria 
described in chapter 2. 
 
Matching Variables  
All three groups were matched on demographic variables. The confabulating 
and non-confabulating groups were also matched on the severity of amnesia 
based on the WMS-IV immediate subtests. 
 
Participants Demographic Differences 
Statistical differences between the three groups on gender, age and level of 
education were examined. Table 5.1 (below) shows the mean percentage of 
males and females in each of the three participant groups. The table also shows 
the means and standard deviations for age and level of education. 
 
A chi-square test for independence (with Fisher’s Exact Test) showed no 
significant gender differences between the groups: X2
 




A one-way ANOVA showed no statistically significant age differences between 
the groups (F (2, 36) = 2.38, p = .11) and level of education (F (2, 36) = 1.58, p 
= .22). 
 
Table 5.1: Demographic difference:  The mean (SD) and significant differences on age and 










Gender    
               % Male 76.9% 69.2% 76.9% 
               % Female 23.1% 30.8% 23.2% 
Age    
                  Means  (SD) 56.9 (9.9) 50.9 (11.2) 48.2( 10.0) 
Level of Education    
                Means  (SD) 13.46 (1.20) 13.77 (1.30) 14.31 (1.18) 
 
 
Participants standard deviation differences based on the WMS-IV subtests 
Table 5.2 (below) shows the differences between the z scores for the WMS-IV 
memory tests and z scores for current (WASI) IQ. Amnesia patients were 
recruited based on the criterion that their memory score is less than 1.5 








Table 5.2: Matching variables: shows the Z score differences between the WMS-IV memory 























































































Table 5.2 shows that the confabulating and non-confabulating patients’, as 
would be expected by definition, showed overall performance on the memory/IQ 
subtest difference greater than 1.5 standard deviations. Furthermore, an 
independent-samples t-test showed that there were no significant differences 
between the two groups on z scores.  
 
Clinical Diagnoses in the Confabulating Group  
Table 5.3 (below) shows the confabulating and non-confabulating patients 
grouped according to their clinical diagnoses at the time of recruitment.  
 
The majority in the confabulating group were diagnosed with Wernicke-
Korsakoff Syndrome. Traumatic brain injury was the second most commonly 
observed pathology in the confabulating group and was often the result of 
vehicle accidents and falling (2/2). Cerebrovascular disease in the current 
sample was predominantly caused by hypertension (2/2).  Encephalitis in the 
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confabulating group was cause by an autoimmune limbic system. Epilepsy was 
diagnosed in one confabulating patient as a result of recurrent seizures 
emanating from the temporal lobe region. A confabulating patient in the current 
sample was diagnosed with systemic lupus erythematosus; this patient had a 
neuropsychiatric syndrome including headaches and degraded anterograde 
memory.  
 
Clinical Diagnoses in the Non-confabulating Group  
In the non-confabulating group, the majority of the patients again had Wernicke-
Korsakoff syndrome. HIV and traumatic brain injury were also common in this 
group. HIV in one of the non-confabulating patients was found in the context of 
Pneumocystis Carinii Pneumonia. Encephalitis in the non-confabulating group 
was cause by potassium channel (VGKC) complex autoantibodies. 
 
Clinical MRI scans were obtained for 10 confabulating patients and 7 non-
confabulating patients (see appendix 3.0 for the clinical reports on patients’ 











Table 5.3: Clinical Diagnoses 13 confabulating amnesia patients and 13 non-confabulating 














Wernicke-Korsakoff Syndrome 5 (38.5%) 8 (6.15%) 13 (33.3%) 
Cerebrovascular Disease 2 (15.4%) 0 (0%) 2 (5.1%) 
HIV Encephalopathy 1 (7.7%) 2 (15.4%) 3 (7.7%) 
Epilepsy  1 (7.7%) 0 (0%) 1 (2.6%) 
Encephalitis 1 (7.7%) 1 (7.7%) 2 (5.1%) 
Systemic Lupus Erythematosus 1 (7.7%) 0 (0%) 1 (2.6%) 
 
 
5.2.2. Screening and Neuropsychological Measures 
As described in chapter 2, all participants were administered screening and 
background neuropsychological tests prior to the experimental procedures.  
 
5.2.3. Experimental Procedure 
Mood induction preceded the affective semantic–associates procedure. There 
were two conditions, one with positive and the other with negative induction, 
presented on separate occasions. The order was counter-balanced with half of 
the participants for each order. The materials used to construct this procedure 
are described in more detail in chapter 2.  
 
1. Mood Induction Procedure – In the positive mood condition, participants 
watched a seven minute scene from the British comedy series entitled ‘Dad’s 
Army’. In the negative condition, a ten minute edited scene from a film 
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entitled ‘One True Thing’ depicting a story about terminal cancer was used. 
The video clips were presented to participants using an Acer Notebook 
computer connected to portable Philips 2.0 watts multimedia speakers to 
accommodate participants with mild hearing difficulties. The Positive Affect 
Negative Affect Scale (PANAS) was completed immediately after the 
presentation of each video clip.  
 
2. Semantic-Associates Procedure: Study Phase – This procedure involved 
the presentation of 6 lists of words, with each list containing 15 word 
associates to one non-presented critical distracter. The lists were 
presented in two A5 display booklets, each containing three word-lists 
belonging to one of the following categories, positive, negative and neutral. 
Each word was printed on a single page and shown for three seconds. The 
booklet pages were turned at a rate to determine this study time.  
 
3. Semantic-Associates Procedure: Recall Test Phase – Free recall tests were 
administered immediately after the presentation of each list. Once 
participants completed the recall test for all 6 lists, they were then 
administered the recognition test. 
 
4. Semantic-Associates Procedure: Recognition Test Phase – This test 
comprised a single display booklet containing 24 previously studied words, 
24 new non-presented unrelated intrusions and 6 critical distracters that had 
not been previously studied but were related to the words presented in the 
study phase. Participants were asked whether they had previously been 
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presented with each word in the study phase of the experiment and to 
respond with either ‘yes’ or ‘no’. 
 
5.3. Results  
This section will be introduced by discussing the results for each 
neuropsychological test administered to the three groups of participants. This is 
followed by a discussion of the results obtained from the confabulation 
interview. Finally, the results obtained from the semantic- associates procedure 
will be discussed. 
 
5.3.1 Neuropsychological Results  
The data obtained from the neuropsychological tests were first analysed using 
one-way ANOVAs. In addition, the confabulating and non-confabulating 
amnesia groups were compared on memory and executive measures using an 
independent-samples t-test. 
 
Table 5.4 (below) shows the means, standard deviations and percentile scores 
of the three groups on the neuropsychological tests. This is followed by a 










Table 5.4: Neuropsychological Results: Mean raw scores, standard deviations and percentile 
scores on neuropsychological tests between the three groups. 
 









Mean (SD) %ile Mean (SD) %ile Mean (SD) %ile 
 













       
WASI (2-subtests)       
Vocabulary  54.5 (9.2) 37th  58.3 (8.8) 50th  57.9 (8.8) 50th  
Matrix Reasoning 21.0 (5.1) 63rd  24.1 (4.3) 75th  27.9 (3.3) 84th  
WASI Full Scale IQ 103.6 (15.0) 61st  109.0 (10.0) 73rd  109.5 (9.8) 73rd  
       
 
WMS IV (immediate subtests) 
     
Logical Memory  11.9 (8.1) 2nd  15.1 (4.6) 5th    33.8 (3.4) 84th   
Verbal Paired Associates  9.6 (6.8) 2nd  15.2 (9.4) 9th  36.4 (9.5) 75th  
Visual Reproduction 18.5 (8.7) 2nd   24.3 (7.9) 5th  41.2 (2.1) 91st  
       
 
RMT 
      
Word Recognition 31.8 (7.8) 1st 36.9 (8.2) 5th  46.2 (2.7) 75th   
Face Recognition 30.2 (6.8) 1st  33.3 (6.8) 5th  42.8 (3.4) 25th  
       
 
Hayling Test 
      
Sentence Completion 
(Time) 
23.2 (14.0) 5th  20.0 (17.6) 10th  12.2 (7.9) 25th  
Unconnected Completion 
(Time) 
70.6 (31.7) 10th  51.9 (31.1) 25th  39.8 (21.9) 50th 
Unconnected Completion 
(Error) 
19.0 (10.3) 1st   13.1 (14.9) 10th  1.40 (2.0) 75th 
       
 
Brixton Test 
      





Premorbid and Current Intellectual Ability 
An inspection of the means on the NART-R and WASI tests on Table 5.4 
indicated that the confabulating patients’ current intellectual ability mildly 
deteriorated from their level of premorbid cognitive functioning. An ANOVA 
analysis of these results revealed no significant difference between the three 
groups on the NART-R (F (2, 36) = .07, p = .93) and WASI Full-Scale IQ (F (2, 
36) = .98, p = .39).    
 
Anterograde Memory 
The present research also used the WMS IV and RMT to examine verbal and 
non-verbal memory capacity in all three groups. The means and percentile 
scores on Table 5.4 indicate that the confabulating and non-confabulating 
amnesia patients had deficits in both verbal and non-verbal memory. A further 
analysis of these results using One-way ANOVA showed that there were 
significant differences between the groups on all three WMS–IV immediate 
subtests: logical memory (F (2, 36) = 55.14, p<.001), verbal paired associates 
(F (2, 36) = 34.61, p<.001) and visual reproduction (F (2, 36) = 37.67, p<.001). 
Tukey post-hoc test revealed that the confabulating and non-confabulating 
groups underperformed on all three WMS-IV subtests compared with the 
healthy controls (p<.001). However, there were no significant differences 
between the confabulating and non-confabulating amnesia patients on these 
subtests. Furthermore, results showed significant differences between the 
groups on both of the RMT tests: Word Recognition (F (2, 36) = 15.55 p<.001) 
and Face Recognition F (2, 36) = 16.28, p<.001). The two patient groups again 
significantly underperformed on these tests compared with healthy controls: 
confabulating group (mean difference= 14.46, p<.001) and non-confabulating 
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group (mean difference= 9.39, p<.001). However there were no significant 
differences between the confabulating and non-confabulating amnesia patients 
on this test. 
 
Executive Functioning 
The present research used the Hayling and Brixton tests to examine executive 
functioning in the three groups. An inspection of the means on Table 5.4 show 
that the confabulating and non-confabulating amnesia groups both 
underperformed on executive measures compared with healthy controls. 
Further analysis using one-way ANOVA revealed no significant difference 
between the three groups on the Hayling sentence completion test: F (2, 36) = 
2.20, p=.13. This finding suggested that there were no significant differences 
between three groups on instigating a timed response. However, significant 
differences between the three groups were found on the Hayling sentence 
unconnected completion tests time score: F (2, 36) = 3.84, p<.05.  A Tukey test 
showed that the confabulating amnesia group were slower to respond on this 
test compared with healthy controls: mean difference= 30.85, p<.05. However, 
this difference was not significant between the confabulating and non-
confabulating groups. Significant differences between the three groups were 
also found on the Hayling sentence unconnected completion tests error score: F 
(2, 36) = 9.41, p< .01 The Tukey test also revealed that both amnesia groups 
produced more errors on the unconnected completion tests compared with 
healthy controls: confabulating group (mean difference=17.62, p<.001) and non-
confabulating group (mean difference=11.69, p<.05). However, there were no 
significant differences between the confabulating and non-confabulating groups 
on this test (mean difference=5.92, p<.34). These findings showed that the 
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confabulating group were slower to respond yet produced more errors. This 
finding suggested that the confabulating group had difficulties suppressing the 
prepotent response. In contrast, the non-confabulating group produced a time 
score that was not significantly different to healthy controls. This suggested that 
the non-confabulating patients were impulsive because they were faster to 
initiate a timed-response yet produced the same number of errors as the 
confabulating group. Finally, the ANOVA analysis also revealed significant 
difference between the three groups on the Brixton test: F (2, 36) = 17.65, p< 
.001. The two amnesia groups significantly underperformed on this test 
compared with healthy controls: confabulating group (mean difference= 12.39, 
p<.001) and non-confabulating (mean difference= 9.92, p<.001). These findings 
indicated that these patients have difficulties identifying and following a rule 
compared with healthy controls. 
 
5.3.2. Confabulation results 
Results obtained from the confabulating and non-confabulating amnesia groups 
on the confabulation interview were analysed to examine the proportion of 
confabulatory answers produced using an independent samples t-test. Table 
5.5 (below) shows the mean proportion of confabulatory answers produced on 









Table 5.5: Confabulation Results: Proportion of confabulatory answers in each section of the 

























































t (24) = 20.33, 




















t (24) = 2.54,  
p< .05 
Confabulatory 






























































t (15.7) = 3.26, 
p<.01 
 























Statistical analysis using an independent-samples t-test showed that the 
confabulating group produced a higher proportion of confabulatory answers on 
this test compared with the non-confabulating group. 
 
Furthermore, results showed that the confabulating group produced a 
significantly higher proportion of confabulatory answers compared with the non-
confabulating group on the episodic questions and episodic “I-don’t-know” 
questions. The confabulating group were also more disorientated in time and 
place compared with the non-confabulating group. 
 
However, there were no significant differences between the two groups on the 
proportion of confabulatory answers produced on personal semantic questions, 
general semantic questions and semantic “I-don’t-know” questions. 
 
5.3.3. Results from the mood induction procedures 
The scores on the Positive Affect Negative Affect Scale (PANAS) questionnaire 
were analysed in order to examine whether the video mood induction 
procedures induced relative mood changes.   
 
A repeated measures ANOVA was carried out to analyse the dependent 
variable: participants’ positive and negative mood ratings.  Paired-sample t-tests 
were also carried out to examine participants’ positive and negative mood 
scores in response to the two mood induction procedures. 
 
The repeated measures ANOVA was carried out with Mood condition (positive 
and negative) and Mood-Rating-Type (positive and negative) as the with-in 
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subject factors. Group was the between-participant factor (confabulating group, 
non-confabulating group and healthy controls). The dependent variable was the 
participants’ mood ratings. Findings showed that there was no main effect of 
Group: F (1, 36) = .53, p=.59.  However, there was a main effect of Mood 
condition: F (1, 36) = 47.99, p<.001 and a main effect of Mood-Rating-Type: F 
(1, 36) = 53.34, p<.001. There was also a significant two-way interaction 
between Mood-condition and Mood-Rating-Type: F (1, 36) = 476.54, p<.001. 
However, there was no significant three-way interaction between Mood 
condition, Mood-Rating-Type and Group: F (2, 36) = .81, p=.45. This suggested 
that the mood ratings were dependent on condition, but with no difference in 
this pattern between groups. 
 
To confirm this, paired-samples t-tests were carried out to compare positive 
versus negative mood induction within each group. All groups that were 
administered the positive video induction procedure produced a significantly 
higher rating for positive mood: confabulating group (t (12) = 9.05, p<.001), non-
confabulating amnesia group (t (12) = 9.85, p<.001) and healthy controls (t (12) 
= 13.26, p<.001). 
 
For the negative video induction procedure, all groups produced a significantly 
higher rating for negative mood: confabulating group (t (12) = 6.63, p<.001), 







5.3.4. Results from the Semantic-Associates Procedures 
Three separate repeated measures ANOVAs were used to analyse the three 
dependent variables: target words, critical distracters and unrelated intrusions. 
This analysis was used for the recall and recognition tests.  The results for the 
recall test are described below. This is followed by the results for the recognition 
test. 
 
5.3.4.1. Recall Test Results  
Table 5.6 (below) shows means and standard deviations (SD) for the proportion 
of target words, critical distracters and unrelated distracters recalled between 


















Table 5.6: Recall Results: Mean scores (SD) for the proportion of target words, critical 




























































































































































































































Recall Test Results for Target Words  
A repeated measures ANOVA was used with Word-Category (positive, negative 
and neutral) and Mood condition (positive and negative) as the two within-
participant factors and Group as the between-participant factor (confabulating 
group, non-confabulating group and healthy controls). The number of target 
words recalled was the dependent variable. There was a significant main effect 
of Group: F (2, 36) = 19.53, p<.001. There was no main effect of Mood 
condition: F (1, 36) = 1.59, p=.21. However there was a significant main effect 
of Word-category: F (2, 72) = 8.73, p<.01. There was no significant interaction 
between Group and Mood condition: F (2, 36) = .34, p=.72. There was also no 
interaction between Group and Word-category: F (4, 72) = .34, p=.27. However, 
there was a significant two-way interaction between Mood condition and Word-
category: F (2, 72) = 25.49, p<.01. There was also a significant three-way 
interaction between Group, Word-category and Mood condition: F (4, 72) = 
7.43, p<.001. These findings suggested that the groups differed in terms of the 
targets recalled between the positive and negative mood conditions. 
 
Paired samples t-tests were carried out to further explore the two-way 
interaction between word-category and mood condition. Findings showed that 
overall, participants recalled significantly more positive targets in the positive 
condition compared with the negative condition: t (38) = 4.56, p<.001. In 
contrast, these participants recalled significantly more negative targets in the 
negative condition compared with the positive condition: t (38) = 3.41, p<.01. 
However there were no significant differences in the recall of neutral targets 
between the positive and negative mood conditions: t (38) = 1.11, p=.27. These 
160 
 
findings suggested that participants generally recalled more information that 
was congruent to the mood state induced at the time of learning the studied list. 
 
Paired samples t-tests were also used to examine whether there was a mood 
congruent effect in the three groups. In the positive mood condition, the 
confabulating group did not show a mood congruent bias. These patients 
showed no significant difference in the proportion of positive, negative and 
neutral targets recalled. In contrast, the non-confabulating patients and healthy 
controls recalled significantly more positive targets in comparison to the 
negative and neutral targets (p<.05). In the negative mood condition, the 
confabulating group showed no significant differences in the proportion of 
positive, negative and neutral targets recalled. The non-confabulating amnesia 
group in the negative mood condition did not show the mood congruent bias. 
This group showed no significant difference in the recall of negative and neutral 
targets (t (38) = 1.98, p=.07). However, healthy controls showed this bias and 
recalled significantly more negative targets compared with positive and neutral 
targets (p<.01). These findings suggested that, in contrast to non-confabulating 
patients and healthy controls, mood in confabulating patients did not influence 
the recall of target words. 
 
A Tukey post-hoc analysis was then carried out to further explore the significant 
three-way interaction, in relation to group differences. Findings showed that the 
confabulating group recalled a significantly lower proportion of targets across all 
three word categories in the positive mood condition compared with the non-
confabulating group (p<.05) and healthy controls (p<.01). In the negative mood 
condition, the confabulating group recalled a significantly lower proportion of 
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positive targets compared with healthy controls (mean difference=.11, p<.05). 
However, there were no significant differences between the confabulating and 
non-confabulating group on the recall of positive targets in the negative 
condition (mean difference=.05, p=.44). This test also revealed that the 
confabulating group recalled a significantly lower proportion of negative and 
neutral targets in the negative condition compared with the two comparison 
groups: healthy controls (p<.001) and non-confabulating group (p<.05). These 
findings showed that negative mood reduced the recall of positive information in 
both confabulating and non-confabulating patients. Overall, patients in the 
confabulating group had difficulties recalling target words in both positive and 
negative mood conditions compared with the two comparison groups. 
 
Recall Test Results for Critical Distracters  
A repeated measures ANOVA was used to examine the number of critical 
distracters recalled with Word-Category (positive, negative and neutral) and 
Mood condition (positive and negative) as the two within-participant factors. 
Group was the between-participant factor (confabulating group, non-
confabulating group and healthy controls). Findings showed that there was no 
significant main effect of Group: F (2, 36) = .01, p=.99. There was also no main 
effect of Mood condition: F (1, 36) = .27, p=.61. However, there was a 
significant main effect of Word-category: F (2, 72) = 6.73, p<.01. There was no 
significant two-way interaction between Group and Mood condition: F (2, 36) = 
.53, p=.60. There was no significant two-way interaction between Group and 
Word-category: F (4, 72) = .42, p=.80. There was no significant two-way 
interaction between Mood condition and Word-category: F (2, 72) = .71, p=.50. 
There was also no significant three-way interaction between Group, Word-
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category and Mood condition: F (4, 72) = 1.33, p=.27. These findings suggested 
that there was no significant difference between the groups on the proportion of 
critical distracters falsely recalled across the word categories. However, these 
findings also suggested that there were differences in the overall proportion of 
critical distracters falsely recalled across the word categories. 
 
The significant main effect of word-category was further explored using paired 
samples t-tests. Findings showed that overall, participants falsely recalled a 
significantly lower proportion of negative critical distracters compared with the 
other two categories: positive critical distracters (t (38) = 2.49, p<.05) and 
neutral critical distracters (t (38) = 4.22, p<.001). However, there were no 
significant differences in false recall between the positive and neutral critical 
distracters (t (38) = .93, p=.36). These findings suggested that participants are 
less susceptive to negative critical distracters compared with positive and 
neutral critical distracters. 
 
Recall Test Results for Unrelated Intrusions 
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 reflect insignificant weak trends. These figures illustrate that 
the confabulating group in the positive and negative mood condition falsely 
recalled a higher proportion of positive unrelated intrusions compared with 
negative and neutral intrusions. In both mood conditions, the confabulating 
group also falsely recalled a higher proportion of positive intrusions compared 





Figure 5.1: False Recall of Unrelated Intrusions in the Positive Mood Condition: Mean 
proportion of unrelated intrusions from the positive, negative and neutral categories falsely 
recalled across the three groups of participants: 13 confabulating amnesia patients, 13 non-

















Figure 5.2: False Recall of Unrelated Intrusions in the Negative Mood Condition: Mean 
proportion of unrelated intrusions from the positive, negative and neutral categories falsely 
recalled across the three groups of participants: 13 confabulating amnesia patients, 13 non-








A repeated measures ANOVA was used to examine the proportion of unrelated 
intrusions recalled with Word-Category (positive, negative and neutral) and 
Mood condition (positive and negative) as the two within-participant factors. 
Group was the between-participant factor (confabulating group, non-
confabulating group and healthy controls). Findings showed no significant main 
effect of Group: F (2, 36) = 1.03, p=.37. There was also no main effect of Mood 
condition: F (1, 36) = 2.60, p=.12. However there was a significant main effect 
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of Word-category: F (2, 72) = 4.84, p<.05. There was no significant interaction 
between Group and Mood condition: F (2, 36) = .39, p=.69. There was no 
significant interaction between Group and Word-category: F (4, 72) = 1.20, 
p=.32. However, there was a significant two-way interaction between Mood 
condition and Word-category: F (2, 72) = 7.98, p<.01. However, there was no 
significant three-way interaction between Group, Word-category and Mood 
condition: F (4, 72) = 2.27, p=.07. These findings suggested that there were 
significant differences between the three groups in terms of the recall of 
unrelated intrusions. However, there was no significant difference between the 
two mood conditions in terms of the proportion of unrelated intrusions falsely 
recalled across the word categories. 
 
The significant main effect of Word-category was analysed further using paired-
samples t-tests. Findings showed that overall participants falsely recalled 
significantly more positive unrelated intrusions compared with negative 
unrelated intrusions: (t (38) = 2.80, p<.01). However, there were no significant 
differences in false recall between positive and neutral unrelated intrusions: (t 
(38) = 1.87, p=.07). There were also no significant differences in false recall 
between negative and neutral unrelated intrusions: (t (38) = 1.42, p=.16).  
 
Paired-samples t-tests were also carried out to explore the two-way interaction 
between word-category and mood condition. Findings showed that overall, 
participants recalled significantly more positive unrelated intrusions in the 
positive condition compared with the negative condition: t (38) = 3.20, p<.01. 
However, there were no significant differences in false recall of negative 
unrelated intrusions between the positive and negative mood conditions: t (38) 
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= .30, p=.77. Similarly, there were no significant differences in false recall of 
neutral unrelated intrusions between the positive and negative mood conditions: 
t (38) = 1.53, p=.14. These findings suggested that only positive mood 
enhanced the false recall of mood-congruent unrelated intrusions. 
 
Summary of Recall Results  
Results from the recall test showed that the confabulating and non-
confabulating groups recalled a significantly lower proportion of target words 
compared with healthy controls. Results also showed that both non-
confabulating patients and healthy controls recalled a higher proportion of 
targets that matched the mood state induced at the time of learning. This mood 
congruent bias was not found in the confabulating group. These findings 
suggest that mood in confabulating patients does not influence veridical recall. 
Also, there was no significant difference between the three groups in terms of 
the proportion of unrelated intrusions recalled in both the positive and negative 
mood conditions. This indicated that the confabulating group did not show the 
positive emotional bias in the recall of positive intrusions.  
 
5.3.4.2. Recognition Test 
Table 5.6 (below) shows means for the proportion of target words, critical 
distracters and unrelated distracters between the three groups. The table shows 





Table 5.7: Recognition Results: Mean scores (standard deviations) for the proportion of target 
words, critical distracters and unrelated intrusions produced in the recognition test between the 















































































































































































































Recognition Test Results for Target Words  
A repeated measure ANOVA was used with Word-category (positive, negative 
and neutral) and Mood condition (positive and negative) as the two within-
participant factors and Group as the between-participant factor (confabulating 
group, non-confabulating group and healthy controls). The number of target 
words recognised was the dependent variable. There was no significant main 
effect of Group: F (2, 36) = .53, p=.59. However, there was a main effect of 
Mood condition: F (1, 36) = 6.31, p<.05 and Word-category: F (2, 72) = 18.04, 
p<.001. There was no interaction between Group and Mood condition: F (2, 36) 
= .09, p=.92. There was also no interaction between Group and Word-category: 
F (4, 72) = 1.90, p=.12. However, there was a significant two-way interaction 
between Mood condition and Word-category: F (2, 72) = 22.03, p<.001. There 
was also a significant three-way interaction between Group, Word-category and 
Mood condition: F (4, 72) = 2.89, p<.05. These findings indicated that mood 
within the groups influenced the proportion of target words recognised across 
the word categories.   
 
The significant main effect of Word-category was examined using paired 
samples t-tests. Findings showed that overall, participants recognised more 
target words from the two emotional categories compared with the neutral 
category: positive category (t (38) = 4.90, p<.001) and negative category (t (38) 
= 5.32, p<.001). However, there were no significant differences in the 
recognition of target words between the positive and negative word categories (t 
(38) = .39, p=.70). These findings are consistent with the results from study 1 




The significant main effect of Mood condition was also further inspected using 
paired samples t-tests. Overall, participants recognised significantly more target 
words in the negative mood condition compared with the positive mood 
condition (t (38) = 2.61, p<.05).  
 
Paired samples t-tests were carried out to examine whether there was a mood 
congruent bias in the three groups. In the positive mood condition, the two 
patient groups recognised significantly more positive targets than neutral 
targets: confabulating group (t (38) = 2.11, p=.05), non-confabulating group (t 
(38) = 3.45, p<.01). There were no significant differences in the proportion of 
positive and negative targets recognized in the confabulating and non-
confabulating groups. In contrast, the healthy controls recognised significantly 
more positive targets in comparison to the negative and neutral targets 
(p<.001). In the negative mood condition, the confabulating group did not show 
a mood congruent bias. In contrast, the two comparison groups showed a mood 
congruent bias and recognised significantly more negative targets compared 
with positive and neutral targets (p<.001). These findings are consistent with the 
results from the recall test and indicated that mood in confabulating patients 
does not enhance veridical recognition of mood-congruent information.  
 
The same measure was used to analyse the two-way interaction between 
Word-category and Mood condition. Findings showed that overall participants 
recognised significantly more positive targets in the positive condition compared 
with the negative condition: t (38) = 2.96, p<.01. Similarly, these participants 
recognised significantly more negative targets in the negative condition 
compared with the positive condition: t (38) = 6.03, p<.001.  Finally, participants 
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recognised more neutral targets in the negative condition compared with the 
positive condition: t (38) = 2.73, p<.05.   
 
A Tukey post-hoc analysis was carried out to examine the significant three-way 
interaction using one-way ANOVA. Findings showed that there were significant 
differences between the groups on positive target recognition in the positive 
mood condition: F (2, 36) = 4.64, p<.05. A Tukey test revealed that the 
confabulating group recognised a significantly lower proportion of positive 
targets in the positive condition compared with healthy controls (mean 
difference= .22, p<.05). However, there was no significant difference on positive 
target recognition in the positive condition between the confabulating and non-
confabulating groups (mean difference=.10, p=.33). The one-way ANOVA 
analysis also showed significant differences between the groups on negative 
target recognition in the negative mood condition:  F (2, 36) = 4.52, p<.05. The 
Tukey test revealed that the confabulating group recognised a significantly 
lower proportion of negative targets in the negative condition compared with the 
non-confabulating group (mean difference=.14, p=.05) and healthy controls 
(mean difference=.16, p<.05). There were no significant differences found 
between the non-confabulating group and healthy controls in the negative mood 
condition. These findings showed that the confabulating group had more 
difficulties recognising target words compared with the two comparison groups. 







Recognition Test Results for Critical Distracters  
A repeated measures ANOVA was used to examine the proportion of critical 
distracters falsely recognised with Word-category (positive, negative and 
neutral) and Mood condition (positive and negative) as the two within-participant 
factors. Group was the between-participant factor (confabulating group, non-
confabulating group and healthy controls). Findings showed no significant main 
effect of Group: F (2, 36) = .34, p=.72 and no main effect of Mood condition: F 
(1, 36) = .71, p=.41. There was also no significant main effect of Word-category: 
F (2, 72) = 2.70, p=.07. There was no significant interaction between Group and 
Mood Condition:  F (2, 36) = 1.96, p=.16. There was also no interaction effect 
between Group and Word-category: F (4, 72) = .57, p=.68. There was no 
significant two-way interaction between Mood condition and Word-category: F 
(2, 72) = .62, p=.54. There was also no significant three-way interaction 
between Group, Word-category and Mood condition: F (4, 72) = 2.30, p=.07. 
This indicates that there were no differences in the proportion of critical 
distracters falsely recognised between the mood conditions across the groups. 
 
Recognition Test Results for Unrelated Intrusions  
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 illustrate that the confabulating group, in both the positive 
and negative mood conditions, falsely recognised a high proportion of positive 
unrelated intrusions compared with the negative and neutral unrelated 
intrusions. In both mood conditions, the confabulating group falsely recognised 
a higher proportion of positive intrusions compared with non-confabulating 
patients and healthy controls. However further analysis using repeated 
measures ANOVA confirmed that only the findings from the negative mood 
condition approached a statistical significance. This indicated that confabulating 
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patients in whom a negative mood was induced falsely recognised a 
significantly higher proportion of positive unrelated intrusions compared with the 
comparison groups.  
 
Figure 5.3: False Recognition of Unrelated Intrusions in Positive Mood Condition: Mean 
proportion of unrelated intrusions from the positive, negative and neutral categories falsely 
recognised by the three groups of participants: 13 confabulating amnesia patients, 13 non-








Figure 5.4: False Recognition of Unrelated Intrusions in Negative Mood Condition: Mean 
proportion of unrelated intrusions from the positive, negative and neutral categories falsely 
recognised by the three groups of participants: 13 confabulating amnesia patients, 13 non-





A repeated measures ANOVA was carried out with Word-category (positive, 
negative and neutral) and Mood condition (positive and negative) as the two 
within-participant factors and Group was the between-participant factor 
(confabulating group, non-confabulating group and healthy controls). The 
dependent variable was the proportion of unrelated intrusions falsely 
recognised. Findings showed that there was a main effect of Group: F (2, 36) = 
10.21, p<.001 and a main effect of Word-category: F (2, 72) = 14.13, p<.001. 
However, there was no main effect of Mood condition: F (1, 36) = 3.73, p=.06. 
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There was no two-way interaction between Group and Mood condition: F (2, 36) 
= 2.54, p=.09. There was also no two-way interaction between Mood condition 
and Word-category: F (2, 72) = 1.57, p=.22. However, there was a two-way 
interaction between Word-category and Group: F (4, 72) = 6.86, p<.001. There 
was also a three-way interaction between Group, Word-category and Mood 
condition: F (4, 72) = 4.07, p<.01. These findings suggested that there were 
significant differences in the proportion of unrelated intrusions between the 
positive and negative mood conditions across the groups. 
 
The significant main effect of Word-category was analysed using paired 
samples t-tests. Overall, participants falsely recognised more positive unrelated 
intrusions compared with the other two word categories: negative category (t 
(38) = 2.84, p<.01) and neutral category (t (38) = 4.35, p<.001).  However, there 
were no significant differences in the recognition of unrelated intrusions 
between the negative and neutral word categories (t (38) = 1.49, p=.14). These 
findings suggested that there was a general positive bias in the false recognition 
of unrelated intrusions. 
 
The same measure was used to examine the proportion of positive unrelated 
intrusions falsely recognised between the positive and negative mood 
conditions. The confabulating group falsely recognised significantly more 
positive intrusions in the negative mood condition compared with the positive 
mood condition: t (12) = 2.52, p<.05. This finding was not observed in the non-
confabulating group (t (12) = 1.35, p=.20) and healthy controls (t (12) = .25, 
p=.80).  These findings indicated that negative mood in the confabulating group 
enhanced the false recognition of positive unrelated intrusions. In addition, 
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findings showed that confabulating patients falsely recognised a significantly 
higher proportion of unrelated intrusions in the negative mood condition 
compared with the positive mood condition (t (12) = 2.66, p<.05). These findings 
were not statistically significant in the non-confabulating group and healthy 
controls.  
 
A one-way ANOVA was carried out to explore the two-way interaction between 
Word-category and Group. Findings showed that there were significant 
differences between the groups on the false recognition of positive unrelated 
intrusions: F (2, 36) = 12.75, p<.001. A Tukey test revealed that the 
confabulating group falsely recognised significantly more positive unrelated 
intrusions compared with the two comparison groups: non-confabulating 
patients (mean difference=.24, p<.01) and healthy controls (mean 
difference=.33 p<.001). These findings indicated that only the confabulating 
group showed a positive emotional bias in the false recognition of unrelated 
intrusions.   
 
The one-way ANOVA also showed that there were significant differences 
between the groups on the false recognition of negative unrelated intrusions: F 
(2, 36) = 4.94, p<.05. The Tukey test revealed that the two amnesia groups 
falsely recognised significantly more negative unrelated intrusions compared 
with healthy controls: confabulating patients (mean difference=.14, p<.05) and 
non-confabulating patients (mean difference=.16, p<.05). However, there were 
no significant differences between the confabulating and non-confabulating 




A one-way ANOVA showed significant differences between the groups on the 
overall false recognition of neutral unrelated intrusions: F (2, 36) = 3.33, p<.05. 
The Tukey test showed that the confabulating group falsely recognised 
significantly more neutral unrelated intrusions compared with healthy controls 
(mean difference=.09, p<.05). However, this difference was not significant 
between the confabulating and non-confabulating groups (mean difference=.06, 
p=.19). No significant differences were found between the non-confabulating 
group and healthy controls (mean difference=.02, p=.76). This indicated that 
confabulating patients generally recognised more unrelated intrusions across 
the word categories compared with healthy controls. 
 
The three-way interaction was further explored using one-way ANOVA. 
Findings showed that there were significant differences between the groups on 
positive unrelated intrusions falsely recognised in the positive mood condition: F 
(2, 36) = 4.05, p<.05. A Tukey tests revealed that the confabulating group 
recognised significantly more positive unrelated intrusions in the positive mood 
condition compared with healthy controls (mean difference=.23, p<.05). 
However, this difference was not significant between the confabulating and non-
confabulating patients (mean difference=.09, p=.56). There was also no 
significant difference between the non-confabulating patients and healthy 
controls (mean difference=.15, p=.19). 
 
The one-way ANOVA test also revealed significant differences between the 
groups on positive unrelated intrusions falsely recognised in the negative mood 
condition: F (2, 36) = 15.89, p<.001. The Tukey test indicated that the 
confabulating group also recognised significantly more positive unrelated 
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intrusions in the negative mood condition compared with the two comparison 
groups: non-confabulating patients (mean difference=.39, p<.001) and healthy 
controls (mean difference=.42, p<.001). There was no significant difference 
between the non-confabulating patients and healthy controls (mean 
difference=.04, p=.89). These findings suggest that negative mood in 
confabulating patients induces a positive emotional bias in false recognition. 
 
Finally, the ANOVA analysis also showed significant differences between the 
three groups on the negative unrelated intrusions falsely recognised in the 
negative mood condition: F (2, 36) = 5.67, p<.01. The two amnesia groups 
falsely recognised significantly more negative unrelated intrusions in the 
negative mood condition compared with the healthy controls: confabulating 
patients (mean difference=.19, p<.05) and non-confabulating patients (mean 
difference=.23, p<.01). However, there were no significant differences in the 
false recognition of negative unrelated intrusions in the negative condition 
between the confabulating and non-confabulating amnesia groups (mean 
difference=.05, p=.80). 
 
Summary of Recognition Results  
Findings show that the confabulating and non-confabulating groups recognised 
a significantly lower proportion of target words and critical distracters compared 
with healthy controls. The non-confabulating group and healthy controls also 
showed a mood congruent bias in the recognition of target words. This memory 
bias was not found in the confabulating group. However, confabulating patients 
showed a positive emotional bias in the false recognition of unrelated intrusions. 
These patients falsely recognised a significantly higher proportion of positive 
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intrusions in the negative mood condition compared with the positive mood 
condition.  
 
Study 3: Signal Detection Analysis  
Signal detection analyses were carried out using rates of endorsements of 
target words (hit rate) and unrelated intrusions (false alarms) for each of the 
three word categories (positive, negative and neutral) in the negative mood 
condition. This analysis was not carried out for the positive mood condition as 
there were no significant differences between the confabulating and non-
confabulating groups on the proportion of positive unrelated intrusions.  
 
Signal Detection Analysis for the Positive Word-Category 
The finding that confabulating patients in the negative mood condition falsely 
recognised a higher proportion of positive intrusions compared with non- 
confabulating patients and healthy controls was further explored. This analysis 
used positive targets as hit rates and positive unrelated intrusions as false 
alarms. The analysis creates measure of memory strength (d’) and decision 
bias (BD"). Here, higher d’ scores mean stronger memory and higher BD" 
estimates mean a more conservative response criterion. Table 5.8 (below) 
shows that the confabulating group had lower d’ and BD" values compared with 
the non-confabulating group and healthy controls. This was confirmed using an 
ANOVA which showed that there were significant differences between the 
groups on d’ scores: F (2, 36) = 32.75, p<.001 and also on BD" estimates: F (2, 




Table 5.8 Signal detection Analysis: Measures of Memory Strength (d’) and response bias (BD") 
comparing positive targets with positive unrelated intrusions in the negative mood condition 
between the three groups. 
 
 
A post hoc Tukey test showed that the confabulating group had a significantly 
lower memory strength compared with the non-confabulating group (mean 
difference = 1.21, p<.001) and healthy controls (mean difference = 1.20, 
p<.001. However, there were no significant differences between the non-
confabulating group and healthy controls in terms of memory strength (mean 
difference = .01, p=.99).  
 
The Tukey test also showed that, in contrast to the results from study 1, BD" 
was significantly lower in the confabulating group compared with the non-
confabulating group (mean difference = .64, p<.05) and healthy controls (mean 
difference = .72, p<.01). No significant differences were found between the non-
confabulating group and healthy controls on this measure (mean difference = 





Signal Detection Analysis –  
Positive Hit Rate Compared 




























Signal Detection Analysis for the Negative Word-Category 
Signal detection analysis using rates of endorsement of negative targets and 
negative intrusions showed significant differences between the three groups. 
The two amnesia groups had significantly lower d prime scores compared with 
healthy controls: confabulating group (mean differences = .1.12, p<.001) and 
non-confabulating group (mean differences = .79, p<.01). However, there were 
no significant d prime differences between the confabulating and non-
confabulating groups (mean differences = .31, p=.30). In addition, no significant 
differences were found between the three groups in terms of response bias: F 
(2, 36) = 2.20, p=.13. 
 
Signal Detection Analysis for the Neutral Word-Category 
Signal detection analysis using rates of endorsement of neutral targets and 
neutral intrusions showed no significant differences between the three groups in 
terms of memory strength: F (2, 36) = .47, p=.63. However, differences were 
found between the three groups in terms of response bias: F (2, 36) = 4.09, 
p<.05. This showed that the confabulating group had a significantly lower BD" 
estimate compared with healthy controls (mean differences = .56, p<.05). 
However, there were no significant differences between the confabulating and 









Summary of Signal Detection Results 
The results from the positive category showed that the confabulating group had 
a significantly lower memory strength compared with the non-confabulating 
group and healthy controls. These results also showed that the confabulating 
group used a more liberal criterion compared with the two comparison groups. 
On this basis, the current findings suggested that there may be two factors 
contributing to the positive emotional bias in confabulation: lower memory 
strength and liberal responding. In confabulating patients, weak memory for 
positive information may have reduced their ability to distinguish positive targets 
from positive intrusions. A liberal response criterion may have also biased 
confabulating patients to respond ‘yes’ to positive unrelated intrusions.  
 
Findings from the neutral category show that although the three groups did not 
differ in terms of memory strength, both confabulating and non-confabulating 
patients used a more liberal criterion. This indicated that the two amnesia 
groups produced more ‘yes’ responses to neutral unrelated intrusions than 
healthy controls. Stanislaw and Todorov (1999) argued that a liberal criterion 
can sometimes produce more ‘yes’ responses to both unrelated intrusions (false 
alarms) and target words (hit rate). However, as these results are from the 









5.4. Discussion  
Fotopoulou and colleagues (2008a) found a correlation between mood and the 
positive emotional bias in confabulation. However, subsequent studies failed to 
replicate this finding and the emotional triggers of confabulation remain unclear.  
The present research is the first to examine whether low mood influences the 
emotional content of confabulation using an affective semantic-associates 
procedure. This study is also the first to use mood induction procedures to 
induce confabulating patients into positive and negative mood sates.  
 
To summarize, the findings from this study suggested the following:  
 
1) The positive video mood induction procedure induced a higher positive 
mood rating in all three groups. Similarly, the negative video mood 
induction procedure induced a higher negative mood rating in all three 
groups.   
 
2) The confabulating patients did not show a mood congruent bias for target 
words in both the positive and negative mood condition. In contrast, the 
non-confabulating amnesia patients and healthy controls showed this 
bias and correctly recognised more words that were congruent to the 
induced mood state.  
 
3) All three groups showed no mood congruent biases in the false recall 




4) Confabulating patients falsely recognised a higher proportion of positive 
unrelated intrusions in the negative mood condition compared with the 
positive mood condition. 
 
5) Confabulating patients in the negative mood condition falsely recognised 
more positive unrelated intrusions compared with non-confabulating 
amnesia patients and healthy controls. 
 
6) The confabulating patients falsely recognised more positive unrelated 
intrusions in the positive mood condition compared with healthy controls 
but not when compared with the non-confabulating patients.  
 
Video mood induction procedures have been shown to induce reliable mood 
states in both older adults and Alzheimer’s patients (Kunzmann and Gruhn, 
2005; Mograbi et al., 2012). The present study found that this mood induction 
procedure successfully induced participants into the proposed mood states. 
Participants presented with the British comedy video clip reported a higher 
rating for positive mood. In contrast, these participants reported a higher rating 
for negative mood following the presentation of the terminal cancer video clip.  
 
The effect of mood on recall has been studied over time in laboratory settings 
using mood induction procedures (Bower et al., 1981; Perrig’s et al., 1988, 
Velten et al., 1968). Some studies provided evidence of the mood congruent 
effect and showed that healthy participants recalled more affective information 
that matched their mood state. These studies suggested that emotions play a 
major role in information processing (Bower et al., 1981).  
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Subsequently, Ruci and colleagues (2009) examined the effects of mood on 
false memories using affective lists from Roediger and colleagues (2001). They 
found that healthy participants who simulated positive emotions falsely 
recognised more positive critical distracters. Similarly, participants who 
simulated negative emotions falsely recognised more negative critical 
distracters.  In the present study, all three groups of participants did not show 
mood congruent biases in the false recall and false recognition of critical 
distracters. However, a mood congruent bias was found in the recall and 
recognition of target words in both non-confabulating patients and healthy 
controls. These two groups falsely recalled more target words from the two 
emotional categories (positive vs. negative) that were congruent to the mood 
induced during the study phase. Confabulating patients did not show this mood 
congruent bias in the recall and recognition of target words. This novel finding 
indicated that confabulating patients may have a deficit in the processing of 
emotional material.  
 
The present study provides a novel insight into confabulation by introducing an 
affective semantic-associates procedure to examine emotional biases in 
confabulating patients. Although confabulating patients in a negative mood state 
falsely recognised a high proportion of unrelated intrusions, this positive bias 
was not observed in the false recognition of critical distracters. Based on the 
results from study 2, it is possible that confabulating patients do not show 
biases in the false recognition of critical distracters because these items are 




The present study found that confabulating patients in a negative mood state 
falsely recognised a higher proportion of positive intrusions compared with 
when these patients were induced to a positive mood. This finding indicated that 
negative mood increases the positive bias in confabulation. Furthermore, 
negative mood significantly increased the overall rate of false recognition in 
confabulating patients. This finding suggested that confabulating patients that 
are clinically depressed are more likely to produce confabulations, particularly 
ones with pleasant content. In addition, these results can be explained using 
Fotopoulou’s theory of confabulation as a defensive mechanism. One possibility 
is that negative mood in the present study may have been detected as a threat 
by the confabulating patients. Consequently, these patients’ unconsciously 
produced more positive intrusions in order to protect their well-being against an 
unpleasant situation. However, this theory does not explain why the 
confabulating patients in the positive mood condition showed the positive 
emotional bias when compared with healthy controls.  
 
Findings obtained from the positive mood condition showed that there were no 
significant differences in the proportion of positive intrusions produced between 
the confabulating and non-confabulating amnesia patients. However, the 
confabulating patients produced more positive intrusions in the positive mood 
condition compared with healthy controls. This difference was not observed in 
non-confabulating patients and healthy controls. Therefore, although 
confabulating patients showed an increased positive bias when induced to a 
negative mood state, they still produced more positive intrusions in the positive 
mood condition compared with healthy controls. This indicated that the positive 
emotional bias in confabulation may not necessarily have a defensive function. 
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This finding is explained in terms of two aspects: Firstly, according to the 
motivational perspective, emotional mechanisms give rise to confabulations as 
a consequence of poor executive control. Secondly, previous studies have 
shown an association between depressed mood and memory deficits (Burt et 
al., 1995; Kizilbash et al., 2002). Based on these aspects, a possible 
explanation for the present finding is that negative mood in confabulation may 
be enhancing the positive bias by causing a further strain on memory and 
executive processes.   
 
Consistent with the findings from study 1, the positive bias in confabulating 
patients was only observed in false recognition. One possible explanation for 
this finding is proposed in relation to the delayed recognition test. The nature of 
the semantic-associates procedure is that the recall test is administered 
immediately after the study phase, whereas the recognition test is administered 
after the recall test has been completed for all 9 lists. Therefore, the delayed 
recognition test may have weakened memory in the confabulating group and 
consequently increased the false recognition of positive unrelated intrusions. A 
comparison of figures 5.2 and 5.4 show that both false recall and false 
recognition of unrelated intrusions display a similar pattern of results. The 
confabulating group in a negative mood state recalled and recognised more 
positive intrusions compared with the two comparison groups. It is postulated 
that confabulating patients may falsely recall significantly more positive 
intrusions if the recall test was delayed. As the present findings showed a 
positive bias only in false recognition, the semantic-associates procedure has to 
be regarded as a weak model of confabulation. If futures studies match the 
delay in recall and recognition testing and find a positive bias in response to 
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both tests, the findings from the semantic-associates procedure would then 
provide stronger evidence that emotional mechanisms are involved in 
confabulations.   
 
Another limitation of the current study is that a signal detection analysis on the 
false recognition of positive intrusions showed that the three groups differed 
significantly in terms of memory strength and response criterion. This indicated 
that confabulating patients tendency to falsely recognise more positive 
unrelated intrusions may be because their memory strength for positive material 
is significantly weaker compared with that of non-confabulating patients and 
healthy controls. Therefore, the positive bias in the content of confabulation may 
be a consequence of weak memory rather than emotional factors. To overcome 
this limitation, future studies would need to delay the administration of the 
recognition test in controls in order to equate for differences in memory strength 
that may cause interaction effects.      
 
Previous studies showed that confabulation is associated with damage to the 
prefrontal lobes (Gilboa and Moscovitch, 2002). In particular, confabulating 
patients showed lesions to the ventromedial and orbitofrontal surfaces of the 
frontal lobes (Gliboa et al., 2006). The present study used patient’s clinical MRI 
scans and found that the frontal lobes were more severely implicated in the 
confabulating group than the non-confabulating group, although this was 
sometimes relatively mild (see Appendix 3.1). These findings support the 
consensus that frontal lobe damage may be important in the development of 




In conclusion, non-confabulating patients and healthy controls showed a mood 
congruence bias and recalled more targets that matched the mood induced 
during the study phase. Although confabulating patients showed memory biases 
for unrelated intrusions, these patients did not show mood congruent or 
incongruent biases for target words. This indicated that mood in confabulation 
influences the content of their false memories but not true memories. The 
present study also indicated that negative mood in confabulating patients 
enhances the false recognition of pleasant memories. This positive emotional 
bias was not observed in non-confabulating patients and healthy controls. 
However, further analysis indicated that the positive bias in confabulating 
patients may be due to weak memory. A liberal response criterion may also 
have biased confabulating patients to mistake positive unrelated intrusions as 



















This chapter will begin with a brief summary of the current programme of 
studies. In the later part of this chapter, the main findings will be discussed in 
terms of the underlying mechanisms impaired in confabulation.   
 
6.1. Summary of present programme of studies 
The present programme of studies showed the following novel insights in 
confabulating amnesia patients:  
 
1) Confabulating patients showed a positive emotional bias in false 
recognition in response to an affective semantic-associates procedure where 
information was not encoded in a self-referent manner.  
 
2) Confabulating patients did not show the positive emotional bias in 
response to encoding pictorial items in a facial expressions semantic-associates 
procedure. 
 
3) Both confabulating and non-confabulating patients showed reduced false 
recognition of pictorial critical distracters. 
 
4) Negative mood enhanced the positive emotional bias in confabulating 





6.2. The Positive Emotional Bias in the Affective Semantic-Associates 
Procedure. 
 
Fotopoulou and colleagues (2008b) examined whether confabulating patients’ 
tendency to produce positive false memories is specific to self-referent 
information or due to a deficit in general emotional processing. They found that 
patients produced more pleasant confabulations in response to encoding self-
referent prose (Fotopoulou et al., 2008b). This bias was not found when 
participants were asked to retrieve information that was not self-referent. The 
present study used an affective semantic-associates procedure and found that 
confabulating patients falsely recognised a higher proportion of positive 
unrelated intrusions compared with negative and neutral intrusions. Therefore 
confabulating patients showed a positive emotional bias in response to studying 
words that were not encoded in a self-referent manner.  
 
However, the positive bias in confabulating patients was only observed in false 
recognition. No significant differences were found in terms of the proportion of 
positive unrelated intrusions falsely recalled between the confabulating patients, 
non-confabulating patients and healthy controls. Four possible explanations for 
these finding are discussed below: 
 
One possible explanation relates to the distinction between provoked and 
spontaneous confabulations. False recognition in the semantic-associates 
procedure represents provoked confabulations. The recognition test comprises 
previously studied words and non-studied words presented to the participants in 
a display booklet. This test is a forced-choice task where false recognition is 
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measured by asking participants to identify whether each presented word was 
previously studied. Therefore, the positive bias in false recognition may have 
been provoked as participants were presented with non-studied intrusions and 
asked to identify whether they were previously studied. In contrast, false recall 
in the semantic-associates procedure is more analogous to spontaneous 
confabulations. In the recall test, participants are required to access and 
retrieve the previously studied list without relying on any sense of familiarity. 
Therefore, this test examined the spontaneous production of critical distracters 
and unrelated intrusions.  
 
Recognition memory involves two separate processes: recollection and 
familiarity. Recollection is the retrieval of information that was previously 
studied. Familiarity is a feeling that the information was previously studied. In 
the semantic-associates procedure, recollection occurs in both recall and 
recognition, whereas familiarity only occurs in recognition. Therefore, 
confabulating patients may have only shown a significant positive bias in false 
recognition because positive unrelated intrusions might have evoked a strong 
sense of familiarity. 
 
Another possible explanation is proposed in relation to the delay between the 
recognition test and the study phase. Confabulating patients’ may have falsely 
recognised a significantly high proportion of positive intrusions because they 
may have forgotten the studied list by the time the recognition test was 
administered. Confabulating patients may have not shown a significant bias in 
false recall because the recall test, as in the standard semantic-associates 
procedure, was administered immediately after the study phase. The current 
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pattern of results supports this explanation. An observation of the figures in 
chapter 3 showed a trend in confabulating patients’ false recall and false 
recognition. Confabulating patients produced a higher proportion of positive 
intrusions compared with non-confabulating patients and healthy controls in 
both false recall and false recognition. However, this bias did not reach a level 
of statistical significance in the recall test. It is postulated that a greater delay 
between the recall test and the study phase might have significantly increased 
the spontaneous production of positive intrusions. 
 
Another explanation is proposed in relation to differences in memory strength. 
Findings from a signal detection analysis indicated that confabulating patients 
showed a positive bias because they have a weak memory only for positive 
information. This suggested that the positive bias is a consequence of weak 
memory rather than due to the impaired mechanisms in confabulation. In order 
to overcome this limitation, future studies would need to delay the 
administration of the recall and recognition tests in healthy controls. This delay 
would help equate memory performance of amnesic patients and healthy 
controls and prevent any interaction effects that might have resulted from the 
groups having different memory strengths. If future studies can show that there 
is no positive bias in delayed memory of non-confabulating patients and healthy 
controls, this would indicate that the positive bias is a consequence of impaired 






6.3. The Positive Emotional Bias in the Facial Expressions Semantic-
Associates Procedure. 
Several studies have consistently reported that items in the form of pictures are 
generally remembered better than words (Paivio & Csapo, 1973; Weldon & 
Roediger 1987). This was attributed to more distinctive qualities in pictures than 
in words. Schacter and colleagues (1997) used a pictorial semantic-associates 
procedure and found that the encoding of pictorial items reduced the overall 
rate of false recognition in healthy participants. Smith and Hunt (1998) obtained 
similar findings and showed that the distinct qualities in visual stimuli helped 
participants discriminate studied items from non-studied intrusions.  
 
The present study used photographs of facial expressions to construct a 
pictorial semantic-associates task. In this study, confabulating patients did not 
show the positive emotional bias that was observed in study 1. The proportion 
of positive unrelated intrusions in the confabulating group was not significantly 
different from those in the non-confabulating group and healthy controls.  
 
One possible explanation for these findings would be that the pictorial 
representations helped confabulating patients discriminate between studied 
items and positive unrelated intrusions. However, if this is the case, 
confabulating patients should show a reduced false recognition rate in response 
to studying pictorial items compared with studying written words. This was 
observed when the rate of false recognition was compared between the present 
study and study 1. Both confabulating and non-confabulating patients falsely 
recognised a significantly lower proportion of critical distracters and unrelated 
intrusions in this study compared with study 1. In relation to the mechanisms in 
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amnesia, these findings suggested that pictorial information may enhance 
encoding and/ or retrieval processes, compared with verbal representations of 
the same or similar information. 
 
However, one limitation is outlined in relation to the comparison between 
studies 1 and 2. The recognition test in the pictorial semantic-associates 
procedure is administered immediately after the study phase, whereas the 
recognition test in study 1 was administered at a delayed retention interval. 
Therefore, the proportion of intrusions and critical distracters may have been 
higher in study 1 because the delayed recognition test may have weakened 
memory. The reduced false recognition performance in study 2 might have 
been due to the recognition test following immediately rather than as a result of 
the pictorial stimuli.  
 
However, the view that a delayed retention interval increased false recognition 
in study 1 compared with study 2 does not explain why healthy controls showed 
no significant differences in false recognition performance across the two 
studies. Therefore, another explanation is proposed in relation to Schacter’s 
theory of gist memory. According to this theory, healthy participants falsely 
recognise critical distracters because they recall the gist of the list and fail to 
remember item-specific information (Schacter et al., 1996). Schacter and 
colleagues found that non-confabulating amnesic patients showed reduced 
false recognition of critical distracters compared with healthy controls. They 
argued that these patients retain limited gist information and form a weak link 




Based on Schacter’s gist theory (1996), healthy controls false recognition rate 
did not significantly decrease in study 2 because the non-presented items 
express facial emotions that are similar to the gist of the studied categories. For 
example, healthy participants are more likely to falsely recognise non-presented 
facial photographs that express anger in response to studying photographs from 
the anger emotional category. In contrast, confabulating and non-confabulating 
patients’ have poor gist memory representations, which may have reduced their 
ability to form a link between the facial expressions in each category. Instead, 
these patients may have relied on the features or distinctive qualities in the 
pictures (such as the face, eyes, hair) rather than the emotion expressed. As a 
result, the confabulating and non-confabulating amnesia patients may have 
rejected more non-presented pictorial items because they did not have the 
distinctive characteristics associated with the studied items. 
 
6.4. Reduced False Recall and False Recognition in Amnesia  
Previous studies using the semantic-associates procedure showed that 
confabulating and non-confabulating amnesia patients falsely recalled and 
falsely recognised a lower proportion of critical distracters compared with 
healthy controls (Melo et al., 1999; Ciaramelli et al., 2006). This tendency to 
show reduced false recall and false recognition to critical distracters was 
attributed to poor gist representations in amnesia (Schacter et al., 1997).  
 
Koutstaal and colleagues (2001) used a pictorial semantic-associates 
procedure to examine whether non-confabulating amnesia patients’ reduced 
false recognition is due to degraded gist memory or a source memory deficit. 
They argued that a semantic-associates procedure that consists of pictures 
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instead of words provides a clear measure of gist-based false recognition. This 
is because the conditions of conceptual and perceptual similarly provoke false 
recognition. Koustaal and colleagues found that non-confabulating patients 
falsely recognised a lower proportion of pictorial critical distracters compared 
with healthy controls. They concluded that amnesia patients have degraded gist 
memory that reduces the ability to form a link between the studied materials.  
 
The present study showed that both confabulating and non-confabulating 
patients recognised a lower proportion of critical distracters compared with 
healthy controls. A signal detection analysis indicated that there were no 
significant differences between the groups on memory strength in terms of the 
proportion of critical distracters falsely recognised. These findings suggested 
that the reduced false recognition of critical distracters is a marker of gist 
memory impairment. The present findings provide a novel insight in indicating 
degraded gist memory in both confabulating and non-confabulating amnesia 
patients. 
 
However, the results also showed that there were no differences between the 
confabulating and non-confabulating patients on the severity of their gist 
memory deficit as measured by the proportion of critical distracters falsely 
recognised. One possible explanation for this finding would be that degraded 







6.5. The Role of Mood on the Content of Confabulation 
An association between mood and the positive emotional bias in confabulation 
has been reported in the literature (Fotopoulou et al., 2008a). However, 
previous findings on this topic have been inconsistent (Fotopoulou et al., 2008a; 
Metcalf et al., 2010; Bajo et al., 2010). The present study examined the role of 
mood in confabulation using video mood induction. Results showed that 
confabulating patients falsely recognised more positive intrusions in the 
negative mood condition compared with the positive mood condition. 
Furthermore, patients in whom a negative mood was induced falsely recognised 
a higher proportion of positive intrusions compared with non-confabulating 
patients and healthy controls. This indicated that negative mood enhances the 
positive bias in confabulating patients. 
 
In the present study, confabulating patients in the positive mood condition also 
falsely recognised significantly more positive intrusions compared with healthy 
controls. This indicated that positive confabulations are enhanced, but are not 
specific to, negative mood states. In addition, negative mood significantly 
increased the overall rate of false recognition in confabulating patients 
compared with non-confabulating patients and healthy controls. This finding can 
be applied to explain the impaired mechanisms in confabulation. In relation to 
Fotopoulou’s theory, one possibility would be that negative mood enhances 
emotional processing biases and increases the rate of confabulations by 
causing a further disruption to memory and executive processes.  
 
The present study showed that negative mood significantly enhanced the 
positive bias in confabulating patients in false recognition. However, a similar 
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but non-significant trend was observed in confabulating patients’ false recall. As 
previously explained in study 1, the significant positive bias in false recognition 
but not in false recall might be due to delayed recognition testing. Negative 
mood might significantly increase false recall of positive intrusions if the recall 
test was delayed.  
 
Findings from a signal detection analysis showed that the confabulating group 
had significantly lower memory strength in terms of the proportion of positive 
intrusions falsely recognised in the negative mood condition. This finding was 
not obtained in the negative and neutral word categories. This indicated that the 
positive bias in the negative mood condition may be due to weak memory in 
confabulating patients.  
 
However, an explanation for why previous studies found a weak association 
between mood and the positive bias remains (Metcalf et al., 2010; Bajo et al., 
2010). These studies examined the positive bias in clinically depressed 
confabulating patients. It is possible that they found a weak correlation because 
the patients may have not been experiencing low mood during the confabulation 
interview. Mood, particularly in patients with depression, is known to fluctuate 
from day-to-day. Self-report mood ratings taken one or two days before the 
confabulation interview may provide a less accurate measure of the effects of 
mood on the content of confabulation. In the present study, the effects of mood 
on confabulation may have been observed because the memory tests were 




Furthermore, mood congruent biases in memory have been found in response 
to the video mood induction procedures. This showed that non-confabulating 
patients and healthy controls correctly recalled and recognised more words that 
matched the mood induced at the time of learning the word lists. Interestingly, 
this finding was not observed in confabulating amnesia patients.  Williams 
(1997) argued that memory biases occur when information is elaborately and 
deeply processed. In relation to the present findings, this suggested that 
confabulating patients may have a deficit in the processing of emotional 
material.   
 
6.6. Conclusion 
The current programme of studies used an affective semantic-associates 
procedure and provided a novel finding into the positive emotional bias in 
confabulation. Findings from these studies showed that the positive bias in 
confabulating patients is not specific to self-referent information. This study is 
also the first to show that the positive bias is not observed in confabulating 
patients when pictorial information is used to aid in the discrimination of studied 
items from non-studied intrusions.  
 
The present findings of the positive bias in confabulating patients’ false 
recognition are important because it shows that these patients are significantly 
more likely to mistake positive information as previously presented. This bias is 
significantly enhanced when the patient is in a negative mood.  In relation to the 
mechanisms of confabulation, this suggested that due to emotional processing 
biases, confabulating patients have difficulties distinguishing true memories 




However there are some limitations that have indicated that the semantic-
associates procedure is not a good model of investigating the positive bias in 
confabulation. Firstly, confabulating patients may have only shown the positive 
bias in false recognition because the recognition test was administered at a 
delay. Although the confabulating patients showed a positive bias in terms of 
false recall of positive intrusions, this was not statistically significant. Delaying 
the recall test may enhance false recall of positive intrusions in confabulating 
patients.  
 
Secondly, confabulating patients’ tendency to falsely recognise a higher 
proportion of positive intrusions compared with non-confabulating patients and 
healthy controls may be due to an emotional processing bias. However, this 
may also be due to weak memory in confabulating patients. Significant group 
differences in memory strength were only found in the false recognition of 
positive intrusions. This undermines the observation that emotional factors may 
be involved in confabulation. If future studies delayed recall and recognition 
tests in controls and find the positive bias only in confabulating patients, this 
would have implications for confabulation and provide stronger evidence that 
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Appendix 2.1: Advertisement email used to recruit healthy volunteers from 
King’s College London for study 1, chapter 3.  
 
TITLE:  The Role of Emotions in Confabulation and Amnesia. 
Volunteers are needed for a study of people with memory disorders. Your 
participation in this study is a maximum duration of 2 hours and you will be 
offered £30 for your contribution. 
 
WHAT IS THIS STUDY ABOUT? 
Confabulation is a memory symptom that is found in patients who experience 
brain damage to certain areas of the brain. Patients with this memory symptom 
tend to produce distorted or incorrect memories. This research study aims to 
investigate how emotions can influence the production of incorrect memories in 
patients with memory disorders. This study is part of a long-term project to help 
us understand whether emotions can trigger symptoms of confabulation.  
 
WE ARE LOOKING TO RECRUIT VOLUNTEERS WHO ARE: 
 Between 18 to 65 years of age, and have an adequate level of spoken 
and written English. 
 No history of brain injury or mental health problems including depression. 
 
WHAT WILL YOU NEED TO DO? 
1) Your first task will be to complete neuropsychological tests that examine 
your reading, IQ, attention and concentration. 
2) You will then be presented with words and pictures which you will be 




The study will be run at the Institute of Psychiatry main building or one of the 
following NHS sites: South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust, 
Kings College Hospital NHS Trust, Guys Hospital NHS Foundation Trust and 
St. Thomas’ Hospital NHS Foundation Trust. 
 
FURTHER INFORMATION:  
Your participation is entirely voluntary. If you agree to take part and later wish to 
withdraw, you may do so at any time. All information will be treated 
anonymously and will be strictly confidential. More information is available on 
the participant information sheet available to all potential participants. If you are 
interested in participating or would like further information, please send an email 
to the research psychologist at nura.alkathiri@kcl.ac.uk (Division of 
Psychological Medicine and Psychiatry). 
  
 













Appendix 2.2: Advertisement email used to recruit healthy volunteers from 
King’s College London for study 3, chapter 5. 
 
TITLE:  The role of emotions in confabulation and amnesia. 
Healthy control participants are needed for a study of people with memory 
disorders or confabulation. Your participation in this study is a maximum 
duration of 2 ½ hours. You will be offered £20 as a contribution towards your 
time, effort and travel expenses. 
 
WHAT IS THIS STUDY ABOUT? 
Confabulation is a memory symptom that is found in patients who experience 
brain damage to certain areas of the brain. Patients with this memory symptom 
tend to produce distorted or incorrect memories. This research study aims to 
investigate how emotions can influence the production of incorrect memories in 
patients with confabulation and memory disorders. This study is part of a long-
term project to help us understand whether emotions can trigger symptoms of 
confabulation.  
 
WE ARE LOOKING TO RECRUIT VOLUNTEERS WHO ARE: 
 Between 18 to 65 years of age, and have an adequate level of English. 
 No history of brain injury or mental health problems including depression. 
 
WHAT WILL YOU NEED TO DO? 
1) You first task will be to complete cognitive paper and pencil tasks.  
2) Session 1 - You will then be presented with a short video clip. Following 
this is a simple memory task, where you will be presented with words 
which you will be asked to remember in recall and recognition memory 
tests. Once you have completed this, you will be contacted after 
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approximately two weeks and asked to come back and complete session 
2.   
3) Session 2 - You will be presented with another short video clip. You will 
then be presented with words which you will be asked to remember in 
recall and recognition memory tests. 
 
If you decide to take part in this research, please note that it is important that 
you attend both session 1 and session 2. 
 
LOCATION: 
The study will be run at the Institute of Psychiatry main building or one of the 
following NHS sites: South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust, Kings 




Your participation is entirely voluntary.  If you agree to take part and later wish 
to withdraw, you may do so at any time without giving a reason. All information 
obtained will be treated anonymously and will be strictly confidential. More 
information concerning participation is available on the participant information 
sheet available to all potential participants. If you are interested in participating 
or would like further information, please send an e-mail to the researcher at 
nura.alkathiri@kcl.ac.uk. 
 






Appendix 2.3: An adapted UK version of the Dalla Barba Confabulation Battery 
used to allocate participants to the confabulating and non-confabulating 
amnesia groups. 
 
Dalla Barba’s confabulation battery 











A) PERSONAL SEMANTIC MEMORY: 
1. What is your name? 
  
  
2. How old are you? 
  
  
3. What is your date of birth? 
  
  
4. Where were you born? 
  
  




6. What is your present address? 
  
  
7. Why are you in hospital? 
  
  
8. Are you married? 
  
  
9. Do you have any children? 
  
 










12. How old were you when you had 
your first child? 
 
  












16. What are your parents’ first names? 
  
  


















  B) EPISODIC MEMORY: 
1. What did you eat for dinner yesterday? 
  
  
2. What did you do yesterday? 
  
  
3. Who did you meet this morning? 
  
  
4. How did you spend last Christmas? 
  
  




6. Do you remember the last time you 
went to see a doctor? 
  
  
7. Do you remember the last time you 
went to the cinema? 
  
  
8. Do you remember the last time you 
went to the restaurant? 
  
  
9. Do you remember the day of your 
admission to this hospital? 
  
  
10. What were you doing the day Princess 
Diana was killed? (31.8.97) 
  
  








13. Do you remember your wedding? (or a 
wedding you attended) 
  
  




15. Do you remember when you were 
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C) ORIENTATION IN TIME AND PLACE: 
1. What year are we? 
  
  
2. What season are we? 
  
  
3. What month are we? 
  
  
4. What is the date? 
  
  
5. What day of the week are we? 
  
  
6. What time is it? 
  
  
7. What city are we in? 
  
  
8. Where are we now? 
  
  
9. In which country are we now? 
  
  




D) GENERAL SEMANTIC MEMORY: 
1. When did World War I start? 
  
  
2. When did World War II start? 
  
  
3. What happened to President Kennedy?   
4. Who is Montgomery? 
  
  
5. Who is Dennis Compton? (cricketer) 
  
  
6. Who is George Best (footballer)? 
  
  





8. Who is Marilyn Monroe? 
  
  
9. Who is the Prime Minister? 
  
  
10. What happened in Kuwait in 1989? 
  
  
11. What happened to Robert Maxwell? 
  
  
12. What happened to the Pope recently? 
  
  













E) I DON’T KNOW – SEMANTIC: 
  
1. Who won the football 
championship/league in 1982? 
  
2. Who won the Nobel Prize for 
literature in 1980? 
  
3. Who won gold medal in the 
men’s Epée competition for 
the last two Olympics? 
  
4. Who was Foreign Secretary in 
1965? 
  
5. Who is president of Mexico?   
6. How many Renault cars were 
sold in 1985? 
  
7. Which team is world champion 
in fencing? 
  
8. Which state abolished the   
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monarchy in 1973? 
9. In what form of employment 
was Marilyn Monroe’s father? 
  




F) I DON’T KNOW – EPISODIC: 
1.  What did you do 13th 
March 1985? 
  
2. What colour was the tie of 
the doctor who examined 
you last time? 
  
3. What did you do Christmas 
day 1957? 
  
4. What did you do on your 
25th birthday? 
  
5. What were you doing last 
month? 
  
6. What were you doing last 
year? 
  
7. On your last visit to the 
bank, what was the clerk 
wearing? 
  
8. What did your school 
teacher say the first time 
you saw her? 
  
9. When you last took the bus, 
how was the person next to 
you dressed? 
  
10. On Tuesday of last week, 







Appendix 2.4: Negative, positive and neutral studied word lists, critical 
distracters and unrelated intrusions from the semantic-associated procedure 
used in study 1, chapter 3.  
 
Negative Studied Lists  Positive Studied Lists  Neutral Studied Lists   
Critical 
Distracter 


































































































































































































































Positive Unrelated Intrusions 
Peace Truth Sing Summer 
Friend Fair Fragrance Handsome 
Right tender pride Strong 
 
Negative Unrelated Intrusions 
Steal Hurt War Harsh 
Death Fright Crime Cold 
Crook Sickness Funeral Burglar 
 
 
Neutral Unrelated Intrusions 
Door Radio Ball Road 
House Apple Time Bulb 










Appendix 2.5: Facial expressions of the six emotional categories (anger, 
disgust, fear, happy, neutral and sad) from the facial expressions semantic-
associates procedure used in study 2, chapters 4. 
 
Anger Emotional category 
Critical 
Distracter 









































Disgust Emotional Category 
Critical 
Distracter 













































Appendix 2.5 (continued) 
Fear Emotional Category 
Critical 
Distracter 









































Happy Emotional Category 
Critical 
Distracter 

















































Appendix 2.5 (continued) 
 
Neutral Emotional Category 
Critical 
Distracter 









































Sad Emotional Category 
Critical 
Distracter 












































Appendix 2.5 (continued) 
 
































































Appendix 2.5 (continued) 
 
 










































Appendix 2.6: Pilot Study data obtained for each of the eight high intensity 
photographs within the six emotional categories (anger, disgust, fear, happy, 
neutral and sad). The photograph that received the highest rating within each 
category was used as the critical distracter. 
 




































































Figure 6.3: Mean Ratings of Each Photographs for Expressing Fear 
 
 































Figure 6.4: Mean Ratings of Each Photographs for Displaying a Happy 
Emotional Expression 
 





























Figure 6.5: Mean Ratings of Each Photographs for Displaying Neutral Facial 
Expression 
 




























Figure 6.6: Mean Ratings of Each Photographs for Displaying Sad Facial 
Expression 
 























Appendix 2.7: Positive Affective Negative Affect Scale (PANAS) questionnaire 




This scale consists of a number of words and phrases that describe 
different feelings and emotions. Read each item and then mark the 
appropriate answer in the space next to that word. Indicate to what 
extent you feel this way right now, that is, at the present moment.  
 
 
                 1  2 3 4  5 





_______ Cheerful                            _______ Disgusted                         ________Pleased 
 
_______Irritable                              _______ Bubbly                               ________ Glad 
 
_______ Sad                                     _______ Afraid                              ________ Distressed   
 
_______Shaky                                  _______ Happy                                ________ Amused 
 
_______Upset                                  _______ Angry 
 
_______ Fantastic                            _______ Guilty  
 
_______Joyful                                   _______ Elated  
 
_______Hostile                                 _______ Lively 
 
_______Ashamed                             _______ Scared 
 
_______Enthusiastic                        _______ Delighted 
 








Appendix 2.8: Pilot Study data used to examine whether the positive and 
negative video clips used for study 3 induce the target mood states.  
 
Table 6.7 shows mean mood ratings on the positive and negative scales in the 
PANAS questionnaire after the administration of the positive video clip.  






















Table 6.8 shows mean mood ratings on the positive and negative scales in the 
PANAS questionnaire after the administration of the negative video clip. 






























Appendix 2.9: Negative, positive and neutral studied lists, critical distracters and 
unrelated intrusions from for the semantic-associated procedure used in study 
3, chapter 5.  
 
Negative Lists  Positive Lists  Neutral Lists   
Critical 
Distracter 
















































































































































































































































































Condition 1: Positive Unrelated Intrusions 
Flower Tender Song Cure 




Condition 2: Positive Unrelated Intrusions 
Strong Roses Cute Handsome 




Condition 1: Negative Unrelated Intrusions 
Death Hurt War Harsh 




Condition 2: Negative Unrelated Intrusions 
Grief Pain Poison Stink 






Condition 1: Neutral Unrelated Intrusions 
Walk Collar Ball Road 




Condition 2: Neutral Unrelated Intrusions 
Sky Pendant Button Bowl 






















Appendix 3.0: Confabulating and non-confabulating patients’ clinical MRI 





Age Pathology Report by 
Neuroradiologist 
Additional 







68 1) Traumatic Brain 
Injury. 
 
2) Heavy Alcohol 
misuse. 
 
There is a large 




misuse. 2012 MRI 
shows greater 
degree of cortical 
atrophy. There was 







40 Korsakoff Syndrome There are numerous 
scattered 
periventricular / 
deep white matter 
T2 hyper-intense 
foci in both cerebral 
hemispheres. There 
was also patchy 
signal change in 
keeping with minor 
small vessel 
ischemic change.  
Professor Kopelman 
added that there 
was a minor degree 
of medial temporal 
lobe atrophy in this 
patients MRI scan. 
V5979K 67 Korsakoff Syndrome Atrophy associated 
with signal alteration 
Professor Kopelman 
added that the 
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in the right thalamus 





There was also 
sulcal widening and 
sylvian fissures 
were also enlarged. 
E8858D 
 
55 Korsakoff Syndrome Atrophy in frontal 
and the cerebellum 
regions consistent 




67 Korsakoff Syndrome Prominence of the 
ventricles and sulci.  
High signal on 
T2/FLAIR within the 
subcortical white 
matter of both 
cerebral 
hemispheres.   
Professor Kopelman 
added that there 
was bilateral 
hippocampal 
atrophy. There was 
also a minor degree 
of small vessel 
change.  
D8818B 61 1) Cerebrovascular 
Disease. 
 
2) History of Alcohol 
Misuse. 
Minor degree of 
cerebellar atrophy. 
He has small vessel 
disease and a 
thalamic infarct 
suggestive of 
continued misuse of 
alcohol.    
Nil  
P4433P 62 1) Cerebrovascular 
Disease. 
 
2) TIA  
There was small 
areas of damage 




degree of frontal 
lobe atrophy.  
Professor Kopelman 
added that there 
was small vessel 
disease in the 
frontal region. 
P8722N 53 HIV with Frontal 
Lobe Syndrome 
Cerebral atrophy, 
frontal small vessel 








S8848O 56 Temporal Lobe 
Epilepsy 
MRI shows bilateral 
scierosis related to 
seizures.  
Professor Kopelman 
added that there 
was a mild degree if 
cortical atrophy with 
sylvian fissure 
widening, bilaterally. 
X975OL 45 Systemic Lupus 
Erythematosus 
MRI shows minimal 
prominence of 




added that the 
atrophy particularly 

























Age Pathology Report by  
Neuroradiologist 
Additional 










There is a mild 
prominence of the 
ventricles. There 
was a focal area of 
T2 hyper-intensity 
within the central 
pons.   
Minor atrophy in the 
posterior cortical 










There was a large 
volume area of 
encephalomalacia 
in the left temporal 
lobe with some 
dilatation of the left 
occipital horn. 






distribution is more 
in keeping with 
previous trauma. 














2)  Harmful 
use of 
Alcohol. 
ventricles. There is 
minor patchy T2 
high signal change 
within the corona 
radiata bilaterally. 
A solitary punctate 
focus of increased 
susceptibility within 
the white matter of 











There is a T2 








in both cerebral 
hemispheres are 
likely to be on a 
mall vessel 
ischaemic basis.  
Nil  
Y3834B 38 1) HIV 
2) Hepatitis C 




There is mild 
prominence of 
cortical sulci.  
Professor 
Kopelman added 
that there was 
atrophy in the right 
hippocampal 
region. 
N8282B 68 Korsakoff 
Syndrome 
There are a couple 
of non-specific foci 
in the left external 
capsule and right 
























that there is 
preiventricular white 
matter small vessel 
disease, particularly 
involving the basal 
ganglia and internal 
capsules bilaterally. 
The left parieto 
occipital region was 
also involved. 
There was also a 





















Appendix 3.1: The location of brain atrophy in the confabulating group and the 





























































































































   













Appendix 3.1 (continued): The location of brain atrophy in the non-confabulating 




























in the posterior 




































































atrophy in the 
right 
hippocampal 
region. 
 
Participant ID: 
Y3834B. 
frontal lobes, 
i.e. mild 
involvement of 
the frontal 
lobes. 
 
Participant ID: 
Z5866T, 
C1288E, 
M5353Y, 
O8389K. 
